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ARTHAPÄTTI : A CRITICAL AND
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OF PÜRVA MIMÄMSA, ADVAITA
VEDÄNTA AND
NYÄYA - VAISÄSIKA SYSTEMS


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
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TO
MY P

It gives me genuine pleasure to introduce to the academic world the present work by Dr. G. Prathapa Simha of the Department of Philosophy, Sri Venkateswara University.

Indian Philosophy and logic and epistemology has been developed through the conflict among the different schools of Philosophy. This conflict might be between Vaidika and Advaidika schools like Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism or between the Vaidika schools themselves like Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva – Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The conflict between the Vaidika schools is most evident in respect of the nature and number of *Pramānas* they have accepted. Although the conflict has been traced in the early works of these systems it gets its impetus at the advent of Uddyotakara and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika, Kumārila and Prabhākara, the two greatest exponents of Pūrva – Mīmāṃsā and Dharmapala and Madhusudhana Saraswathi of Advaita Vedānta.

In this book Dr. G. Prathapa Simha has concentrated his attention on *Arthāpatti* and has made critical assessment of the presentation of this *Pramāṇa* by Pūrva – Mīmāṃsā and Advaita on the one hand and Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika on the other. He was led to this task on three grounds. First, even the schools who accepted *Arthāpatti* as a *Pramāṇa* have different views of knowledge do not mean the same when they attempt at the definition of this *Pramāṇa*. Secondly, the Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika's refutation of *Arthāpatti* as an independent source of valid knowledge in as much as in its view it is nothing but a case of *kevala anumāna* or purely inferential form of inference. Thirdly, the three distinct means of defending the independent

character of 'Prāmāṇya' by the two schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta consistent with their respective formulations of the nature of the *Pramāṇa* under consideration.

I have no hesitation to say that Dr. G. P. Srinivas Simha has devoted his time and energy to this study, while working for his Ph.D. at Sri Venkateswara University and has succeeded in making some advancement in the field of Indian Epistemology. His study of the subject is highly appreciable. I feel happy in commending his present work as a good contribution to Indian Philosophy.

S. V. University,
TIRUPATI

M. Srinivasulu
Professor and Chairman,
Board of Studies in Philosophy

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The present book is the result of my research work on *Arthāpatti* – Critical and Comparative Study of Views of Pūrva – Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika systems¹ which was submitted for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Sri Venkateswara University in 1989.

There is much difference of opinion among Indian Epistemologists as to what the ultimate sources of human knowledge are. For the Cārvākīs, who are radical empiricists, *Pratyakṣa* or perception is the only valid source of knowledge and all valid knowledge comes from perception. Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas hold the *Pratyakṣa* or perception and *Anumāna* or inference are the ultimate sources of valid knowledge. According to Śāṅkhya, Yoga and Viśiṣṭādvaita systems, *Śabda* or Verbal testimony also should be recognised as an independent source of knowledge like perception and inference. The Cārvākīs include *Upamāna* and *Arthāpatti* under inference and *Abhava* under perception. Mīmāṃsā are in favour of the view that there are four independent sources of knowledge namely, perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison. According to them, the other sources of knowledge namely *Arthāpatti* or presumption and *Anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension recognised by the systems of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta may be included within these four and so need not be taken as ultimate or independent source of knowledge. The Prabhakara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā adds *Āpti* or presumption to the list of four *pramāṇas* admitted by Nyāya. The Bhaṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita school of *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* recognised the above five *pramāṇas* to the addition of *Anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension. According to the Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, *Arthāpatti* is a separate

source of knowledge because it gives us a knowledge of facts which cannot be otherwise explained. It cannot be explained by inference or intuition. According to the Advaita Vedānta and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, *Arthāpatti* is an independent *pramāṇa* or ultimate source of knowledge. It is a unique cause of such a knowledge of existence or non-existence as is not due to inference or any other sources of knowledge.

It is, therefore, of immense importance for students of Indian philosophy to probe into the question why different systems accept different number of *pramāṇas*. It is worthwhile to inquire whether the acceptance of the number of *pramāṇas* by a system is based on its ontological commitments or not. It is of course possible to compare any two or more systems accepting different number of *pramāṇas* and find out whether accepting more number of *pramāṇas* is committing the fallacy of commission or the system accepting a lesser number of *pramāṇas* is committing the fallacy of omission. In the present work, I have chosen "*Arthāpatti*" or postulation for my investigation. *Arthāpatti* has been accepted as a *pramāṇa* by the two schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta. On the other hand, the Buddhists the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga refuse to accept *Arthāpatti* as a distinct way of knowing simply because they hold that it is reducible to inference. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of Nyāya System champions this ground in the same way in which Kumārila Bhaṭṭa leads the opposite camp. Jayanta follows the conventional Nyaya line in rejecting *Arthāpatti* as a *pramāṇa*. Though his predecessors have also dealt with the problem, Jayanta's detailed comprehensive and systematic treatment of *Arthāpatti* in his *Nyayamanjari* seems to have surpassed all previous accounts. Jayanta has convincingly proved the superiority of the Nyaya position against that of the

Mīmāṃsā. It is perhaps for the first time that a 'large' conflict between the Nyāya Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta has been brought to the surface and resolved with logical and erudite argumentation. Dharmarājadharaśāstrī, of Advaita who has given a fair account of *Arthāpatti* is posterior to Jayanta and none of the scholars prior to him has thought it worthwhile to give a systematic analysis of the problem. It follows that at the time of Jayanta the main exponents of *Arthāpatti* were the Mīmāṃsākas. Thus, Jayanta *Bhaṭṭa* had to analyse this problem against the views of the Mīmāṃsākas. Jayanta ultimately refuses both the schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā contending that since *Arthāpatti* is reducible to inference, it is not an independent *pramāṇa* or a distinct way of knowing.

The whole problem of *Arthāpatti* in Indian Philosophy, ultimately revolves around mainly the two schools, of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta on the one hand and the Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika on the other, the central issue being whether *Arthāpatti* is an independent *pramāṇa* distinct from inference or it is *Anumāna* which can be reduced to inference thereby losing its identity and distinctness as an independent *pramāṇa*. The present researcher contemplates, to start with the elucidation of the nature of *Arthāpatti* as conceived by the two schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta by whom it has been accepted as a *pramāṇa*. Secondly, the book contemplates to probe into the respective views of these schools to vouch for its distinctness from *Anumāna* or inference. Thirdly, it is proposed to inquire into the validity of the Nyāya attempts with special reference to Jayanta *Bhaṭṭa*, to reduce it to *Anumāna pramāṇa*. This is the three-fold task which the present author has as his main

As the literature of each of the systems is very vast, it has been found as to limit the study to the selected works of each of the systems. As regards the selection of the sources, the texts which are of basic importance and have constructive value are selected for the present study. I have selected as far as possible the *sūtras*, the *bhāṣyas* and the *vārtikas* as well as some celebrated works of each system. The selection of these texts is prompted by the consideration that the *sūtras* represent the seeds of the thought, the *bhāṣyas* and the *vārtikas* indicated their development into a discipline in the form of concrete and possible criticism and the celebrated works offer a picture of a full-fledged system. The celebrated works of different systems consulted here are the manuals which contain the elaboration or compendium of what has been said in original texts of the systems.

It has not been our aim to settle the chronological controversies. The latest accepted views regarding the age of the texts has been generally followed. The works of modern scholars are also consulted for a clearer and critical presentation of the subject matter.

G. PRATHAPA SILVERIA

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G. PRATHAPA

The discussions and controversies regarding the nature and status of *Arthāpatti* cover a wide range of problems. Therefore, a definite arrangement is followed in writing this book. The book is prepared in five chapters.

In the first chapter entitled "*Meaning, Validity, Nature and Source of Valid knowledge*" the theories of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of knowledge (*jñāna*), the criterion of valid knowledge (*pramā*) and the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are discussed in brief. Regarding the essential nature of knowledge, the three main conceptions advocated by the different schools of Indian Philosophy are explained. The Nyāya view, that the knowledge is an attribute (*Guna*) of the self, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view of knowledge as a substantive modification of *buddhi* and the Bauddha and the Mīmāṃsaka view that knowledge is an activity (*Karman*), a transitive process have been discussed.

It is generally admitted by the schools of Indian Philosophy that *pramā* is true or valid knowledge. There is, however, a difference of opinion between the schools regarding the test of validity used. Hence the several definitions of *pramā* as offered by the different systems are clearly explained. The views of the Nyāya, the Vaiśiṣṭika, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Bauddha, the Sāṃkhya and the Jaina views of *pramāṇa* are critically explained.

The third part of discussion is devoted to the theories of *pramāṇa*, or the means of valid knowledge. All the systems of Indian Philosophy agree in respect of the literal meaning as well as the function or the purpose of *pramāṇa* that it is conducive to the attainment of true knowledge. There is, however, divergence

of opinion about the exact nature of *Kāraṇa* of valid knowledge. A *Kāraṇa* is generally conceived as a special cause in producing a particular effect. The criterion of *Kāraṇa*, however, is variously interpreted by different systems. The views of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣikās, the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Mīmāṃsa, the Sāṃkhya–Yoga and the Advaita Vedānta are presented.

The second chapter, "*The Nature and Function of Arthāpatti*", is devoted to a critical discussion of the traditional issue of the nature and scope of our knowledge claims by means of *Arthāpatti* or postulation. The three views on the nature of *Arthāpatti* are considered as they stand. These are: 1) Bhaṭṭa's view that *Arthāpatti* is a means of resolving a conflict; 2) Prabhākara's view that *Arthāpatti* involves an element of doubt; and 3) Advaita Vedānta interpretation that *Arthāpatti* is an explanation of an otherwise inexplicable fact. Kumārila and Prabhākara or Pūrva Mīmāṃsa, though both depend on Sabara Bhāṣya regarding *Arthāpatti*, interpreted the *pramāṇa* in their own distinct ways. *Arthāpatti* is a valid and independent source of knowledge for both the schools. But Prabhākara's view of *Arthāpatti* is just the reverse of Kumārila's. Sincere attempt has been made to understand these contrasting views of *Arthāpatti* and to highlight the salient features of Kumārila's and Prabhākara's interpretations of Sabara Bhāṣya in respect of *Arthāpatti*. The stand point of Advaita Vedānta which advocates *Arthāpatti* as an independent source of cognition, may be said to differ from Prabhākara and be in agreement with Kumārila in not recognizing 'doubt' as an element in this source of cognition. Even so, it understands presumption in a way different from that in which the Mīmāṃsa understands it, although it may be that their separate understandings ultimately amount to one and the same thing. The Advaita Vedāntist view

of presumption differs from that of the Mīmāṃsā in making no mention of such a thing as the conflict between two known facts and consequently, being unconcerned with the idea of the resolution of the conflict of this description. In the view of the Advaita Vedānta, there is only one fact which is said to be well known namely, that something presents itself to be inexplicable or stands unexplained and so is in need of explanation. This points to the function, the performance of which is the very essence *Arthāpatti*.

The third chapter is "Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika on *Arthāpatti* " It is well known that the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika system which accepts only four *pramāṇas* does not regard *Arthāpatti* as an independent *pramāṇa*, although it does not cast any aspersions on the bonafides of *Arthāpatti* as a valid source of cognition. All said and done, the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika stand point is that *Arthāpatti* is a case of *Anumāna* or inference. The whole burden of this chapter is the presentation of the different shades of this Nyāya stand point expressed in the course of the history of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika logic. The views of Gautama and Vātsyāyana that *Arthāpatti* is the same as *anvaya-vyāpti*; Uddyotakara's view that *Arthāpatti* is a case of *Sāmānyatodraṣṭa* inference; Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's view that *Arthāpatti* in any of its forms, is identical with inference and finally the view of the latter Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika logicians that *Arthāpatti* is indistinguishable from *Anumāna* based on *Kevala Vyatirekivyāpti* or purely negative concomitance, have all been explained in considerable depth and details.

The fourth chapter is captioned "In Defence of *Arthāpatti* as an Independent *Pramāṇa*". In the face of the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika onslaughts on the independent status of *Arthāpatti*, it behoves on the propents of *Arthāpatti* to extricate the *pramāṇa* under consideration from these onslaughts and attain

for it an independent and irreducible character beyond all shadow of doubt and suspicion. In short the entire burden of the Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta systems is to prove that *Arthāpatti* is different from and other than *Anumāna*. The present chapter is an effort in this regard. The contributions of Kumārila, Prabhākara and Advaita Vedānta have been dealt with in separate sections.

In the fifth and the last chapter "*A Critical Estimate*", the views of the writer in favour of the Mīmāṃsā–Advaita Vedānta conception of *Arthāpatti* as an independent *pramāṇa* have been attempted.

At the end a comprehensive bibliography is appended.

Chapter I

KNOWLEDGE, VALID KNOWLEDGE AND SOURCE OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Man finds himself in the possession of certain convictions which, roughly speaking, he calls knowledge. Further, he finds that all his convictions are not of the same value, and that he has to distinguish them as true or false. The awareness of this distinction naturally leads him to inquire into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Such a study, which, in the words of Dr. Ward, is a systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science, is Epistemology. It will appear that while the acquirement of knowledge is common to all men, a systematic reflection about it has been the concern of a few. Even among philosophers, not all of them have been alive to the problem of knowledge as a distinct branch of study. Whereas in the history of European Philosophy, the beginnings of a systematic study of theory of knowledge may be traced to Locke's enunciation of the enquiry in his 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding',¹ and a definite formation of it to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason',² in Indian Philosophy, the first systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (the *Pramāṇas*) is to be found in Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtras*, which also deals with the objects of knowledge (*Prameya*). The Nyāya Philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of objects. Nyāya as a science lays down the rules and methods which are essentially necessary for a clear and precise understanding of all the materials of our

knowledge as these are derived from observation and authority. With this end in view, the science of Nyāya deals with all the processes and methods that are involved, either directly or indirectly, in the right and consistent knowledge of reality. That this is so appears clearly from the common use of the word *ānvīkṣikī* as a synonym for the *Nyāyaśāstra*. The name *Ānvīkṣikī* means the science of the processes and methods of a reasoned and systematic knowledge of objects, supervening on a vague understanding of them on the basis of mere perception and uncritical testimony. In other words, it is the science of an analytic and reflective knowledge of objects in continuation of and as an advance on the unreflective general knowledge in which we are more receptive than critical. It is the mediated knowledge of the contents of faith, feeling and intuition. Accordingly, Nyāya (literal meaning; methodical study) may be described as the science of the methods and conditions of valid thought and true knowledge of objects.

It should, however, be remarked here that the epistemological problem as to the methods and conditions of valid knowledge is neither the sole nor the ultimate concern of the Nyāya Philosophy. Epistemology in the arena of Indian Philosophy is developed as an aid to metaphysics. It provides the method for the proper understanding of the metaphysical investigations regarding the nature of the ultimate reality and the relation between the ultimate reality and the empirical self as well as the objective world. Though, every system of Indian Philosophy devotes a considerable part of discussion to the epistemological and logical problems, yet their chief aim was to provide methodological explanation for metaphysical investigations. Gautama, the first systematic exponent of Epistemology in Indian Philosophy, discusses the question whether it is possible to conceive the means of knowledge

independently of knowledge and the objects of knowledge.³ He maintains that while the existence of the means of knowledge is proved by the fact that there is knowledge of objects, just as the existence of a (distant) drum is proved by the fact that there is sound produced out of it,⁴ their validity is proved by the means of knowledge themselves. In this respect, he compares the means of knowledge to a lamp which illumines other things as well as itself.⁵

An examination of knowledge, which Epistemology undertakes, provides, however, a method of Metaphysical inquiry and criticism. The sages who expound different systems of Philosophy realised the nature of ultimate reality, through Yogic practices. They tried to convey their supernatural and mystic experiences through words of various *āgamās* precisely and methodologically. Epistemology was sought as a method for correct understanding of the metaphysical experiences handed down to us; and we find that, in the history of Philosophy, whether consciously or unconsciously, it has been used as such. This is most true of our own times, when all metaphysical problems are attacked through an analysis of knowledge; and again, all Philosophical criticism is usually based upon Epistemological ground. The same conception is implied in the term '*pramāṇa*' in Indian Philosophy which signifies both means of knowledge and means of proof. The beginnings of the analysis of knowledge and means of proof for the beliefs which they had come to hold, for their own satisfaction, but still more, for producing conviction in others. This is evident from the fact that systematic logic in India took its rise from such rules and forms of debating as are found in some of the works of the early period. Hence, to regard Epistemology as a mere formal analysis of knowledge is not only futile but also untrue to facts.

Considered from this point of view, Epistemology can be exactly distinguished from Logic only in so far as the latter is treated in its purely formal aspect; otherwise, it is substantially the same. Unlike in Western Philosophy, Logic could not develop as a branch of study independent of metaphysical colouring in the arena of Indian Philosophy. The study of Epistemological and logical problems of Indian Philosophy under the heading 'Nyāya' which aims at discussing the process of knowing and argumentation cannot be called 'logic' in the strict sense of the term. Logic in the west is understood as formal form of argumentation but Indian Philosophy does not demarcate formal form informal argumentation and consequently does not differentiate logic from means of knowledge. Moreover, the scope of Nyāya is wider than that of logic. While the former deals with all the means of knowledge with a metaphysical colouring, the latter is primarily concerned with inferential problems. Thus, 'Nyāya' is the study of the means of knowing and the means of testing this knowledge and does not restrict its scope only to formal logic.

In order to discuss the validity of the various means of knowledge, Epistemology has to depend upon an analysis of the mental processes leading to them, and hence, it is intimately connected with Psychology. It was because of this close connection between the two studies that in the earlier works of Indian Philosophy an enquiry into the nature of the *Pramāṇas* is of a mixed nature; that is to say, the distinction between the Psychological and Epistemological aspects of the inquiry is not quite clear.

Before we undertake the problems of *Arthāpatti* or presumption for a detailed and systematic consideration, it is very

necessary to survey in brief, the conceptions of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of knowledge (*Jñāna*), the criterion of valid knowledge (*Pramā*) and the means of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). The problem of knowledge (*Jñāna*) has long engaged the attention of thinkers all over the world. What is the nature of knowledge? What are the means of acquiring it? What is the criterion of the truth of knowledge? Briefly, these are some of the issues which comprise the subject matter of the epistemological inquiries that lead to the formulation of a theory of knowledge. Even a general survey of the views of different scholars in Western Philosophy regarding these issues shows that there are two groups of epistemologists, viz., the sceptic and the dogmatic. According to the former the problem of knowledge does not have any solution but the dogmatists believe that it is capable of being solved. In Indian Philosophy, though different systems have adopted divergent attitude towards these issues, yet even the materialist Cārvakas attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and thus obviously one of the views is that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. Therefore, it is clear that scepticism in this regard has not clouded any school of Indian Philosophy.

A. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE (*Jñāna*)

As regards the nature of cognition there is a sharp difference of opinion among different systems of Indian Philosophy. Some systems hold that cognition is self-luminous (*Svaparakāśa*), while the others assume that it can be revealed only by some other means of cognition.

Self-luminosity of cognition means that a piece of cognition is cognised by itself. It does not require any other cognition for its own illumination.⁶ It illumines itself and its object

simultaneously. When a man has the cognition of something blue (*nīla*) he has at the same time the awareness of the cognition of something blue (*nīla-dhī*). This awareness is caused by cognition itself. But the term non-self - luminosity (*paraprakāśatva*) means that a piece of cognition is cognied by some other means of cognition i.e. by perception or by inference.⁷

The self-luminosity of cognition is accepted by the Buddhists, the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsikas, the Advaita Vedāntins and the Jainas.⁸ Cognition (*buddhi or mahat*) being unconscious, is realised by *puruṣa*, according to the Sāṃkhyas. It is perceptible through *anuvyavasāya* (apperception), as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But it is merely inferrable through *jñatātā* (cognisedness) as accepted by Kamalasāila. It is to be noted in this connection that each school of Indian Philosophy has recognised the ideas regarding nature of cognition in accordance with its views on either realism or idealism.

The Sāṃkhyas maintain that the cognition, being evolved from *prakṛti*, is of material nature. As such cognition is unconscious by itself⁹ and is illumined by *puruṣa*, which alone is self-conscious.¹⁰

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas put forward the theory of *anuvyavasāya* (apperception). When the external sense-organ comes into contact with an object, there arises the apprehension (*Vyavasāya*) of the object. This apprehension is not self-luminous. Its awareness arises by the apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) through the medium of internal sense-organ or the mind (*mānas*) which takes the first apprehension as its object.¹¹ Thus according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, cognition is not self-luminous, but is apprehensible only through another piece of cognition, which is called *anuvya-vasāya* (apperception).

Kumārila expounds a different view. He, showing him-self a greater realist than the Nyāya – Vaiśeṣikas, goes a step further, in order to show the pre-dominance of external objects, asserts that cognition cannot be cognised perceptually, but is merely inferred through its effect. He contends that "It cannot apprehend itself while it is busy in apprehending an object. Though it is of illuminating nature, yet it depends upon 'something else' for its own manifestation. Just as the visual organ can manifest colour, but cannot manifest itself, so a cognition can manifest an object, but not itself. Its power of illumination is exhausted in manifesting an external object".¹² Then the question arises, what is that 'something else' (*anyat*) which illumines the cognition? That thing is 'manifestedness' or 'cognisedness' (*prakaṭata* or *jñātata*), which, after the manifestation of the object, is produced in that object as its new property. The process is like this: "When an object comes in contact with the sense, the knowledge of that object is produced in the soul. That knowledge being formless and not self-luminous, cannot be directly perceived, but be produced a new quality called 'manifestedness' in the object. It is from this quality that the knowledge is inferred".¹³ In this connection, we may refer to one sarcastic remark of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa against the *jñātata* theory of Kumārila. He says "fearing whom, also have these Vedic-scholars (*Srotriyah*) developed such a defeatist mentality."¹⁴

Against this strong realistic attitude of Kumārila, Prabhākara, under the influence of Buddhism, takes a bold step and expounds his famous theory of *triputi-samivit*, according to which *samivit* (consciousness) being of self-luminous character, cognises the three factors simultaneously - (i) it cognises the object. (ii) it cognises itself and (iii) it also cognises the

knower (the soul) and hence his theory is called *triputi-samiviti* or *tripartite* perception.¹⁵

The Buddhists are unanimous on this point, whether they are the Vaibhasikas, the Sautrantikas or the Idealists, that cognition is self-luminous (*Svapṛākāśā*). Even in one early work like the *Milinda-pāñh o*, explaining *prajñā* to the king Nagasena says, "Self-luminosity is also a character of *prajñā*".¹⁶ The Buddhists are so certain about the self-luminosity of cognition that they assert: "If cognition does not cognise itself, the cognition of the object is not possible".¹⁷ In the *Sloka-Vāṛthika*, Kumārila explained the same view of the Buddhists thus : "And so long as the illumination in the form of cognition (*Jñānā Khya prakāśa*) is not comprehended, even the object will not be apprehended, because its apprehension depends upon the cognition, just as the illumination of a jar depends upon the illumination of the lamp".¹⁸ Explaining the same, he further asserts "Even if the objects have been produced, their apprehension, some times, does not occur either due to the absence of luminosity (as in case of peak darkness) or due to the presence of some impediment (like the obstruction of a wall); while in the case of cognition, there is no impediment (in its illumination) at the time of its origination, nor is it as a non-luminous nature, on account of which it may not be apprehended (i.e. it is self-luminous and hence it is always apprehensible)".¹⁹ It is further added, "cognition is always produced before the apprehension of the object and its consciousness (*Sāṃivedanam*) must also occur at the same time (i.e. at the time of its origination), because if it is not cognised at the same time, it cannot be cognised afterwards."²⁰

It is thus evident, from the above account that according to the Buddhists cognition is of self-luminous nature. It originates

before the apprehension of the object and is cognised at the same time.

The Buddhists are totally against the theory of "non-self-luminosity" (*par-prakāśatva*) of cognition, maintained by the realists, specially by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhatta Mīmāṃsakas. The Buddhists, as presented by Kumārila refute to opponents' theories of *anuvyavasāya* (apperception) and *jñātātā* (cognisedness). Thus : "Cognition does not require the origination of another cognition, contrary to this if it is held that the cognition of previous cognition depends upon the latter one, then there would occur *regressus ad infinitum*".²¹ At another place Kumārila explains the Buddhists view further. He says that when one cognition is cognised by another cognition, then there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. But having found that recollection (*Smṛti*) occurs about two things - i.e. about the object as well as its cognition, it is assumed that all is apprehended (at one and the same time). Thus in case of apprehending all by one cognition only (it can be concluded that) every thing is possible by that alone (and no other cognition is required)".²²

What the Buddhist really means to say is: When a person, after apprehending an object, say jar, recollects it afterwards, there arises in his mind the recollection of the jar as well as the cognition of the jar. These two-formed recollection of a cognition (*dvi-rūpa-smṛtiḥ*) shows that at the time of the apprehension of the jar, the person had cognised its cognition too, which proves the self-luminous nature of cognition.²³ This idea, mentioned in the *Slokarāthika*, fully corroborates with a verse of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dinnāga.²⁴ Later on the same idea of two-formed recollection (*dvi-rūpa smṛtiḥ*) is conveyed by Dharmakīrti.²⁵ Śāntarakṣita²⁶ and Kamalaśīla²⁷ in their respective treatises.²⁸

B. PRAMĀ OR VALID KNOWLEDGE

In the course of Philosophical investigations, we find ourselves in the possession of certain convictions regarding reality and methods of acquiring it. The awareness of the distinction between true and false knowledge naturally leads us to verify the validity of this conviction through various methods which may legitimately be termed as *pramāṇas*. Vātsyāyana, the author of *Nyāya Bhāṣya* defines Nyāya as examination of an object through the *pramāṇas*.²⁹ The basic aim of the *pramāṇas* is to test the Validity of various convictions. But, the convictions which stand the test of validity are the *pramā* which denotes true or valid knowledge. Thus, *pramā* in Indian Philosophy, has two-fold purposes of testing the validity of conviction and to give rise to new convictions of validity.

Different systems of Indian Philosophy have expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of *pramā*. Prof. D.M. Datta seems perfectly right in his observation that "*pramā* is generally defined as a cognition having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (*abādhitatva* or *yathārthattva* and *anadhigatatva*), and that as regards the first characteristic - truth - all schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous".³⁰ But on the second characteristic there is difference of opinion. It is, however, seen that even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ among themselves regarding the meaning of truth.

Now let us see what valid knowledge means and what are the methods of arriving at it. As we have seen before, Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimīśra and Jayanta refer to knowledge through the terms '*buddhi*', '*upalabdhi*' or '*jñāna*', irrespective of the validity or non-validity of a particular type of cognition. The later Naiyāyikas, however, use the term

'*pramā*', for valid knowledge and '*apramā*' for non-valid cognition. The terms '*pramāṇa*', '*pramiti*', '*prameya*', and '*pramānya*', were however, as current in the old Nyāya as in the later. So we may conclude that old Nyāyikas used *pramā* in the sense of valid knowledge. The later Mimāṃsa writers adopt these terms. But Kumārila and his Commentators are not known to have used them. They have used the terms '*pramāṇa*' and '*pramānya*' and '*apramānya*' to express the opposite notions. The latter two terms have been invariably taken in the same sense while the former two have been used rather indiscriminately. The term '*pramāṇa*' sometimes stands for a means of right knowledge whose result is termed '*pramiti*' or '*miti*' and '*pramānya*' that means the capacity of a means to generate a correct knowledge.

The Nyāya definition of *pramā* or valid knowledge is that it is a presentational cognition (*anubhava*), in which there is a characterisation, in thought, of the object as it is in reality (*Yathārtha*), as well as a definite assurance of its being objectively valid (*assamidiḡdha*). *Pramā* or valid knowledge also has been defined by the Nyāya as true presentational cognition (*Yathārthathanubhava*). If we analyse this conception of *pramā*, we shall get three essential factors involved in all valid knowledge. Knowledge as a function implies a subject-object relation. In all knowledge, be it true or false or neither, we see that a subject or knower stands related to an object, in so far as the former has a cognition of the latter. When, however, we do not have any knowledge or cognition in view but only true or valid knowledge (*pramā*), there must be another factor, namely, a method of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Hence, we see that the conception of *pramā* or valid knowledge implies three necessary factors, namely, the subject (*pramātā*) the object (*prameya*) and the method of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).³¹

The Vaiśeṣikas consider certainty (lack of doubt), non-contradictoriness and definiteness as the marks of valid knowledge. Praśastapāda divides knowledge into *Vidyā* and *Avidyā*³² which correspond to the *pramā* (Valid knowledge) and *Apramā* (Non-valid knowledge) respectively. Sridhara defines *Vidyā* as firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition.³³ Thus, the definition introduces definiteness (*adhyavasaya*), as a mark of valid knowledge. In this respect, he appears to be influenced by the Nyāya view. But if his view is accepted as a correct interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda, it is practically identical with the *Bhaṭṭa* view of valid knowledge as a definite, true and new cognition.

According to the Buddhists, the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. They define *Pramā* as the knowledge which reveals an object that is capable of successful volition,³⁴ or as the knowledge which makes us reach the object revealed by it.³⁵ Kamalasila, however, further clarifies that the valid knowledge refers to a possible successful action, though not to the actual achievement of the object.³⁶ In all these cases, it is common that the validity of knowledge depends upon the success in the practical activity. The Buddhists conception of truth is pragmatic, while the *Bhaṭṭa* conception is realistic. According to the Buddhists, a knowledge is true if it harmonises with volitional experience; truth does not consist in its harmony with the real nature of objects, because reality is dynamic, while knowledge represents it as static. Correspondence is a meaningless term for the Buddhists because objects of knowledge are changing from moment to moment, so that correspondence can never be established.

The Buddhist definition is too wide because it applies to such cases of memory also that it possesses practical efficiency. It is too narrow because it does not apply to inferential cognition

of past and future objects, which lacks practical efficiency. If truth is equated with practical efficiency, the knowledge of such objects as one destroyed instantaneously after their birth e.g. lightning, will always be false, because they cannot be attained.³⁷

According to the Jaina logician, definiteness is the essential mark of valid knowledge. Vadidevasuri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which reveals itself and the other objects.³⁸ The characteristic of definiteness here, however, does not differ essentially from the view of the Naiyāyikas because definiteness is further stated by Jaina logician themselves to be the determination of an object in the form in which it really exists.³⁹ Siddhasena considers non-contradictoriness in place of definiteness as a mark of *pramā*.⁴⁰ The definition of *pramāṇa* offered by Akalanka⁴¹ reveals that he considers non-contradictoriness and novelty as the mark of valid knowledge. Ratnaprabhācārya explains 'determinate cognition' as that which determines an object in the form in which it really exists. Accordingly, absence of doubt and truth are recognised as the essential mark of valid knowledge, while newness is rejected and hence, memory is accepted as a form of valid knowledge.

According to Kumāṛila "Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects, which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions."⁴² Unbeka says that the word *druda* excludes doubt from valid knowledge and '*Na Viśamvādamṛcchati*' (which is not contradicted by other cognitions), which he reads in the place of '*Napi Samvādamṛcchati*' excludes error or illusion. Sucaritamīśra comments that valid knowledge is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge in the form 'this is not so' and that it contains some new information (*Vijñāna*) about its subject. Valid knowledge, therefore, is a certain, true and informative cognition of something.

Parthasarathi extracts from *Sūtra* 1.1.5. of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa* the definition of valid knowledge as an apprehension of previously unapprehended object, which is devoid of defects in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience.⁴³ Later on he defines valid knowledge as "a true cognition which relates to something previously uncognised."⁴⁴ This definition is practically the same as the former except that in the former one the source from which discrepancy may creep in knowledge, viz. the defects of the sense-organs etc., is mentioned and the possibility of the falsification of a valid knowledge in future is precluded. Parthasarathi⁴⁵ mentions three distinctive features of valid knowledge, viz., (1) its objects are not remembered as having been previously known, (2) it conforms to the real nature or its object, and (3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge and if any one of these is absent in a knowledge, it ceases to be valid.

A knowledge which does not add something to our present stock of information, cannot be valid. Validity consists in discovering new objects or new features of known objects for thought. Valid knowledge is an advance on what we already know. The *Bhāṭṭa* considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what we already know. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us. The objects in our environment are always changing and the social conditions never continue in the same form. We have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances, and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspects of things. The practical side of knowledge cannot be neglected when we consider its epistemological worth. Thus, according to the

Bhaṭṭa a valid knowledge is essentially useful and hence it must reveal something new.

Here a theoretical difficulty arises : Should a continuous perception of something be treated as valid or not? We have such perceptions very frequently, and what the perception reveals in the subsequent moments does not appear to be different from what is revealed in the first moment. For instance, I have a flower on my table and look at it continuously for some seconds; but I do not find it different in latter seconds from what I find it in the first second. The cognitions other than that of the first second do not reveal anything new.. Should they then be invalid? The *Bhaṭṭa* answer is that newness marks everyone of these cognitions, because, though the object of all such cognitions is identically the same, yet it is cognised as existing in different moments of time in each. The existence of the flower in a subsequent moment cannot be apprehended by its cognition in the preceding moment. If time-moments are symbolised by t_1, t_2, t_3 etc. and the perceived object by O , then the object of the first moment cognition is O_{t_1} , that of the second moment cognition is O_{t_2} and so on. Thus, each of the cognitions reveals a new thing, all are valid.

It may be objected that though there is a difference among the successive moments of time, yet it cannot be cognised because it is too subtle. The answer is that such statements as 'I have been seeing this thing since morning till now'; "I saw the thing first in the preceding moment, and the like become unintelligible if the difference of time is not perceived. In these we have a direct consciousness of time. Time is not imperceptible as the *Vaiśeṣikas* hold. It is true that time has no shape, but perceptibility has nothing to do with shape. That of which we have a direct consciousness is perceptible. Therefore, continuous perception is

not excluded when valid knowledge is defined as the cognition of a previously unknown real objects.⁴⁶

The Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems also define valid knowledge along the Bhaṭṭa line. They recognise novelty as a mark of valid knowledge and try to justify the novelty of successive cognitions in a continuous perception similarly. But unlike the Bhaṭṭa they offer an alternative solution of the difficulty. They assert that the continuous perception of an object, for instance, a jar, is one cognition and not a series of successive cognitions, because the mental mode (*antaḥkrana Vṛitti*) that assumes the shape of the jar is one and lasts till another mode arises. Thus, the cognition is one and has one object throughout its duration. The numerical difference among cognitions should be based on that of their objects and not on the moments of time. If I perceive a jar continuously for five seconds, I do not have five cognitions but one. If I perceive a jar continuously for the first three seconds and then a flower for the next two seconds, I have two different cognitions and not five.

According to Sāṅkhya valid knowledge is the mode of '*buddhi*' which apprehends an object, undoubted, real and not known before.⁴⁷ The definition, like the Bhaṭṭa one recognises novelty, absence of doubt and truth as the essential marks of valid knowledge. Both the Sāṅkhya the Bhaṭṭa are realists. But there is one important difference between the two. According to the Sāṅkhya '*buddhi*' or cognition assumes the form of the object. Thus the truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object in the sense in which a true copy has it to its original. But the Bhaṭṭa is opposed to the copy-theory of knowledge. According to him cognition is formless. Knowledge reveals objects, but it does not assume any form. Knowledge is judgmental. It arises in the form of such judgments as 'this is a jar', 'this is blue'

etc., but not in the form of pictures. When I see a rose, I judge it to be a rose, and my seeing is true because the rose is actually there, not because I have a picture in my mind which faithfully copies the rose.

The Advaita Vedānta definition of validity has more points of disagreement. Dharmarājādhvarindra gives two alternative definitions, viz., "Valid knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not already known and which apprehends an object that is not already known which is not contradicted" and "Valid knowledge is an uncontradicted knowledge".⁴⁸ The first definition excludes memory from valid knowledge, while the second includes it. Thus the Vedāntin is not necessarily opposed to memory and he does not mention certitude as an essential mark of valid knowledge. However, both Vedāntin and the Bhaṭṭa mention '*abādhitatva*' or non-contradiction as a mark of validity. There is a more outstanding difference between the two in that the Vedāntin distinguishes between relative and absolute truth, while for the Bhaṭṭa all truth is absolute and all that is not absolutely true is false. Dharmarājādhvarindra says "the term 'not contradicted' (*abādhita*) means 'not contradicted during the transmigratory state'".⁴⁹ All empirical cognitions according to the Vedāntin, are true only so long as the ultimate truth, the identity of all existence, is not realised. Even the illusory cognition and dream cognition are true so long as they last. But the Bhaṭṭa is definitely opposed to the truth of illusions and dreams and to the falsehood of empirical cognitions.⁵⁰

Salikanātha, a commentator of Prabhākara, criticises the Bhaṭṭa definition of valid knowledge as follows :

In a continuous perception the successive cognitions apprehend the same object; so all the cognitions except the first

cease to be valid. Kumārila says that they are valid as they apprehend different moments of time. But the difference between two successive moments of time cannot be apprehended, because it is too subtle. Thus the Bhaṭṭa definition is too narrow. Again, the word 'dr̥ḍha' in that definition is useless. This word is interested with a view to exclude doubt from valid knowledge; but doubt is already excluded when valid knowledge is said to be an apprehension of the previously unapprehended. Doubt is not one cognition. When some tall object is cognised indefinitely as 'a man or a post', the tallness is perceived which revives the memories of 'man' and 'post' in the mind, and the perceiver doubts whether the tallness belongs to a man or a post. Here the element of perception is valid and the element of recollection is invalid, because it is the apprehension of the apprehended. Therefore, Bhaṭṭa definition is redundant. It is redundant in one more respect. The word 'avisamvādi' (unerring) is absolutely unnecessary, because all knowledge which is not memory, is true. Even illusions are true so far as they are of the nature of experience (anubhūti) while the element of memory in them is false.⁵¹

Prabhākara's definition of valid knowledge is the same as that of later Nyāya except that he does not feel the necessity of including the term 'yathārthatva' in the definition. Śālikanātha gives the following definition of valid knowledge:

"Valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience". In a continuous perception the later cognitions arising from sense object inter course, like the first cognition, are different from memory, and hence they are valid. Recognition too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid in as much as it depends on a

former experience. It does not determine an object independently. Sometimes a past experience re-in states itself and its past character is forgotten and thus it appears to be a new experience instead of a recollection. It also invalid because it depends solely on the impression for its birth.⁵²

Prabhākara's definition of valid knowledge 'anubhūti' is vague, for it is difficult to define the term 'anubhūti'. From the verse quoted above it is obvious that 'anubhūti' is a cognition other than memory and that it is produced sometimes by such cases as the operation of the senses which are different from impressions and sometimes by the co-operation of such cases with impressions as in the case of recognition and inference. So far there is no difficulty. But the difficulty arises when Śalikanātha differentiates 'anubhūti' from memory on the ground that the former does not depend on any other cognition while the latter depends on a past cognition. Inference depends on the recollection of a general rule and the perception of some mark, and determinate perception too depends on the indeterminate perception. Then, are they not 'anubhūti'? If they are not 'anubhūti' they can never be valid according to the definition of valid knowledge.⁵³ Again, there is a practical difficulty also. We are ordinarily aware, when a cognition arises, of its being a memory if it is memory and thus by the method of exclusion we can easily know whether a cognition is memory of 'anubhūti'. But some times when memory is obscured a memory-cognition is taken to be 'anubhūti' and sometimes an 'anubhūti' is taken to be a memory-cognition. Now, as there is no means of knowing real nature of a cognition except the direct consciousness of an individual, we cannot be confident in the above cases as to the correctness of our judgement of validity or invalidity. Prabhākara says that memory is invalid. But he merely says it dogmatically without showing any reason why it should be called

invalid. After all it is also a form of knowledge like '*anubhūti*'. Kumārila, on the other hand, points out that memory repeats as old experience and does not add anything new to what we already known.⁵⁴ The difference between '*anubhūti*' and memory cannot be other than that the former gives something new while the latter repeats an old experience, and if Prabhākara chooses to appeal to reason rather than be dogmatic, he cannot offer any other ground for the indivisibility of memory save its being an apprehension of the apprehended. Hence, he cannot but recognise newness as a condition of validity.⁵⁵

Again, Prabhākara's definition is too wide as it applies to doubt and illusion also.⁵⁶ He says that doubt and illusion are valid so far as they are '*anubhūti*'. But the duty of a philosopher is to examine the grounds of the concepts that are universally held and not to destroy them, so Prabhākara cannot go against the verdict of common-sense that doubt and illusion are invalid. He says that doubt and illusion are invalid so far as the element of memory is involved in them. But they are not recognised by people to be invalid on the ground of the memory - element, but on that of their being respectively unassured and false. Therefore, Prabhākara has to accept newness, certitude and truth as the essential characteristics of valid knowledge, and therefore all his objections against the Bhāṭa definition fall to ground.

Pārthasārathi points out some inconsistencies in Prabhākara's view. According to Prabhākara's definition a dream - cognition, which arises solely from mental impressions, is invalid; but this is not consistent with his view that a dream-cognition is valid so far as the elements of cognition and the cogniser in it is concerned. In all cognitions, whatever, their status, the self and the cognition are, according to Prabhākara, necessarily known and validity known, and dream-cognition too is a cognition. If

Prabhākara says that a dream-cognition, being memory in respect of its object and 'anubhūti' in respect of its form and the cogniser, is partly valid and partly invalid, then recognition too, involving an element of memory and an element of 'anubhūti', must be called partly valid and partly invalid. But this is against the universally accepted opinion of people. Either a cognition is wholly valid or wholly invalid. Practical activities of life cannot be based on partly valid and partly invalid cognitions. Again, the illusion of a yellow conch will be wholly valid as it does not involve any memory and, hence, is purely an 'anubhūti' but none can accept this.⁵⁷ Prabhākara's definition is not a definition of valid knowledge at all. When it is said that all knowledge except memory is valid knowledge, Prabhākara must have the generally accepted conception of validity in his mind and after examining all knowledge in the light of that conception he must have arrived at the above conclusion.

Thus all the systems unanimously hold validity or truth as the characteristic of *pramā* but differ in respect of the mark of validity or truth. The above discussion of the nature of *pramā* further reveals that according to some schools like the Sāṃkhya and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā novelty also is an essential part or differentia of valid knowledge. Some Systematists like the Vaiśeṣikas and Jainas do not consider novelty as a mark of valid knowledge since they include remembrance (*Smṛti*) into the case of valid knowledge. Some schools like the Advaita are indifferent to the controversy. Dharamarājadhara-vendra defines *pramā* in two ways with and without validity as the mark of valid knowledge. Here, the crux of the problem lies in the acceptance or rejection of validity of remembrance as a means of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhyas has accepted novelty as a mark of *pramā* to exclude remembrance from the domain of valid knowledge. The Jainas also

accept remembrance among the forms of valid mediate knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta is indifferent to the problem. The Naiyāyikas consider the presentation knowledge (*anubhūti*) as a mark of *pramā* and exclude remembrance which is not the presentation of an object but a reproduction of previous experience solely caused by the impressions of past experience. The recognition of novelty as an essential factor of valid knowledge further poses the question of the ground for inclusion of the persistent knowledge of the same object (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) into the valid knowledge because the persistent knowledge is considered as a form of valid knowledge by all systematists. The different schools assign different reasons to justify the inclusion of this kind of knowledge into valid knowledge.

C. PRAMĀṆA

The origination of knowledge presupposes a subject, an object, a source or means to acquire knowledge and the resultant cognition. Vātsyāyana aptly remarks: "He, who is induced to an action out of his desire to seek or shun an object, is *pramātā*. The object that is cognised, is *prameya*. The knowledge of the object is apprehended is *pramāṇa*. With these four, the circuit of cognition of an object completes itself".⁵⁸

Pramāṇa derivatively means the instrument of valid knowledge (*Pramāyāḥ Kāraṇam*). Hence, generally speaking, we may say that *pramāṇa* is the means or source of right knowledge. It is that which gives us valid knowledge, and only valid knowledge of objects. So, it has been said: "There cannot be any right understanding of things except by means of *pramāṇa*. A subject arrives at the valid knowledge of objects by means of *pramāṇa*, for the existence and nature of objects are to be ascertained only by such cognitions as are based on *pramāṇa*. Again, we are told:

"*Pramāṇa* is the cause of valid cognition of objects, is as much on it gives as a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves".⁵⁹ *Pramāṇa* has a real correspondence with objects, in the sense that the nature and attributes of objects, as revealed by *pramāṇa*, are uncontradictorily true of them, despite all variations in time, place and other conditions."⁶⁰

So far we are given to understand, not what a *pramāṇa* exactly is, but what the general character of *pramāṇa* must be. We do not go beyond such general description of *pramāṇa* when we are told by others that "*pramāṇa* is that which is invariably related to *pramā*" or "to be *pramāṇa* is never to be disconnected from a knower possessing right knowledge."⁶¹ All this means only that *pramāṇa* is the *Kāraṇa* or means of *pramā* or valid knowledge. What then is a *Kāraṇa* and how is it constituted? In order to answer the first part of this question we should follow the distinction between *Kāraṇa* and *Kaṛaṇa* (means and cause).

A cause has been defined as the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect (*ananyathā siddha niyata pūrvabhāvi*). Conversely, an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent.⁶² Or, an effect is what begins to be and thereby negates its antecedent non-existence. There are three kinds of causes, namely, the constituent (*Samavāyi*), the non-constituent (*Asamavāyi*) and the efficient (*nimitta*). The constituent cause is the substratum in which the effect is inherent, e.g. the threads of the cloth. The non-constituent cause is the mediate cause of an effect. It determines the effect only in so far as it stands as an inherent attribute of a constituent cause. Its causal efficiency, therefore, is mediated through its intimate relation to the material or constituent cause. In relation to the effect 'cloth' the contact of the threads is the mediate cause of the colour or cloth. The efficient cause is different from both the constituent and

non-constituent causes. It is not merely the passive substratum in which the effect inheres, nor any inherent attribute of the substratum that indirectly determines the effect. Rather, it is the agency that acts on both the constituent and non-constituent causes and makes them produce the effect. In relation to the cloth, the loom and such other agents constitute the efficient cause. It is the efficient cause that is to be regarded as *Kāraṇa* as means, because it is principally concerned in bringing about the effect. While the first two are general causes or rather conditions of the effect, the last is actually the operative cause of it. It is the special cause, or simply, the cause of the effect.⁶³

Now reverting to the definition of *pramāṇa*, we may say that it is the specific cause of valid knowledge as distinguished from its general causes or universal conditions. *Pramāṇa* is the unique operative cause (*Kāraṇa*) of right knowledge (*pramā*). It does not, however, follow from this that *pramāṇa* is a simple concept denoting a single thing. On the other hand, we are told that it denotes a complex of many conditions which are partly physical and partly psychical or mental in nature. In fact, any instance of knowledge involves a long and complicated process which is either physical and physiological or mental or both. The visual perception of a jar, for example, is conditioned by physical contact between the eyes and the object as well as by internal operations of the visual organ, its contact with *means* or the mind, and that of the latter with soul. Hence, *pramāṇa* is taken to mean the entire complex or collection of all the specific physical and psychical conditions (*bodhābodha svabhava sāmāgrī*) that are actually operative in bringing about a valid and assured cognition of objects (*pramā*). This however, does not include such universal conditions of all knowledge as subject and object, time and space, etc., within the compass of *pramāṇa* or the method of knowledge.

Hence, the final definition of *pramāṇa* is that it is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and that object, which does not normally fail to produce valid knowledge.⁶⁴

The Vaiśeṣika system defines *pramāṇa* as the unique operative cause (*Kāraṇa*) of both true presentational knowledge and memory.⁶⁵ It would take memory as a distinct *pramāṇa* or method of knowledge like perception and inference. The Nyāya restrict *pramāṇa* to the ground of presentational knowledge has been set aside and memory has been rightly shown to be an independent method of knowledge by the Vaiśeṣikas.⁶⁶

The Jainas take *pramāṇa* in a general sense so as to make it applicable to both immediate presentational knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and mediate knowledge (*parokṣa*). So far, they are true. Under mediate knowledge they include sense - perception, inference, memory and recognition. In this general sense, *pramāṇa* is knowledge that reveals both itself and its object in a way that is not liable to contradiction. According to the Jainas, *pramāṇa* is the nature of knowledge. Amongst various definitions of *pramāṇa* offered by the Jaina logicians, it is commonly accepted that the *pramāṇa* reveals itself as well as its object.⁶⁷

Siddhasena states that *pramāṇa* is that which illumines itself the object and which is not sublated.⁶⁸ Here it is to be seen that term '*bādhavivarjita*' is the same as '*bādhavarjita*' of the Mimāṃsakas and '*avisamvadin*' of Dharmakīrti. Thus, the Jaina theory of *pramāṇa* as presented by Hemachandra is the synthesis of the views of all the systems. It is perhaps the reason that Jayanta does not think it worth while to refute the Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* under a separate heading. It is one of the greatest qualities of Jayanta that he avoids repetition.

The Buddhist philosophers differ amongst themselves with regard to the definition of *pramāṇa*. The Sautrantika and the

Vaibhasika, the two realistic schools of Buddhist Philosophy, maintain that *pramāṇa* is that which gives a true knowledge of objects. By true knowledge (*pramā*) they mean the identity of content between the cognition and the cognitum, but the idealist school of Buddhism namely, the *Vijñānavāda* which is also known as *yogācāra*, is of the view that consciousness (*Vijñāna*) is the principle of self-manifestation and it is the source of all knowledge. According to *Vijñānavādins*, *Pramā* is practically useful knowledge and *pramāṇa* is that which brings about such knowledge. Nagārjuna, the propounder of the Madhyamika school of Buddhism, refers to the existence of *pramāṇa* in his work. *Pramāṇa-viddhavaansa* there is no question of his accepting or defining the concept of *pramāṇa*. Dinnāga on the other hand presents a positive theory of knowledge, which is in sharp contrast to Nagarjuna's denial of the means of knowledge.

Dinnāga includes in his definition of *pramāṇa* the characteristic '*sva-samvithi*' meaning that the effect of *pramāṇa* should involve self-cognition.⁶⁹ Dharmakīrti maintains that *pramāṇa* is an uncontradicted experience.⁷⁰ Hence, *pramāṇa* or the method of knowledge fulfils its function when it shows an object in such a way as to enable us to act successfully in relation to it. In short, *pramā* is practically useful knowledge, and *pramāṇa* is the source of such knowledge.⁷¹

According to the Sāṃkhya, *pramāṇa* is a modification of *buddhi*. Kapila states that *prama* is a determinate knowledge of an object not known before and *pramāṇa* is that which is most conducive to such a knowledge. *Vijñānabhikṣu* is of the view that whenever the *puruṣa* is spoken of as having valid cognition, the modification of *buddhi* is *pramāṇa*, but when the *buddhi* is held as one that cognises, it is the sense-object contact, etc., that constitute *pramāṇa*.⁷² Whereas *Vijñānabhikṣu* suggests two alternative features of *pramāṇa*. Vācaspati is definite that it is a modification

of the *Citta*, having a content free from all that is doubtful and erroneous. Isvarakṛṣṇa simply maintains that *pramāṇa* is that which brings about the cognition of objects.⁷³

The Sāṅkhya–yoga concept of *pramāṇa* is different from all these. Patanjali holds that *pramāṇa* is the function of *Citta* (*cittavṛtti*).⁷⁴ The Yuktidīpika states that since the *citta* is one, the *pramāṇa* is one only.⁷⁵ It is through limiting adjuncts that it is said to be three-fold.⁷⁶ Vācaspati Miśra also accepts the usually accepted meaning of *pramāṇa* as the means of valid knowledge. He, however, offers two definitions of *pramā* which imply two different opinions regarding the nature of *pramāṇa* also. He defines *pramā* as the modification of *Citta* (*cittavṛtti*) the object of which is not either doubtful (*sandigdha*) contradictory (*viparīta*) or known (*adhiḡata*).⁷⁷ The *pramāṇa* as the means of that will be the sense-object contact etc. He gives an alternative definition of *pramā* as the apprehension of the *puruṣa* which results from the modification of *buddhi*.⁷⁸ In that case, the *pramāṇa* will be the modification of the *buddhi* itself. Vīṇābhikṣu explains it more vividly. When the result of knowledge is considered to be located in the *buddhi*, the *pramāṇa* is the sense-object contact, etc., and when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in the *puruṣa*, the *pramāṇa* is the function of the *buddhi* itself.⁷⁹ Vīṇābhikṣu also makes it clear that the use of *pramāṇa* with reference to the sense, is always indirect.⁸⁰

The Prabhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsa defines *pramāṇa* as immediate experience (*anubhūti*). Śālikantha states that valid knowledge is an experience, which is different from memory.⁸¹ Prabhākara's definition on the whole is vague, since it is difficult to define the term '*anubhūti*'. It is too wide because it applies to doubt and illusion. Basically however, Prabhākara's views on this issue are more or less identical with that of Nyāya.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers have formulated such a general definition of *pramāṇa*, that consists in the combination of the main tenets of the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika as well as of the Buddhist schools. According to Kumārila, *pramāṇa* is a definite and assured cognition of objects which does not require confirmation by other cognitions.⁸² Umbeka maintains that the terms ‘*druda*’ and ‘*avisamvāda*’ exclude doubt and error respectively from valid knowledge.⁸³ Pardhasārathi explains the Bhaṭṭa standpoint stating that a *pramāṇa* should be free from defects in the source and subsequent contradiction of the revealed truth. It should not cover the knowledge of the already known objects. Briefly speaking, according to the Bhaṭṭa’s, a *pramāṇa* is a method of cognition of an unknown object which is not liable to be sublated by subsequent experience.

The Advaita Vedānta defines *pramāṇa* as the operative cause (*Kāraṇa*) of *pramā* or true knowledge. It defines *pramā* in two ways. First, *Pramā* means knowledge that has both the characteristic of novelty and un-contradictedness (*anadhigatābādhita*). This means that true knowledge is uncontradicted and original, i.e. that gives us new information. Secondly, *pramā* is taken to mean simply uncontradicted knowledge of objects. The result is that *pramā* is made to exclude or include memory accordingly as we accept the one or the other way of defining *pramā* or true knowledge.⁸⁴

In any inquiry into the Indian theories of the valid sources of cognitions or *pramāṇas*, it is necessary to note at the very outset that there is no unanimity among the different schools of Indian philosophy about the number of these sources. The minimum number is one, standing for perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is regarded by the materialists and naturalists led by the Cārvākas as the only source of cognition. The next higher number is two,

including perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*Anumāna*) which, in the view of Buddhism and Kanāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy, are the only two sources of cognition. The Sāṃkhya goes further in admitting three sources of cognition, including testimony (*Sabda; āptvavacana*) in addition to perception and inference. One section of the Nyāya is in agreement with the Sāṃkhya in admitting these three only, but another section adds to this number by recognizing comparison (*Upamāna*) as a separate source of cognition. Further addition to the number is made by the Mīmāṃsa school, with the result that the sources of cognition become five in number, including presumption (*Arthāpatti*) over and above the four recognized by the Nyāya. But even then, the process of the increase of the number of the sources of cognition did not come to an end. For in the hands of the Vedānta and the section of Mīmāṃsa philosophy headed by Kumārila, the number increased to six with the addition of Non-apprehension (*Anupalabdhi*) to the list admitted by the Mīmāṃsa school as a whole. One wished, however, that the tendency to multiply the sources of cognition came to an end at least at this stage. But that did not happen. For it was left for the Paurāṇikas (believers in the authority of the semi-historical branch of Sanskrit literature known as the *purāṇās*) to increase the number of the sources of cognition to eight by means of the addition of tradition (*Aitiḥya*) and inclusion (*Sambhava*). But even this was not the end of the matter. Mention has been made in Indian philosophical literature of two more sources of cognition respectively called gesture (*ceṣṭā*) and elimination (*prariśeṣa*).

It seems that philosophers usually admit perception, inference and testimony as separate and independent source of cognition, and that nowhere else outside India have they cared to consider the possibility of there being sources of cognition other than these

three. It is especially in view of this that it would be worth while to try to ascertain whether comparison (*Upamāna*), presumption (*Arthāpatti*), etc., which have come to be recognized as additional independent sources of cognition within the field of Indian Philosophy, really deserve to be so recognised. Let us then begin the consideration of *Arthāpatti* (presumption), it being kept in view, however, that there is a fundamental difference between the *Mīmāṃsa* and *Advaita Vedānta* on the one hand and the *Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika* on the other, with regard to the understanding of the nature of this source of cognition.

It would be useful to consider here how the Chief Champions of *Arthāpatti*, the *Bhāṭṭas* and *Prabhākaras*, maintain that it is a distinct *pramāṇa* and should not be brought under *Anumāna* or *Sabda* and on what grounds the *Naiyāyikas* refuse to recognise it as a distinct *pramāṇa*.

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Chapter II

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ARTHĀPATTI

The present chapter is a sincere attempt to discuss the traditional issue of the nature and scope of our knowledge claims by means of *Arthāpatti* or presumption or postulation. The three views on the nature of *Arthāpatti* are considered as they stand. These are 1) Bhaṭṭa's view that presumption is a means of resolving a conflict; 2) Prabhākara's view that presumption is characterised by an element of doubt and 3) Advaita interpretation that presumption is a hypothesis. The chapter then compares the different conceptions of *Arthāpatti*.

In Indian philosophy *Arthāpatti* seems to have been interpreted in two principal senses. Vātsyāyana representation of it as a sort of implication of what is given in another form would bring it under the class of immediate inference. According to him it is apprehension from opposition of what is stated. From negative comes the opposed positive. His own example is: If we have the statement that when there are no clouds it does not rain, we may get, by direct implication of opposition, when it rains there are clouds.

Among the schools of Indian philosophy, it is the Mīmāṃsa (including the two branches respectively headed by Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) and the Advaita Vedānta which alone recognises presumption as a separate or independent source of cognition. Who gives us an authoritative exposition of *Arthāpatti*? In the view of the former, the admission of presumption is a necessity when there arises a conflict between two well known

facts followed by a demand for its resolution. Accordingly, the prominent members of the Mīmāṃsa school including Sabara, have defined presumption as the assumption of an unperceived fact apart from which the conflict between two actually perceived or known fact cannot be resolved.¹ The typical example of presumption which has been of common use in the Mīmāṃsa school of philosophy is as follows. If we know that Devadatta is alive and at the same time find that he is absent from home, there arises a conflict between his being alive and his being absent from home, which cannot be resolved except on the assumption that he lives somewhere away from home.

While the Bhaṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsa, like that of Advaita Vedānta recognises six *pramāṇas*, the Prabhākara school restricts them to five. The Prabhākara refuses to concede the status of an independent source of knowledge (*Pramāṇatva*) to anupalabdhi or non-comprehension, while the Bhaṭṭas elevate it to the rank of a *pramāṇa*. Apart from perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, presumption or *Arthāpatti* is accepted as a valid and independent source of knowledge by the two schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsa, though the Prabhākaras and the Bhaṭṭas do differ regarding some important aspects of the nature and the range of *Arthāpatti*.

When the perception of a thing cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing, this assumption is called 'presumption' or '*Arthāpatti*', that is, here the knowledge of the fact explained of the word '*Arthāpatti*', is the assumption, supposition, or postulation of a fact (*Arthā* = fact, *āpatti* = *kalpana* = supposition).² 'Artha' which means 'significance' 'meaning' and '*Āpatti*' which means 'difficulty'. The etymologically '*Arthāpatti*' means a difficulty that arises due to the lack of adequate meaning of significance furnished by presented expressions. The problem, thus, is semantic and specially that of

semantic gap, that needs to be bridged up to be able to bring out the intended and requisite semantic import. For e.g. Devadatta is alive and we do not find him in the house. We have the certainty about his life. Then the conflict that arises between these two truths is explained by another truth or assumption viz. that he is outside the house. This assumption is *Arthāpatti*. *Arthāpatti* presents an object presumed to exist without which another object seen or heard or cannot be spoken of an existent. As Hiriyanna puts it, "*Arthāpatti* is a postulation of something to account for what apparently clashes with experience and therefore is of the nature of hypothesis. We may otherwise state it as rendering explicit what is already implicit in two truths both of which have been properly tested but which appear mutually incompatible. Thus if we know that Devadatta is alive and do not find him in his house, we conclude that he should be somewhere else".²

Indian philosophers have shown four alternative attitudes to *Arthāpatti* down through the ages. There are first some, who postulate it as a *pramāṇa* in its own right, second, others, who hold it to be a species of some other *pramāṇa*; third, still others, who do not recognize it as a *pramāṇa* or a species of some *pramāṇa*, and fourth, the rest, who reject it along with all other *pramāṇas*.³

Arthāpatti is the necessary supposition of an unperceived fact which alone can explain a phenomenon that demands explanation. When a given phenomenon is such that one cannot understand it in any way without supposing some other fact, one has to postulate this other fact by way of explaining the phenomenon. This process of explaining an otherwise inexplicable phenomenon by the affirmation of explaining the fact is called *Arthāpatti*.⁴

It is assumption (*artti*) of a fact (*artha*) to account for another inexplicable fact. The postulation of a hypothesis to explain the inexplicable fact is called *Arthāpatti*. It is presumption, postulation,

or implication. The knowledge of the fact to be explained (*Upapādyā*). It cannot be explained without postulating his eating at night. In the absence of his eating at night his stoutness cannot be explained. Eating at night explains the unintelligible fact (*Upapādaka*). This assumption (*kalpanā*) of hypothesis is called (*Arthāpatti*). It is the supposition of a cause. The effect is given. The cause is assumed.⁵

We may have a direct knowledge of fact of non-existence, just as we have the knowledge of existent facts. But merely by this we should not conclude that this direct experience is as much a matter of sense perception in the one case as much a matter of sense perception in the one case as in the other. The truth of the matter is that when the existent is perceived, what is non-existent is not perceived, and therefore directly related in the both cases. *Arthāpatti* (postulation) is not the deduction of a conclusion from given premises, but the necessary supposition of a general principle as the only explanation of some given facts.⁶

For Immanuel Kant existence of God is a postulate of the moral life, not in the sense that it is deducible from certain ethical propositions but in the sense that it is the only principle which can explain ethical propositions concerning the moral life. So we have to admit memory, non perception and postulation as three distinct ways of knowing in addition to the four recognised by the Naiyāyika.⁷

The charge is often heard against Indian philosophy that its theories are not based on logical reasoning but on religious authority and, therefore they are dogmatic rather than critical. The Nyāya philosophy is a standing repudiation of this charge. The postulation applies the method of logical criticism to solve the problem of life and reality. It is by means of a sound logic

that it tries to ascertain the truth and defend itself against hostile criticism.

Arthāpatti as a source of knowledge consists in the supposition of some unperceived fact which however cannot be explained without some other fact. We have to presuppose or postulate the existence of this other fact even though we do not perceive it. A phenomenon is presented to our experience and we find that there is a seeming contradiction involved in it. One tries to get over this contradiction by supposing some other fact which explains away the contradiction. The given fact which is to be explained is called the *Upapādyā* and that explains it is called the *Upapādita*. Hence here one proceeds from the knowledge of something to be explained to the knowledge of one which explains it, i.e. from the consequence to the ground.⁸

A. THE PŪRVA MĪMĀMSA CONCEPTION OF ARTHĀPATTI

It is in the Śābhara Bhāṣya on the *Sūtras* of Jaimini that we find a brief account of *Arthāpatti* as a *pramāṇa*. According to Śābhara *Arthāpatti* is the presumption of an object not seen on the ground that a fact already seen or heard would not be possible without that presumption. For instance, if it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, the presumption would be that he is outside the house, as otherwise the fact of his being alive and being absent in the house would not be explained.⁹ Although Śābhara's statement is very brief and simple, it raised to a great controversy among the followers of the Mīmāṃsa system.

i. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Arthāpatti

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa regards presumption as a distinct means of knowledge. He appears to be faithful to the statement of Bhāṣya in his interpretation of *Arthāpatti*. Kumārila sees some inexplicability in what Śābhara calls a fact already seen or heard.

In order to make this inexplicability evident Kumārila analyses two facts viz. Devadatta's being alive and subsequent observation of his non-existence in his house between which he argues the existence of a conflict or contradiction. In order that this conflict or contradiction is resolved Devadatta's existence outside the house is assumed. It is this assumption Kumārila calls *Arthāpatti*.

Kumārila elaborates Sabara's view in his own way. According to Kumārila, the word *Dṛṣṭaḥ* in the bhāṣya means that the fact is known by any of the five means and the *Srutaḥ* signifies that it has been learnt from the scriptural or non-scriptural source. Hence, the meaning of Sabara's statement would be that whenever a fact is known to us or learnt from a verbal source seems to be apparently absurd and requires the assumption of some other fact to explain it, it is called *Arthāpatti* or presumption.¹⁰ Thus it is clear that in Kumārila's view the element which distinguishes *Arthāpatti* from the other *pramāṇas* is the presence of inexplicability in some observed or well ascertained fact. Parthasaradhi also says that when we observe that a well ascertained fact cannot be explained without another fact, we presume the latter in order to account for the former and this presumption is *Arthāpatti*.¹¹ We know with perfect certainty that a man is alive, yet we do not find him in the house. The man exists, yet he does not exist in the house. This fact appears to be conflicting. How can man exist and not exist at the same time? This conflict cannot be resolved unless it is presumed that the man exists outside the house. This supposition of the man's outside existence explains his non-existence in the house. Sucherita Miśra too reiterates the fact of inexplicability as the crux of *Arthāpatti*. He states that the basis of presumption is the inexplicability which lays apparent inconsistency of two cognitions. In one instance we find that fire burns the object

which comes in contact with it, but in another we find that if some medicine is applied to the object it does not burn. We presume that when the burning power is present burning takes place and when it is destroyed, though the visible form of fire may remain as before, the burning does not take place.¹²

According to Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā the *karana* or means of such a presumption is the consciousness of an inner contradiction (*anupapatti*): and the result of the presumption is resolving this contradiction (*upapatti*). The contradiction here is, of course not real but only apparent. If there is a real contradiction in facts, then there can be no reconciliation at all. For instance one perceives silver in a place from a distance and when he fixes it upon approaching and finds that there is no silver. Between the cognition 'there is silver' and 'there is no silver', there is a real conflict and the conflict can be resolved only by assuming that one of the cognitions is false. Similarly when someone says that 'there are fruits on the river bank' and another person says that 'there are no fruits on the river bank', the two statements really come into contradiction. Both the statements cannot be accepted. Thus when there is a real conflict the only way of resolving it is in the rejection of one of the alternatives as false. In the case of *Arthāpatti*, however, both the cognitions are true, though they appear at first sight to be conflicting. Such an apparent contradiction introduces a state of tension in one's mind, because neither any one of the cognitions can be accepted or rejected, nor can they be reconciled together.¹³

The contradiction between the two cognitions which is instrumental to presumption, according to the Bhaṭṭas, is always between two *pramāṇas*. In the instance cited above the conflict is between *Anumāna* and *Anupalabdhi*. By *Anumāna* it is known that a living man must be somewhere and from *Anupalabdhi* it

is known that Devadatta does not exist in his house where he would be normally expected. What is known from the inference is that the (living) Devadatta exists somewhere. But there is no specification at this stage as to the exact place where he exists, so that he may also exist in the house. But from non-apprehension he is known not to exist in the house. It is this conflict between inference and non-apprehension that leads to the presumption that Devadatta exists outside. This presumption of Devadatta's outside existence that explains his non-existence in the house thereby resolving the conflict between the two cognitions.¹⁴ The two means of knowledge which contradict each other and lead to presumption cannot both of them be specific, because, if they were so, they could be reconciled with each other. For instance, the *pramāṇas* 'there is silver' and 'there is no silver' are both specific and hence irreconcilable. Thus of the two conflicting *pramāṇas*, which lead to presumption, one of them must be general and the other specific.¹⁵

The words '*Dr̥ṣṭaḥ Śruto vā*' in Śabara's statement do not appear to refer to two different forms of *Arthāpatti*, viz. *Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* or presumption from the seen and *Śrutārthāpatti* or presumption from the heard. Śabara has given only one example of *Arthāpatti*, but in case if he intended two forms of *Arthāpatti*, he should have given two instead of one. Hence, despite the Bhāṣya's mention of only two forms of cognitions.

According to Kumārila the words '*dr̥ṣṭaḥ śrutova*' in Bhāṣya refer to two kinds of *Arthāpatti*, e.g. *Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* and '*Śrutārthāpatti*'. The word '*dr̥ṣṭaḥ*' (seen) stands for all the six means of condition perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony and negation. The word '*śruta*' (heard) refers to the presumption of a fact. 'Devadatta who is fat, does not take his meal during the day'. On hearing such assertion, we arrive at the idea of 'Devatta's eating at night', Kumārila holds this to be

a distinctive type of knowledge and calls it '*Śrutārthāpatti*'. Salikanātha says that what is presumed on hearing the sentence, 'Caitra who is fat does not eat during the day', is the fact of eating at night and not the sentence, 'he eats at night. The inexplicability that is removed by the presumption consists in the conflict between fatness and fasting and not between the sentences, 'Caitra is fat, and 'He does not eat in the day'. So, the conflict between two facts must be resolved by presuming another fact. Even when the words 'eats at night' are uttered after uttering the sentence 'Caitra who is fat ' does not eat during the day', the conflict arising in the mind of the person on hearing the latter sentence is not resolved if he does not know the meaning of the word 'night'. Therefore, a conflict is to be resolved through the presumption of a fact and not of words. The only argument that Kumārila offers in favour of *Śrutārthāpatti* is that all determinate cognitions are accompanied by the memory of words and the cognition resulting from a verbal inconsistency is a determinate cognition. But Salikanātha has exposed the weakness of this argument and Kumārila's commentators admit the point raised by him. Kumārila sub-divides *Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*, into five forms and thus we have six forms of *Arthāpatti* in all. The example given above is that of *abhāvapūrvikā arthāpatti* i.e. presumption based on non-apprehension. Devadatta's non-existence in the house is ascertained from non-apprehension and this is a fact which remains inexplicable without the presumption of Devadatta's outside existence. Here the inexplicable lies in the fact given by non-apprehension. But this is always the case, since the inexplicability may also lie in fact given by perception or any other *pramāṇa*. Thus *Arthāpatti* is of six forms, viz. that based on perception, based on inference, on verbal testimony, on comparison, on another presumption and on non-apprehension.¹⁶

The first form of *Arthāpatti*, viz. *pratyakṣapūrvikā arthāpatti*, is illustrated in the presumption of burning power in fire. In this kind of *Arthāpatti* the inconsistency lies in a perceived fact. We perceive that fire burns things. This fact remains inexplicable without the presumption of burning power in fire. Power is an imperceptible entity and is considered to be a category different from substance, quality, action and universal. Kumārila does not clearly show in what the inexplicability consists that leads to the presumption of burning power. Sucāritamiśra says that the inexplicability consists in the inconsistency of the perceived fact with another *pramāṇa*. From perception it is ascertained that fire burns things. We perceive the form of fire, its conjunction with a thing and then the fact that the thing is burnt. Thus perception reveals that fire is the cause of burning things. But this is found to be inconsistent with the experience that sometimes an object, e.g. a human body, is not burnt when some medicine is applied to it, though at other times it is burnt. The visible form of fire or its conjunction with an object cannot be the cause of burning, because a cause is always followed by an effect while the visible form of fire or its conjunction with an object is not at times followed by the effect, viz. burning. Burning, however, being an occasional phenomenon cannot take place without a cause. Thus the inexplicability of the fact of burning consists in the inconsistency between two cognitions, viz. that an effect takes place and that its cause is apparently absent, and this inexplicability leads to the presumption that there is some visible cause of burning, viz. the burning power of fire. Then, why objects are sometimes burnt by fire and sometimes not, becomes fully intelligible on the ground that when the burning power is present burning takes place and it is destroyed, though the visible form of fire is not destroyed, burning does not take place.¹⁷ Here we need not dwell on the arguments for and against power as a distinct category.

In *Arthāpatti* based on inference the inconsistency lies in an inferred fact and it is illustrated in the presumption of moving power in the sun. It is known through inference that the sun moves. But how can it move. Things possess such limbs as legs etc., but we do not find any such limbs in the case of the sun. Thus there is a conflict between two *pramāṇas*, viz. that the sun moves and that it possesses no means of motion. This conflict is resolved by the presumption of moving power in the sun.¹⁸

Arthāpatti based on *Upamāna* is illustrated thus : Through *Upamāna* it is known that a cow is similar to a gavaya. But there is some inexplicability involved in this cognition of similarity. How can the cognition of the cow's similarity arise now on the perception of the gavaya and not at the time when the cow was actually perceived for the first time? The similarity of the cow to the gavaya consists in the presence in the former of the universal of the limbs of the latter and these universals were present in the cow even when it was perceived for the first time; but the cow was not then cognised to be similar to gavaya. This conflict is resolved by the presumption of some power in the cow which is manifested by the perception of the counter - correlative and gives rise to the cognition of its similarity to the gavaya.¹⁹

Arthāpatti based on *Arthāpatti* is illustrated in the presumption of the eternity of words. A word is heard and then the cognition of the object that is denoted by it arises in the mind. From this it is concluded that the word is the cause of the cognition of the corresponding object. But there can be no cause unless there is some action. Thus some action inhering in the word is inferred and this action is known as '*abhidhā*' or denotation. This denotativeness that inheres in the word becomes inexplicable on the ground that when the word was heard for the first time it was not followed by the cognition of the object. The meaning

of a word is known only after its relation to the corresponding object is comprehended. But the relation between a word and an object is not found to be of the nature of such usual relations as conjunction, inherence etc. Thus the inexplicability is resolved by the presumption of a peculiar power residing in the word. The relation between a word and an object is of the nature of a power and the meaning of a word is not understood unless this power is apprehended. This is the denotative power of a word. Again the denotative power of a word cannot be possible without the entity of the words. This impossibility leads to the presumption of entity of word. A person orders his servant using the words 'bring the cow' and the servant brings the cow because he understands the meaning of these words, and he understands because he has already comprehended the denotative powers of the words 'cow' and 'bring'. The understanding of the meaning of a word 'cow' cannot be explained otherwise than on the ground that the 'cow' uttered by the master and heard by the servant now is the same as was heard by the servant on a past occasion when he comprehended its power of denoting the animal cow. Thus, it is known through *Arthāpatti* that the word 'cow' is eternal.²⁰

Srutarthāpatti differs from the other kinds of *Arthāpatti* in respect of its verbal testimony. But the more important difference in it is that the words are presumed while in others some fact is presumed. It is illustrated in the presumption of the sentence 'Caitra eats during the night' on hearing the sentence 'Caitra who is fat does not eat during the day'. The sentence that is heard involves an inner incompatibility because fatness is concomitant not with fasting but with feasting. From Caitra's fatness it is gathered that he must be eating voraciously. But contrarily to what is expected, the other part of the sentence says that he fasts during the day. The meaning of the sentence appears

to be self-contradictory. Caitra's fatness cannot be explained unless it is presumed that he eats at night. Thus to remove the inconsistency in the meaning of the heard sentence, the sentence 'he eats at night' is imported. *Srutārthāpatti* is the importation of a sentence or word to complete the sense of a heard sentence. A person utters the word 'water'. The word 'water' does not give a complete meaning and the hearer knowing the context in which the word is uttered completes the sentence by importing the word 'bring'. This is another example of *Srutārthāpatti*. The fact that Caitra eats during the night without which Caitra's fatness remains inexplicable is not directly denoted by the sentence that has heard, because the heard sentence does not contain such words as 'night' etc. What is directly denoted by the sentence is the fact that Caitra is fat and does not eat during the day. A sentence gives out only particular sense. Therefore, 'eats at night' is the meaning of a different sentence not uttered by the speaker but presumed by the hearer.²¹

Kumārila holds '*Srutārthāpatti*' to be a distinct type knowledge. Kumārila is conscious of his opponents' views advocating its inclusion in other sources of knowledge. But he ignores their criticism and tries to prove the distinctiveness of *Srutārthāpatti* from other sources of knowledge.

***Srutārthāpatti* versus perception**

Kumārila holds that *Srutārthāpatti* is not the subject of direct sense-perception because taking meal at night is beyond the range of our vision. It is not even a case of auditory perception because our ears are not capable of grasping an unuttered word of clause.²²

***Srutārthāpatti* versus comparison**

The Bhaṭṭas state that *Srutārthāpatti* cannot be regarded as a case of comparison, since there is no similarity either between the sentence, which is heard, i.e., 'does not eat in the day' and

that which is not heard, i.e., 'eats at night', or between the meanings of these sentences.

Srutarthāpatti versus verbal testimony

Srutarthāpatti is the presumption based upon testimony and not the verbal testimony itself. In the usual verbal testimony, the sentence is complete but in *Srutarthāpatti* a portion of it is given and another is to be presumed. In the usual verbal testimony, the words which are heard, have the competence to convey the complete sense, but such is not the case with presumption based upon testimony. In the given example that which is heard conveys the negative meaning, i.e., 'does not eat during the day' and not the positive meaning, i.e., 'eats at night'. Therefore, the knowledge that he takes his food at night is based upon the part of the sentence which is presumed by us.

Srutarthāpatti versus inference

The presumption of unuttered words is not an inference, since they are known even when the concomitance is absent.²³ Moreover, it is not possible here to determine the mark. If the sentence 'he eats at night' is the probandum and 'Devadatta who is flabby but does not take his meal during the day' is the probans, then the probans in question does not belong to the subject of inference i.e., the speaker of the sentence, but belongs to such a locus as contains the negation of the probandum and hence it is not an invariable mark. Moreover, he finds here no such property as can be proved by means of the probans in question just as we prove that a hill is fiery because it is smoky. Neither the sentence 'He does not take his meal during the day' nor its meaning can constitute the mark which will help us to infer the sentence 'He takes his meal at night'. If the sentence containing the phrase 'at night' is not heard, then how can it be held as belonging to the subject of inference? But if it is heard, there is no need of inferring it. Here, we cannot even hold that the inconsistency

inherent in the sentence does not stir our imagination to supplement it by the assumption of another sentence, i.e., 'He takes his meal at night' in order to make it a consistent one.

Kumārila holds that what happens in '*Srutārthāpatti*' is that the sentence which is being heard, implies a syntactical relation with its own unheard part. It implies the remaining portion because the sentence which is not given here, by itself (not having the complete parts) does not convey a consistent meaning. Therefore, the given part of the sentence implies its own remaining part out of grammatical necessity. So, what is presumed here is 'a portion of the sentence' and not the object meant by it.

Kumārila is quite aware of the following objections that could be raised by his opponents against this hypothesis. There is no point in presuming a portion of the sentence since this objective could also be achieved through the presumption of the complementary meaning by the existing meaning. The sentence 'Bulky Devadatta does not eat during the day' could lead to 'presume the complementary meaning, i.e. natural food, in the same way in which the smoke leads to the inference of fire.'²⁴ Moreover, a portion of the sentence which is presumed is not meant for invisible merit but for understanding the relevant meaning and in that case there is no fault if one holds that the complementary meaning is presumed and not the complementary sentence. In other words, the presumption relates to the fact and not to the clause.²⁵

The Bhattas refute the above objections on the following grounds : A sentence which does not convey a complete meaning but produces an imperfect knowledge of objects is not a source of valid knowledge. Eyes and other sense-organs, revealing only a portion of an object with which they come in contact, produce valid knowledge, whereas a sentence conveying only a portion of the complete whole in which each of its constituents, i.e. parts of

speech, fulfils its duty and tends to convey the meaning of the sentence. These parts do never stop half-way but invariably complete the task of expressing complete meaning of a sentence. A sentence which expresses a complete meaning is a source of knowledge. Such a sentence bears a significant name. Therefore, whenever we hear a portion of a sentence we fill up the gap, supplying the understood portion by our own imagination. How can we get the complete and consistent meaning if the understood portion is not supplied? In many cases the Vedic injunctions are incomplete. By means of presumption based upon testimony, they are made complete. But in these cases if we do not complete the Vedic injunction, which enjoin rites, the latter, being merely implied will not be strictly Vedic. The Vedic *mantra* (a prayer) which speaks of a kind of ceremony in honour of the departed ancestors (*aṣṭaka* by name) leads us to assume an injunction which enjoins *aṣṭaka*. Sometimes, we also assume a complete Vedic injunction on the basis of an incomplete injunction. The Vedic injunction "one should perform *Viśvajit* sacrifice" is an instance of an incomplete Vedic injunction. The injunction does not contain a word which may denote that the sacrificer is to get the fruit of the action. In such a case it does not carry the sense which it intends to convey. The object of an injunction is to induce a man to perform the rite prescribed by it. But only a man who is aware of the fruit of the rite and intends to have it, is persuaded to do so. Hence the above injunction should be supplemented by a word '*svargakāmah*' so that the complete injunction should amount to saying that one who is desirous of heaven should perform *Viśvajit* sacrifice. In case of subsidiary rites such as *aindrāgni*, etc., a general hint has only been given by the basic injunction as to their observance. In order to know the details of the rites that make them up, we are to assume some injunction which assert that the

subsidiary rites bear a close resemblance to principal rites to which they belong. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, the Bhāṭṭa theory of '*Srutārthāpatti*' could be summed up in the following form :

Srutārthāpatti is the presumption of an unheard clause with a given sentence, when the sentence involves an inner contradiction and is inexplicable without the presumption of such a clause. It is not only different from other source of knowing but from other type of presumption as well. The proper evaluation of *Srutārthāpatti* depends upon the appropriate conception of the sentence. It is interesting to note that almost all the arguments of the Bhāṭṭa regarding *Srutārthāpatti* centre round the structural and textual dimensions of the sentence. In the stock example of *Srutārthāpatti*, i.e., 'Flabby Devadatta does not take his food during the day', the Vedāntins think that the presumption (He takes his food at night) is that of a fact, but the Bhāṭṭas hold it to be a case of the presumption of a clause.²⁶

ii. Prabhākara on Arthāpatti

Prabhākara who started another school of Pūrva Mimāṃsa is now supposed to be earlier than Kumārila by a majority of scholars. Prabhākara wrote a commentary named *Bṛhāti* on Sabara's Bhāṣya. According to Dr. Jha, Prabhākara's interpretation of the Bhāṣya is more faithful than that of Kumārila. But so far as the Tarkapāda section of the *Bṛhāti* is concerned, we cannot subscribe to this opinion. On many occasions he has given forced interpretations and has even twisted the Bhāṣya texts in order to suit his own views. His style is very cumbersome and very difficult to follow without the commentary. Prabhākara, however, was more original thinker than Kumārila and he will always be remembered as the author of a peculiar theory of knowledge known as *Triputipratyakṣa vāda* or the theory of triple perception and a theory of error known as *Vivekākhyāti vāda*. Prabhākara's work has been commented upon by Śalikanātha.

Śālikanātha's commentary is known as R̥juvimālapāncikā. He also wrote Prakaraṇa pāñcikā which is an independent treatise on the Prabhākara school. Śālikanātha was a first rate scholar like Parthasārathi and the reputation that Prabhākara enjoyed among them was mainly due to him.

In Indian philosophy the distinction between psychology, epistemology and logic is not so rigidly drawn as in western philosophy. I think it necessary, therefore, to begin with a brief consideration of this question. Psychology may be said to deal with nature and sequence of mental processes as they occur. Epistemology deals with the conditions of or grounds on which mental process can lead us to valid knowledge. Logic deals with the formal character of the processes which can give us valid knowledge.²⁷ It would appear that the relation is very close one, though the province of one system is indistinguishable from one another. Not all mental processes of the cognitive type lead us to valid knowledge, though such processes must be involved in all cases of valid knowledge. It is only when these occur in certain conditions we have valid knowledge. The relation of the processes leading to valid knowledge can be expressed in generalised form and thereby we can get some logical standards of validity.

One may conclude from the above analysis of relations, that the psychology of doubt may under certain conditions lead upto epistemology of doubt. Or, in other words, we may use doubt as a way of approach to valid knowledge. It is true that this statement sounds like a paradox. For doubt on its very surface is opposed to certain knowledge. One closes the door to action and the other opens it. But if we look to the beginnings of modern western philosophy, we find that the knowledge is opened to us only at the end of a long path of doubt. The process of doubting itself provides the great fact from which Descartes deduced his philosophical truth of the Body-Mind relation, of the primary

fact of consciousness, of innate ideas and of the existence of God. Much earlier in India the epistemological possibility of doubt received a distinct recognition in the doctrine of *Arthāpatti*. *Arthāpatti* is referred to in Sabara and Kautilya, though for its proper analysis as a form of valid knowledge we have to come down to the time of Pūrva Mimāṃsa.

It is my purpose in this section to discuss the Prabhākara account of the epistemological and logical character *Arthāpatti*, but before I do that I would indicate the psychological nature of doubt.

The reference to the process of doubt in psychological literature is very scanty. Stout, who devotes a chapter to the analysis of belief says that doubt belongs to the attitude of belief which he distinguishes from the attitude of supposition. The latter consists in the free activity of imagination and lacks the important element of objective control of subjective activity. Doubt would have always come to an objective reference. It represents a state of suspense from which relief is sought in the form of transition to belief.

Taking our general stand on this view of Stout, we may attempt a more minute analysis of the processes involved in doubt.

1. It presupposes a previous tendency to belief either on the basis of perception or inference or authority.

2. Then we have some other belief suggested in course of further experience or memory or inference from some other facts or from authority. Psychologically it is possible for this second belief to be motivated by purely emotional factors as we find neurotic character of the obsessional type. We need not take this source of doubt into our present consideration for the reason that the emotional motives are represented in ideological terms with which alone we are concerned in epistemology.

3. A momentary state of suspense arises and there is a tendency to reject the first without positively rejecting it altogether.

4. Then comes an activity of the mind in which it moves from one alternative to the other, closely examining their different aspects or calling by specially directed association other ideas in support of the alternatives or even proceeding to new lines of evidence. The activity as a whole is comparable in the general nature to the exploratory manifold activity of the animal in the maze box. It is attendance by a restlessness which seeks relief in finally resolving the doubt in either of three ways 1) Rejection of the second belief and thereby removal of the contradiction implied in the doubt. 2) Rejection of their first belief and thereby removal of the contradiction or 3) Transcending of the contradiction present in the doubt by a third belief.

In the first and second forms of resolution of doubt, the act of doubting serves as a general condition to further processes of cognition for the strengthening of one alternative belief to the other. It cannot be considered, however, a condition in the sense of epistemological ground of valid knowledge, even though it may lead up to such knowledge as the result of the further cognitive processes it inspires. The only right observation that we can make as regards the function of doubt in these two cases is the doubt has sometimes a great motivating value for pursuit of further knowledge.

In the third form of resolution of doubt, it seems to be more positively contributive to new knowledge. In addition to its function as a motivating condition of further knowledge, it may provide a specific ground in the proper epistemological sense for transition to new knowledge. It seems to me that the Prabhākara form of the doctrine of *Arthāpatti* in Indian Philosophy details this specific epistemological ground.

Kumārila and Prabhākara, both regard *Arthāpatti* as a means of knowledge, but they differ in the details regarding the nature and the range of *Arthāpatti*. Though both the schools depend on Sabara's Bhāṣya regarding *Arthāpatti*, they interpret in their own different ways.

According to Prabhākara, presumption involves an element of doubt, the doubt about the truth of two well known facts on account of their mutual conflict. And it is the removal of this doubt which in his view is the specific function of (presumption) *Arthāpatti*. The recognition of doubt as an element in presumption, further holds, is not only of use in the understanding of the nature and function of *Arthāpatti* (presumption), but serves the additional purpose of showing that this source of cognition is distinct from inference. As regards the latter point, Prabhākara explains it as follows. In the case of inference, the *liṅga* (sign or mark) for example smoke, is such that its existence is beyond doubt, so that from the undoubted perception of smoke one can immediately infer the existence of fire. But the situation is different in the case of presumption in as much as the undoubted perception of Devadatta absence from home, of course, may lead to his unperceived existence somewhere outside his home; but it can do that immediately but only mediately by way of removing the doubt about his being alive.

Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that presumption primarily (and indeed exclusively) involves the conflict (*virodha* or *anupatti*) between two well known facts; so that any additional element such as 'doubt' must be out of place with in the structure of this source of cognition. In any case, the recognition of doubt as an element in presumption is negated as per Kumārila, unlike Prabhākara who supposes it is, in view of the distinction between presumption and inference. Kumārila's reason for this is that this distinction can be very well explained solely with reference to

the conflict involved in presumption. With the view to the explanation of the distinction between presumption and inference, it would, in the view of Kumārila, be sufficient to observe that, whereas presumption involves an element of conflict and at the same time is required to resolve the same, inference is free from this element and consequently, does not have the same function to perform as is imposed upon presumption to do. Besides, the recognition of doubt as an element in presumption, Kumārila observes further that presumption would adversely affect the performance of the proper function on the part of this source of cognition. For if the knowledge or rather information about a fact, for example, Devadatta's being alive, were doubtful, presumption would certainly be left without a sound basis to stand upon. Kumārila thus frees this source of cognition from the additional burden, the burden of doubt which Prābhākara imposed upon it seeks to show that, rid of its complexity, presumption can very well maintain its distinctiveness from that of inference.²⁸

Unlike Kumārila, Prabhākara changes the sequence of words in Śabara's definition from "*dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho anyathā nopapadyate ityarthakalpanā*" to "*dr̥ṣṭaḥ śrutavārtho arthakalpanā anyathā nopapadyate iti*" meaning that in *Arthāpatti* a fact seen or heard is the means of knowing another fact which is inexplicable without the former. Prabhākara begins his discussion with the question as to what *anyathānopapatti* is.²⁹ According to him, the meaning of Śabara's statement is that *Arthāpatti* is the presumption of a fact explaining another fact which is otherwise inexplicable. Prabhākara further states that if the phrase '*anyathā nopapadyate*' in Śabara's definition *Arthāpatti* means the impossibility of the existence of a thing without another thing. If this be the case, then *Arthāpatti* is nothing but the inference of cause from its effect, because the existence of

an effect can be possible without the existence of its cause and thus it ceases to be different or independent *pramāṇa*.³⁰ As regards the view that in inference the conclusion is drawn from a well known relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. While in *Arthāpatti* there is no knowledge of such a relation, Prabhākara rejects this distinction and holds that the cognition inexplicability, i.e. of the fact that this is impossible without that presumption which cannot arise unless we already know the relation between what is explained and what explains it. Inexplicability is not perceptible. It is known when we already know that one thing (effect) is invariably concomitant with another thing (cause), which actually is one of them (see). So, *Arthāpatti* also would be based on the knowledge of a relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*, as in the case of inference. Prabhākara finally asks, what, then, is the distinctive element of *Arthāpatti*? He answers that in the inference of a cause from its effect, the probans viz. the effect is inexplicable and the cause which is the probandum is what explains it, while in the case of *Arthāpatti* the probans is that which explains and the probandum is that which remains inexplicable without the supposition of the former. That is, in the case of *Anumāna* the procedure of thought is from 'anupapanna' to the 'upapādaka', while in the case of *Arthāpatti* it is from the 'upapādaka' to the 'anupapanna'.³¹ Thus in the view of Prabhākara the exclusive characteristic of *Arthāpatti* is the knowledge of that which is not explained from a knowledge of that which explains it. Thus in the cited instance of *Arthāpatti* the fact of Devadatta's non-existence in the house explains the fact of his outside existence.

Prabhākara's view of *Arthāpatti* is just the reverse of Kumārila's view. Unlike Prabhākara, Kumārila interprets Sabara's definition of *Arthāpatti* without making any change in the sequence of words in it. Kumārila states that the fact of Devadatta's non-existence in the house by the presumption of

his existence outside. Prabhākara's view of *Arthāpatti* is not consistent with Sabara's view either, because he states that which is to be known through *Arthāpatti* is unexplained while Sabara says that a seen or heard fact is unexplained and this inexplicability is the means of knowing what explains it. Prabhākara tries to avoid the inconsistency of facts in Sabara's statement by changing the order of words from '*dr̥ṣṭh śruto vārtho*' *nyahtā nopapadyate* - *ityarthakalpānā*' to '*dr̥ṣṭah śruto vārthakalpānanyatha nopapadyate*', which means that in *Arthāpatti* a seen or heard fact is the means of knowing another fact which is inexplicable without the former.³²

Prabhākara's view seems to be wrong, for the reason that there can be no cognition of the inexplicable from that of which explains. If such be possible, the cognition of 'Śimsāpāṇess' from the perception of treeness would be correct, because śimsāpāṇess cannot be explained without treeness ... śimsāpā cannot be śimsāpā unless it is a tree. But as a matter of fact, we cannot say that a tree is śimsāpā because it is a tree. Therefore, in *Arthāpatti* the *upapādaka* is known from the *anupapanna*. In the given example what is known is Devadatta's existence outside and it explains his non-existence in the house.³³ Prabhākara says that the known fact Devadatta's non-existence in the house is not inexplicable. But then there should be no need of presuming his existence outside, because the known fact is supposed to be intelligible by itself. Prabhākara says that Devadatta's existence outside is inexplicable. But the consciousness of the person who does not see Devadatta in the house is really different. When he is aware of Devadatta's absence what he cognises is not that Devadatta's presence outside is inexplicable but that Devadatta is out.³⁴

Śālikanātha tries to make Prabhākara's point of view more acceptable in the following way: 'It is not existence outside that remains inexplicable, but it is the existence of Devadatta that remains inexplicable without presuming his stay outside when he is not found in the house. Inexplicability arises when a fact is opposed to some *pramāṇa*. Though Devadatta is known to be alive from some *pramāṇa*, yet it is opposed by the knowledge that he is not present in the house where he is generally seen. This opposition renders to the fact that his being alive is doubtful. There are three steps in the *Arthāpatti*, viz., first, there is cognition of non-existence in the house, second, this cognition conflicts with the fact of Devadatta's being alive which is thus rendered doubtful, and third, his existence outside is presumed and this presumption removes the doubt. Thus the cause of inexplicability is the cognition of non-existence; that which is inexplicable is the fact of Devadatta's being alive; and which results from the presumption of outside existence is the conviction of Devadatta's being alive.³⁵ The element that distinguishes *Arthāpatti* from inference, according to Śālikanātha, is doubt rather than apparent inconsistency. He says that in inference a well-ascertained and undoubted thing is the producer of cognition, but in *Arthāpatti* a doubtful thing is the producer of cognition.³⁶

Parthasārathi criticises Śālikanātha's view as follows: When Devadatta's life itself has been rendered doubtful, it can never be the ground of his existence outside. How can it be said that since Devadatta is either dead or alive therefore he is outside? When one is in doubt about Devadatta's life, the doubt cannot be removed by presuming that he is outside. A doubt is removed only when its cause is destroyed or when either of the alternatives is confirmed by a stronger *pramāṇa*. The cause of doubt in the present case is non-existence in the house. Now, when existence

outside is presumed it will only confirm the cause of doubt, viz. non-existence in the house, because of the fact of outside existence is merely a supposition and is not known independently through a stronger *pramāṇa* like perception or inference. This supposition cannot even confirm anyone of the alternatives. The alternatives are stated in the form 'Devadatta is either alive or dead'. Staying outside is one thing and life or death is a different thing. *Arthāpatti* based on non-existence in the house cannot remove the doubt. It is absurd to say that because Devadatta is not present in the house, therefore he is outside and alive. Devadatta's life, which was first known as certain, was rendered doubtful because of his non-existence in the house. How can the cause of doubt itself be the cause of its removal? The fact is that Devadatta is already known to be alive beyond any shade of doubt. But if for some reason a person happens to entertain doubt about Devadatta's being alive and wishes to dispel it, then he should first approach some reliable person for the correct information. If he is able to ascertain in this way that Devadatta is alive, then he can say that because Devadatta is alive and not present in the house therefore he must be out. Thus doubt cannot be the distinguishing factor *Arthāpatti*.³⁷

According to Kumārila, the words '*dr̥ṣṭaḥ śrūtoḥ*' in the *Bhāṣya* refer to two kinds of *Arthāpatti*. But Prabhākara interprets the words as meaning the same thing. '*Dr̥ṣṭaḥ*' means well-known and '*śrūtoḥ*' is another word meaning the same thing in common usage. Thus, according to Prabhākara, there is no '*Srūṭārthāpatti*' or presumption of a sentence or a word. According to Kumārila the word *dr̥ṣṭaḥ* (seen) stands for all the six means of cognition (perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and negation), and the word (heard) *śrūta* refers to the presumption of a fact. Śālikanātha says that what is presumed on hearing the sentence, 'Caitra who is fat does not eat during

the day', is the fact of eating at night and not the sentence, 'he eats at night'. The inexplicability that is removed by the presumption consists in the conflict between fatness and fasting and not between the sentences, 'Caitra is fat' and 'He does not eat during the day'. So, the conflict between two facts must be resolved by presuming another fact. Even when the words 'eats at night' are uttered after uttering the sentence 'Caitra who is fat does not eat during the day', the conflict arising in the mind of the person on hearing the latter sentence is not resolved if he does not know the meaning of the word 'night'. Therefore, a conflict is to be resolved through presumption of a fact and not of words. It is true that in the care of all who know the use of language determinate cognitions are always accompanied by the memory of words; and accordingly when a person cognises the fact that Caitra eats at night his cognition is verbalised yet this is not an uncommon thing, because even in *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* the cognition of the presumed fact, i.e. Devadatta's existence outside is, verbalised.³⁸

Implicit words also contribute in determining the meaning. If we reflect on the nature of conditions which regulate the meanings of the sentences then we come to know that there are some cases which show that even understood words determine meanings of sentences. For example, there are a few Vedic injunctions which are elliptical in their character. An illustration of this type is *viśvajitā yajeta*, i.e. a person who intends to enjoy heavenly bliss should perform the sacrifice called *viśvajit*. In this injunction the compound word *śvargakāmaḥ* (one who intends to enjoy heavenly bliss) is not given still, the implicit word contributes towards the conveying of the complete meaning of the above injunction.

Sometimes the given words do not even contribute to the meaning. There are also some injunctions in which the given words which are heard are given up since they do not help to

convey the complete meanings of these injunctions. An illustration of this type is *ubhayam havir ārtim ṛcchet*. Here the word *ubhayam* has been abandoned since it is not capable of expressing the complete meaning of a great Vedic injunction. In connection with the directions of the new moon and the full-moon sacrifices, it has been stated that if both the articles which are to be offered are spoiled, then 'Indra' should be offered five plates of rice. Now, the *prima facie* view is that an emphasis should be laid upon the adjective *ubhayam*. But the conclusive view is that even if one of these two articles to be offered is spoiled, the contemporary rite should be observed. Hence the word *ubhaya* loses its significance since its absence opens up a wider scope. The actual traditional practice is that the word *ubhaya* should be given up. Thus, it has got no part to play when the meaning of the above two cojoined injunctions is conveyed.

In some cases, no importance is attached to a sub-ordinate clause which does not shape the meaning of the main injunction, i.e. in the Vedic sentence "*Prayājśrṣṇa havīṃsyabhidāryati*" (i.e. one sprinkles the articles with such clarified butter which remains after the completion of *prayāja* sacrifice) the clause *prayājśrṣṇa* refers to the procedure of sacrificing the animal in *Vājapeya* sacrifice. There is also no ruling as regards the preservation of such clarified butter and the pot which contains it. It is just possible that the sentence, a portion which is not given, may also directly convey a meaning. In that case there is no use of assuming the type of *Arthāpatti* based upon testimony. As in the so called instances of *Arthāpatti* based on testimony, the meaning is directly conveyed by the incomplete sentences, so that the intermediate process of supplying the silent portion in order to render the sentence complete is only superfluous.

, The only argument that Kumārila offers in favour of *Srūāsthāpatti* is the one refuted by Śālikanātha. Kumārila says

that all determinate cognitions are accompanied by the memory of words and the cognition resulting from a verbal inconsistency is a determinate cognition.³⁹ Śālikanātha has exposed the weakness of this argument and Kumārila's commentators admit the point raised by him. Sucaritamisra offers another argument : It is true that the inconsistency in a heard sentence is primarily an inconsistency in facts that which is presumed to remove this inconsistency is also primarily a fact, yet the inconsistency of a sentence can be removed only by the presumption of another sentence. An inconsistent sentence is really an incomplete sentence and it can be completed only by importing another appropriate sentence or word. When someone utters the word '*pacati*' (cooks) the hearer expects another word, say, '*odanam*' (rice) and is not satisfied merely with the perception of rice before him. The expectancy is relieved only when the speaker himself adds the word '*odanam*' (rice) or when, in case he does not add it, the hearer imports it. Similarly when an incomplete sentence stands in need of another sentence, the expectancy thus created can be relieved only by importing that sentence, not merely by presuming the corresponding fact.⁴⁰

The salient features of Kumārila's and Prabhākara's interpretation of Śābara's statements may be stated as follows:

Sābara takes the fact already seen or heard as a single unit. It is the living Devadatta's non-existence in the house, the truth of which is not possible according to Sābara without the assumption of Devadatta's existence outside the house.

Kumārila sees inexplicability between two facts constituting the substance of what Sābara called the fact already seen or heard.

Kumārila is therefore very faithful to the Bhaṣyakāra in fixing the objects of knowledge in *Arthapatti* as also the purpose of *Arthapatti* as a *pramāṇa*. The assumption made is sought to explain another well established fact.

Prabhākara presents a different picture and purpose of *Arthāpatti*. In his anxiety to distinguish it from *Anumāna* and uphold the independence of *Arthāpatti* as a *pramāṇa*, Prabhākara is all out to picturise *Arthāpatti* as involving or process that is diametrically opposed to that involved in inference. In inference the effect (wetness of the ground) explains its cause (a past rain). According to Prabhākara the movement of thought in *Arthāpatti* is just the reverse in as much as the probans is that which explains and the probandum is that which is explained. In otherwords in inference, the probans is explained by the probandum as smoke is explained by fire. But in *Arthāpatti* the probans (non-existence in the house) is explained by the probandum (his existence outside the house). To be clear the assumption of Devadatta's existence outside the house is explained by his non-existence in the house.

Here the probans and the probandum are the same facts. That is the means by which we assume is the probans. That which is assumed by means of probans is the probandum. In either case Devadatta's non-existence is the probans and Devadatta's existence outside the house is the probandum in either case the matter of the presumption remains the same viz. Devadatta's existence outside the house. But the real point of contention between Sabara and Kumārila on one hand and that of Prabhākara on the other is only regarding the purpose or the intention of *Arthāpatti*. It is only a matter of what explains what or what is explained by what. In simple words to make the distinction between the two schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsa clear; Kumārila says, "It is the assumption of Devadatta's existence outside the house that explains, he is being alive and not being in the house". On the other hand, according to Prabhākara, Devadatta's being alive and not being in the house that explains he existed outside the house.

The position of Kumārila regarding *Arthāpatti* is due to Sabara's original view. The contribution of Kumārila is that he sees some inexplicability or conflict in the fact already seen or heard which according to Sabara is something which is not possible or which it is not possible to be maintained in the absence of another assumption. In other words Kumārila sees a conflict or contradiction between two facts viz. Devadatta being alive and his being not found in the house. One thing is clear viz. that Kumārila uses certainly a stronger term (inexplicability or conflict or contradiction) than the moderate description of Sabara of the situation under consideration. It is difficult to understand what the inexplicability or conflict is in the matter at hand. Why should there be a conflict at all between the two facts of a man being alive and his not being in the house. To be in the house is not part of man's essential existence of his being alive. It is a common phenomenon that a man's life is spent both in and outside the house. There are merely two aspects of man's existence. Sometimes he is in the house sometimes he is outside the house. Even layman in the street not to speak of logician is bothered about man's non-existence in the house to when he wants to call on him on any particular occasion. If a living man were not to be found on anywhere on physical world there would perhaps occur a state of mental conflict as to how a living man cannot be traced in any part of the physical world. The mere non-existence of the house of a living man is never a sufficient ground to invoke any element of tension or conflict in the inquirer's mind and for this reason Kumārila's description of the state which is the ground of presumption is only to read too much into things.

If on the other hand we try to view the situation in terms of disjunction, Kumārila's overstress on the epistemological situation *Arthāpatti* can be better exposed if we follow the logic

of dichotomous division and classify the entirety of human existence by the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive alternatives: A living man must be either in the house or outside the house, the problem looks much more simple and far less serious. As per the logic of valid disjunctive syllogism. If you deny one of the alternatives you are certain to affirm the other.

Here the whole point of the discussion is that Kumārila is unjustified in calling the situation inexplicable in order to resolve which an assumption is warranted. Perhaps Sabara's original exposition of *Arthāpatti* is more convincing and a better representation of the facts of *Arthāpatti*. It is so because the assumption a man's existence outside the house is only a logical step or an intellectual necessity on the part of a knowing mind which is only half way through. The assumption under consideration rather fills a gap rather than explaining a conflict or contradiction. It is simply because there is no conflict at all. A state of conflict exists between two opposing facts or phenomena. There is a conflict or a contradiction when we say that fire is cool and water is with flames. What contradiction is there between a living man and his not being in the house?

In the absence of a conflict or a contradiction the question of which explains what, a point centreing which the two schools of Pūrvamīmāṃsa differ from each other does not arise at all. The assumption, on the part of a knowing mind, that a living man exists outside his house after knowing that he is not in his house is neither an explanation offered to the doubts regarding his being alive nor an explanation to one's non-existence in his house. It is simply the completion of a single process of thought.

I think that is exactly what is in the mind of Prabhākara, when he says that the objective of the *Arthāpatti* is the knowledge of that which is not explained that the knowledge of that which

explains it. Hence in the given instance of *Arthāpatti*, the fact of Devadatta's non-existence in the house, is what according to Prabhākara, that explains the fact of Devadatta's existence outside. What we mean to say that Prabhākara must have thought over Sabara's original view of *Arthāpatti* along with Kumārila's interpretation in the way which we have analysed above and presented a more consistent and more convincing explanation of the nature and function of *Arthāpatti*. First of all, the existence of a conflict or inexplicability does not arise simply because there is no real opposition in the fact already seen or heard and therefore the question of resolving or explaining any such phenomenon does not arise. Secondly the presumption of something unseen as an attempted reconciliation of an already known object is as futile as groping in the dark for a black cat which is not there.

That *Arthāpatti* is a knowledge of that which is not explained from the knowledge of that which explains, it is only a true representation of the natural process of thought, still preserving its identity as an independent *pramāṇa*. Though Prabhākara's analysis of the process of *Arthāpatti* is represented as a process which is the reverse of Kumārila's interpretation, it only rectifies a sort of laboured understanding of the Bhāṣyakara and the misrepresentation of the original text of the Bhāṣya. Prabhāra's explanation is pure and simple and that presumption is but natural completion of a process of thought. Herein also lies the unique and distinctive element of *Arthāpatti* from that of inference. Though Prabhākara is all out to expound *Arthāpatti* in a way that it distinguishes itself from *Anumāna* his conclusions ultimately hit the right path. The distinguishing *Arthāpatti* from that of inference as is evident from Prabhākara's analysis may be summarised as follows. In *Arthāpatti* the knowledge of a fact seen or heard (which is the ground) involves an intellectual obligation to fulfil the remaining part of thought, in the form of presumption. In the

absence of the presumption the earlier process of thought remains incomplete and halfway through. But in the case of inference as one infers fire from smoke involves a determined effort to account for particular phenomenon. In the absence of any such determined effort an explanation the basis of such inference would be self sufficient and does not remain in any state of inexplicability or confusion. Hence the presumption of something is an inevitable and natural continuation of process and inference is something which we can afford when there is will to do it. This exactly what is in the mind of Prabhākara in his account of *Arthāpatti*.

B. ARTHĀPATTI: THE CONCEPTION OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

Six sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are accepted by the Advaitin.⁴¹ They are perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-cognition. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsikas also accept all these six. As a matter of fact, generally the Advaitins follow the Bhāṭṭa in all empirical categories and usages.⁴² The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsikas accept only five *pramāṇas* with presumption while the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaita Vedāntins accept six, adding non-cognition or *Anupalabdhi*.

The Advaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsa presumption as a separate source of knowledge because in their opinion it provides us with the knowledge of facts which cannot be explained otherwise. Mīmāṃsikas frequently use *Arthāpatti* for explaining the Vedic texts by presuming missing words and meanings without which the Vedic texts cannot be correctly understood. They also base their beliefs on presumption in such cases as survival of the self after death. The Advaitins hold *Arthāpatti* useful for explaining the Vedānta texts. For example, the Upanisads sometimes speak of the creation of the world by *Brahman* and

out of *Brahman* but sometimes they teach that there is no multiplicity and hold that Brahman is the only reality. This conflict is resolved by supposing that creation is not a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *Brahman*, but only an apparent change (*vivarta*) like the appearance of a rope as a snake. The supposition of *māyā* as the power of *Brahman* to create an apparent world is a kind of presumption. The Advaitins use this method also in assuming some unperceived facts and principles for explaining experienced facts. For example, they suppose the existence of an objectless blissful consciousness during dreamless sleep, in order to explain the memory which we have on rising from such a sleep when we say 'I had a comfortable sleep'.

The Advaita Vedānta as an advocate of the view of presumption as an independent source of cognition, may be said to differ from Prabhākara and be in agreement with Kumārila in not recognizing 'doubt' as an element in this source of cognition. Even so, be it noted that it understands presumption in a way different from that in which the Mimāṃsā understands it, although it may be that their separate understandings ultimately amount to one and the same thing. The Advaita Vedāntist view of presumption differs from that of the Mimāṃsā in making no mention of such a thing as the conflict between two known facts and consequently, being unconcerned with the idea of the resolution of the conflict of this description, in the view of the Advaita Vedānta, there is only one fact which is said to be well known namely, that something presents itself to be inexplicable or stands unexplained and so is in need of explanation. This points to the function, the performance of which is the very essence of presumption. And the function, according to the Advaita Vedānta, is none other than the framing of an assumption or supposition (*Kalpanā*) which provides the explanation in demand. Thus presumption is regarded by this school of philosophy as comprising the knowledge of the fact to be explained

(*Upapādyā-jñānam*) and the supposition or, let us say, knowledge of something that provides the required explanation (*Upapādakā-jñānam*). Then by calling the former knowledge *kāraṇam* (instrumental cause) and the latter *phalam* (result or effect), the Vedānta arrives at the definition of presumption as the framing of an explanatory hypothesis (*Upapādaka kalpanam*) on the basis of the knowledge of the fact to be explained (*Upapādyā-jñānam*).⁴³ The fact that a person is fat, though he does not eat during the day, cannot be intelligible unless he eats at night. The fatness of the person is to be explained and eating at night explains it. The inexplicability of fatness in the absence of eating in the day is removed by the presumption of eating at night. Like Kumārila, Dharmarāja also distinguishes between two kinds of *Arthāpatti*, viz. *Drṣṭārthāpatti* and *Srutārthāpatti*. A man observes that there is silver in front of him and immediately afterwards he observes that there is no silver at all. The second cognition denies the presence of silver. But the denial cannot be explained if the first cognition 'there is silver' be true. Therefore, it is presumed that the first cognition was false. The perception of silver is a fact and the non-perception of it also is a fact. The fact of non-perception becomes inexplicable, if the silver perceived at first be real. This inexplicability is removed when it is presumed that the silver was unreal or illusory. This is an example of *Drṣṭārthāpatti*.

This seems to indicate that the Advaita Vedānta makes an improvement upon the position of the Mīmāṃsa in so far as it presents presumption (*Arthāpatti*) in a clearer scientific light by regarding it as the framing of explanatory hypothesis instead of as a source of cognition in the ordinary sense. Thus the situation, for example, that a person who desists from eating during day time is still stout (*pina*) is, the view of the Advaita Vedānta, one which primarily calls for an explanation, instead of the acquisition

of the knowledge of something or other. And the explanation in demand, as is held by this school of philosophy, is to be found in a hypothesis which is likely to be that the person concerned eats at night.

It would be worthwhile to mention, however, the Advaita Vedānta has made an attempt to inquire into the various situations which call for their explanation and has, accordingly, come to admit several kinds of presumption (*Arthāpatti*). *Arthāpatti* is of two kinds : a) postulation from the perceived (*Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*) and b) postulation from the verbal cognised (*Srutarthāpatti*).

The first kind can be illustrated from the instance of the illusory silver. One sees the shell as silver. The cognition now is "This is silver". The illusion is sublated by the subsequent cognition of the locus, the shell. The sublation is of the form "This is not silver" contradicting the earlier condition "This is silver". This will be quite unintelligible, if the silver in "This is silver" were real. So, one has to presume that the silver is not real but illusory.

The second variety of postulation occurs as follows : A sentence is heard. Now, the own sense of this sentence itself is unintelligible. Therefore, there has to be postulated some other sense to make the sentence intelligible. For example, there is the statement in the Chāndogya Upanisad: "He who knows the self, crosses sorrow".⁴⁴ This declaration is unintelligible in its own sense. For, self is known, and this knowledge cannot remove the entire host of bonds or fetters signified by the word 'Sorrow' - knowledge can remove only error. To make the sense of the declaration intelligible, bondage which is sorrow, is taken to be illusory. Thus, the postulation here is with reference to illusoriness. Even in empirical statements like "Devadatta who will live to

be a hundred is not at home", his existence somewhere outside his home is postulated.

This postulation from the verbal cognition (*Srutārthāpatti*) is again of two kinds, viz., one which is due to the failure on the part of a speaker to make a grammatically complete statement (*abhidhānānupapatti*) and one which is due to the unintelligibility of the meaning of a grammatically complete statement (*abhihithānupapatti*).

When a part of sentence is expressed, there may be the unintelligibility of expressing and syntactical relation. In that case, we have to postulate a word which will complete the syntactical relation. For example, the word 'door' as a part of a sentence may not have intelligible syntactical relation. It must then be supposed that the word 'door' as a part of a sentence may not have intelligible syntactical relation. It must then be supposed that the word 'door' stands in a syntactical relation to the word 'close', and the sentence will be 'closed door'. For another example, in scripture, rites are prescribed to the one who desires heaven, as 'He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with *Jyotiṣṭoma*'. Sometimes the fruit is not explicitly stated. In those cases, a fruit has to be postulated.⁴⁵

With regard to the non-intelligibility of the expressed, when a sense of a sentence is unintelligible, another sense has to be postulated. For example : 'He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*'. Here as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, being momentary, cannot be instrumental to the attainment of heaven, there is postulation an unseen potency, called *apūrva*, as intermediary.⁴⁶

We may give a common example of postulation to explain the incongruity of meaning in a statement. The sentence 'The camel is the ship of the desert' is meaningless if the word 'ship' is taken in its primary sense, e.g., 'a vessel to navigate in the sea'. It is by the assumption of its secondary or figurative meaning,

such as 'a means of transportation', that we find the significance of the statement.

The Vedāntic account of *Arthāpatti* differs from Bhāṭṭa in three main respects: 1) Dharmarāja does not specify the cause of inexplicability while according to Bhāṭṭa apparent contradiction is the cause. In most of the examples of *Arthāpatti* given by Dharmarāja we find that an element of contradiction is involved. But in the example of the first kind of *Srutārthāpatti*⁴⁷ we do not find any contradiction, though inexplicability or unintelligibility exists. According to the Bhāṭṭa too, importation of a word in order to complete a sentence is an instance of *Srutārthāpatti*; and hence according to the rule that apparent contradiction is the instrumental cause of presumption, we should expect apparent contradiction here also. But actually there is no contradiction of any sort here. There is contradiction when a known fact conflicts with our past general experience, i.e., when what happens is opposed to what we expect to happen according to our past experience. But when someone utters the word '*dvāram*' (door) there is nothing which happens to conflict with our past experience. What we expect is that the speaker should speak something more while he does not speak more. It would involve contradiction if we expected one additional word appropriate in the context and the speaker uttered a different word. For example, if the speaker says 'close the door' when it is too hot inside, the sentence gives rise to conflict because the word 'close' cannot be expected in the situation. Of course, in a way the utterance of the word '*dvāram*' (door) also produces conflict in so far as the hearer does not know for the time being whether he should close the door or see it or break it. But this is not a conflict between two cognitions or facts, because it occurs between two or more subjective responses of the hearer aroused by the word '*dvāram*', while the word itself is not one of the conflicting parties. Therefore, the unintelligibility caused by the

utterance of the word '*dvāram*' is not due to its incompatibility with our experience, but due to the failure on the part of the speaker to express his intention fully. The presumption of the word '*pidhehi*' in this case is like framing an hypothesis, and the situation that it seeks to explain is far more complex than the mere utterance of the word '*dvāram*'. The hearer presumes the appropriate word not merely on hearing the word '*dvāram*' but also on perceiving the other details, e.g. the existing state of the door, the weather etc.

2) The contradiction in the example of *Dr̥ṣṭārthāpati* is between two specific cognitions, viz. 'this is silver' and 'this is not silver' and it is no apparent but real because the two cognitions cannot be simultaneously true. This seems to be inconsistent with the Bhāṭṭa view. According to the Bhāṭṭa view a contradiction can be reconciled through presumption only when one of the conflicting cognitions is general and the other specific, in which case the contradiction is merely apparent. The Bhāṭṭa view that a real contradiction cannot be reconciled seems to be true because the term 'reconciliation' implies that the claim of the conflicting cognitions to be true is justified through presumption, while in the case of real contradiction one of the cognitions is really false and hence its claim to be true can never be justified. Thus there can be no reconciliation in the proper sense between the cognitions 'this is silver' and 'this is not silver' through the presumption that the first one is false. However, it is wrong to say that the contradiction which leads to presumption lies between two cognitions. The contradiction which is reconcilable primarily lies not between two cognitions but between a fact and our general experience or between two facts whose co-existence seems to be inexplicable. The fact that living Caitra is not present in the house is inconsistent with my general experience that he was found in the house whenever I went to see him. This inconsistency is not

logical but psychological. In Dharmarāja's example of *Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* the contradiction lies between the facts that silver is perceived from a distance and that on making a closer approach it is not found where it was perceived; and this contradiction is reconciled by presuming that what was perceived from a distance was not real but illusory silver, because if it were to be real it could not have disappeared so soon without any visible cause. This co-existence of silver is inexplicable otherwise than on the presumption of the illusory nature of silver.

3) In *Śrutārthāpatti*, according to the Bhāṭṭa view, there is always the presumption of a word or sentence, while according to the Vedānta view there is sometimes the presumption of a word and sometimes the presumption of a fact. In the Vedānta view there is sometimes the presumption of a word and sometimes the presumption of a fact. The Vedānta view seems to be a compromise between the Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara views when a person utters a grammatically incomplete sentence, i.e. a sentence in which the subject or the object or the verb is missing, the hearer always presumes a word or words. It is true that the incompleteness of the sentence is detected by understanding the fact to which the sentence refers, for example one who hears the word '*dvāram*' discovers that the speaker's statement is incomplete only when he understands the situation that the weather is cold and the door is open. But then the incompleteness is not removed simply by presuming the fact that the door is to be closed. Suppose the speaker utters the word 'door' and makes a gesture to close it or utters the word 'close' and points with his finger towards the door. Yet the expectancy created in the mind of the hearer is not relieved unless the required word is uttered. We actually find that sometimes the hearer himself utters involuntarily the word or words left unuttered by the speaker. This fact favours

the Vedānta view. On hearing the word '*dvāram*' the hearer closed the door, but at the same time he feels that the speaker ought to have spoken the complete sentence '*dvāram pidhehi*', and thus he himself supplies the word '*pidhehi*'. When, however, a sentence is grammatically complete but the sense involves some inconsistency, it is not a word that is presumed but some fact. A man says that Devadatta is fat and does not eat during the day. The statement is grammatically complete. But the hearer who presumes that Devadatta eats at night does not feel that the speaker ought to have spoken the clause 'Devadatta eats at night' in addition. Devadatta's eating at night is really a fact implied in his fatness in the absence of eating during the day. The speaker himself may be ignorant of his implication. How can then the hearer feel that the speaker has missed to utter the said clause? Hence it is more reasonable to say that the object of *Arthāpatti* in the present case is a fact rather than a clause. This type of *Arthāpatti* is equivalent to drawing the implication of a statement. Thus the Vedānta view of *Srutārthāpatti* is more reasonable than the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhakara views. *Abhidhānānupapatti* leads to the presumption of the word which together with the actually uttered word forms a complete statement; and *abhihitānupapatti* leads to the presumption of a fact which resolves the conflict in the sense of an already complete statement.

Dharmarāja establishes that *Arthāpatti* cannot be included in inference. The Advaitins hold that in inference, our knowledge is based on pervasion of co-presence alone, *anvaya*, i.e., universal concomitance between the middle and the major term. When *Arthāpatti* is reduced to an inferential form, the major premise of such an inference will express only the universal relation between the major term and the absence of the middle term. The relation will be *vyatirekavyāpti*, and not *anvayavyāpti*. And

Advaitins do not accept *vyatireki* or merely negative inference. For example, in the syllogism "Earth is different from the other elements, because it possesses odour", the *vyapti* or pervasion is negative in the form "whatever is not different from the other elements has no odour". But it cannot be said positively that "whatever has odour is different from the other elements, exists in it or not". So the inferential character of *kevala vyatireki* is not accepted by Advaitins.⁴⁸ Here, in the case mentioned, the major premise will be "The absence of eating at night while fasting by day in a case of the absence of stoutness".⁴⁹ For reasons stated above, this *Vyatireki* type of inference is not admissible to the Advaitin. According to him, *Vyatireki* type of inference can only indicate an unintelligibility thus calling for a postulation. In the example of the earth, it is thus: earth could not intelligibly possess a quality not present in other elements, without being different from those elements. In the case of Devadatta, Devadatta cannot intelligibly be stout while not eating at day time without eating at night.⁵⁰

Thus *Arthāpatti* is a distinct *pramāṇa*, standing in its own right and supplying a specific need in knowledge.

We may formulate the Advaita standpoint thus: Since it could be demonstrated that all empirical experience is relative and finite, we are justified in postulating the Absolute. Since no relation other than that of non-difference is tenable between subject and object and the different objects of cognition 'non-difference' can be postulated. This is not the same as the argument from the idea of the Absolute to its existence. Here it is argued that since we experience the finite and the relative and find it to be not self-existent, the Absolute is postulated in order to understand it. But *Arthāpatti* cannot tell us the nature of the Absolute; that should be known only from the Veda. *Arthāpatti* is an exercise of reason, they do not reckon it to be inferential reasoning.

The Vedāntins themselves used *Arthāpatti* not simply for explaining facts of finite experience like the stoutness of a man who does not eat during the day or the absence of Devadatta from home, but also for arriving at philosophical categories like that of power or *Sakti*. Their main argument in that may be stated thus; Something, as e.g. germ growing into a tree or *Jyotistoma* sacrifice leading to heaven, would be unexplained (or *anupapanna*) if there were no supposition of power. Dr. Seal is reported to have said that the difference of the general philosophical position between Hume and Kant may be said to rest on the application of an *Arthāpatti*. Over against fact of finite experience as obtained through series of sense impressions stands such general notions as causality. The element of contradiction involved is sought to be removed by Hume by rejection of ontological validity of the general notions. In the same situation Kant on the other hand proceeds to reason on the line of *Arthāpatti*. Accepting the validity of both discrete sense elements and of general notions he comes to his transcendental deductions. The line of procedure is analogous to that in *Arthāpatti*. From the consequent to the only possible antecedent without which it cannot be explained. We have stated that the conclusion in *Arthāpatti* is a function of the nature of the partial contradictories in mutual relation. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire how would Kant's transcendental implication stand modified if the facts were regarded in other than human tradition of absolute difference of body and mind. The objective idealism of Hegel can be said to be the result of an *Arthāpatti* in which the basic facts of the arguments have been so changed.⁵¹

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41. tānīpramāṇāni sat, pratyakṣānumānopamāna sabalartha pāṭyanupalobdhibedaṭ, Vedānta Paribhāṣa, p.6.
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Advaitins hold that no inference can take place through the absence of the probans where the probandum to be proved in non-existent. They insist on positive experience.
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Chapter III

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA ON ARTHĀPATTI

Since *Arthāpatti* is primarily concerned with the framing of hypothesis and since hypothesis relate to something as yet unperceived, *Arthāpatti* needs to be regarded as a source of *parokṣa* (non-perceptual) and not *aparokṣa* (perceptual) cognition. So the question of its reducibility to perception cannot arise. And its reducibility to either testimony or comparison, on account of their being sources of *parokṣa* cognition, is obviously out of the question. The only source of *parokṣa* cognition, its reducibility to which may be characterized by some measure of plausibility, should be none other than inference. But as we have seen earlier, both Prabhākara and Kumārila have argued the distinctness of *Arthāpatti* from inference in their respective ways. The Advaita Vedānta also does the same in the following manner. This school of philosophy, be it noted in the beginning, holds that in the case of inference strictly so called, the universal major premise must be based on positive concomitance (*anvayavyāpti*), and that the inference in which negative concomitance (*Vyatirekavyāpti*) constitutes the basis of its universal major premise is really no inference as such, but is another name for *Arthāpatti*. Judged in the light, *Arthāpatti* as the Advaita Vedānta argues, is distinct from inference for the simple reason that a universal major premise based on positive concomitance is not available in its case, the proposition, for example, "whoever there is stoutness (*pīnatvaim*) there is the condition of eating at night (*rātribhojanam*)" being contrary to fact. But this really brings

to light the crux of the whole situation by leaving behind the demand for a fresh inquiry into the possibility of inference with a universal major premise based on negative concomitance (*VyatirekaVyāpti*). Hence, arises the necessity for the consideration of the attempts made by the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya to show that *Arthāpatti*, in the final analysis, is a form of inference.

Let us begin by observing that Prabhākara's attempt to account for the distinction between *Arthāpatti* and *Anumāna* with reference to his admission of the presence of an element of doubt in the former and the absence of it in the latter proves a failure in the light of Kumārila's finding that *Arthāpatti*, as a matter of fact, does not have to bear the burden of any such thing as doubt. Even so, Kumārila is as insistent on the recognition of this distinction as is Prabhākara, and finds the reason for this recognition in his view that *Arthāpatti* differs from inference in that, whereas the former involves the conflict between two known facts, the latter is free from such involvement. But then, any attempt to argue the distinction between the two sources of cognition under consideration, not with reference to their respective peculiarities as ways of cognizing, but reference to the element or elements supposed to be involved in them, is undoubtedly superficial and cannot really serve the purpose which it is intended to serve. This seems to have been realized by the Advaita Vedānta as is evident from the fact, that, instead of undertaking the useless task of ascertaining the factors likely to be involved in *Arthāpatti*, it straight away takes notice of the peculiarity of this way of cognizing and accordingly states that it is none but the act of framing hypothesis with a view to explaining situations which call for explanation. Thus has the Advaita Vedānta, as it seems to me, offered the most realistic interpretation of the nature

Arthāpatti, which as will be explained later, hardly leaves any scope for asking the question whether this source of cognition is reducible to any other and especially inference.

As previously indicated, the Advaita Vedānta, while dismissing the possibility of the interpretation of *Arthāpatti* as identical with that kind of inference in which the universal major premise is based upon positive concomitance, does not rule out, but on the contrary, admits the possibility of its being regarded as the same as the kind of inference in whose case the universal major premise is based on negative concomitance. Even so, it seeks to rescue *Arthāpatti*, from its absorption in inference by declaring the inference of the latter kind to be nothing but *Arthāpatti*, in disguise. But this is too simple and easy way of vindicating the independence of this way of cognising to produce any salutary effect upon the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy which, consistently with their respective epistemological positions, are intent upon establishing the identity of *Arthāpatti* with inference. It is, therefore, no wonder that all of them should try to show that *Arthāpatti*, is indistinguishable from inference in one form or another. It is, however, the philosophers belonging to the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools who have taken the greatest interest in the performance of this task.

A. GAUTAMA AND VĀTSYĀYANA ON ARTHĀPATTI

The Mimāṃsaka's was not the only account of *Arthāpatti* current in the early schools; and it was not the original meaning of the term. The notion is discussed in that passage of the *Nyāya-sūtra*¹, which argues against the separate status of supposed *pramāṇa*'s other than four enumerated in *Nyāya-sūtra-I*, i.3; and the account there given, as interpreted

by Vātsyāyana, is not identical with the account given by Sabara.

The topic of *Arthāpatti* is introduced by Gautama in the aphorism 2.2.1 by way of an objection that his classification of sources of knowledge is inadequate, because he has left out *Arthāpatti* (and three sources of knowledge). Gautama defends his classification in the following aphorism by saying (among other things) that *Arthāpatti* is included in inference (*Anumāna*). His own statement of objection is: "(The sources of knowledge) are not four, because *Aitihya*, *Arthāpatti*, *Sambhava*, and *Abhāva* are (additional) sources of knowledge". The reply: "Since *Aitihya* (tradition) is not different from *Sabda* (authoritative statement) and since *Arthāpatti*, *Sambhava*, and *Abhāva* are not different from *Anumāna* (inference), there is no refutation (of the view that the sources of knowledge are four, namely, perception, inference, analogy and authoritative statement)". From this objection and reply we know that already before the time of Gautama there were philosophers who subscribed to a narrow view of inference and excluded *Arthāpatti* and so on from it as distinct sources of knowledge as against that Gautama is subscribing to a broad conception of inference that would be inclusive of *Arthāpatti* and so on.

In the aphorism following those mentioned earlier, Gautama has discussed to question of the validity or invalidity of *Arthāpatti*. But he has not explained what is meant by *Arthāpatti*. For such an explanation we have to look at Vātsyāyana, whose definition of *Arthāpatti* is follows: "Where from a proposition stated another proposition follows as a necessary consequences, that is *Arthāpatti*."² This definition of *Arthāpatti* makes it applicable to any valid deductive reasoning with a single premise and single conclusion. Vātsyāyana has not emphasized

that there should be a single conclusion. He has merely put *Artha* in the singular number. Hence one cannot rule out the possibility that there could be more than one premise. However, in both of the examples available from Vātsyāyana, there is only one premise. Thus it is probable that what is meant by *Arthāpatti* is a deductive reasoning with a single premise.

Vātsyāyana's definition of *Arthāpatti* does not make it clear on what the implication, between the premise and the conclusion, is based. His other remarks and examples, however, help us to see what the basis is. We will first look at his example. "For instance, what is implied in the statement that when there is no cloud it does not rain? (The implication is) that it rains where there are clouds".³ i.e. the object cognised through implication is that the production of effect, rain, is limited to the existence of the cause, clouds. If not A, not B: ergo if B, then A. Vātsyāyana further characterises this process as 'apprehending from opposition what is not stated'.⁴ He says shortly afterwards: "from the statement that in the absence of the cause the effect is not produced, we arrive by implication at what is related to thus on its opposite, namely that the effect is produced in the presence of the cause. For from a negative comes the opposed affirmative".⁵

It may be noticed that the premise and the conclusion in this argument are conditional statements. We have seen that Gautama and Vātsyāyana were concerned in disjunctive syllogism with reasoning involving the two connectives of negation and disjunction. The present specimen shows that reasoning involving yet another connective, namely, the conditional, occupied their attention. Moreover, in this case both the premise and the conclusion are unmistakably propositions, and hence the reasoning belongs, without doubt, to the logic of propositions.

Gautama has declared that reasonings of this kind are to be included in inference. Regarding that, Vātsyāyana's comments are as follows: "Inference is knowledge through the given of what is not given, but related (to the given) . . . Since *Arthāpatti* is knowledge of a proposition which is not stated obtained from the precise understanding of the meaning of a sentence by means of the relation of opposition, it is definitely inference".⁶ According to this quotation, *Arthāpatti* is knowledge from the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. In modern terminology this amounts to saying that *Arthāpatti* is analytic knowledge and not knowledge obtained by any empirical means.

Moreover, the proposition deduced is said to be related by way of 'opposition' to the premise. Vātsyāyana has clarified what is meant by 'opposition' (*pratyanyikabhāva*) as follows: "If there is no cause, there is no effect from the meaning of this sentence is obtained the proposition related by way of opposition that 'if there is cause, there is effect'. The positive is the opposite (*pratyanyika*) of the negative".⁷ What is meant is that 'there is cause', is related by way of opposition to 'there is no cause', and similarly 'there is no effect', to 'there is effect'. In the proposition 'there is no cause' the sanskrit sentence shows that what is negated is the proposition 'there is cause' and similarly in the case of 'there is no effect'. Thus we know from this example that a proposition and its negation are related by way of opposition.

It is now clear that the implication on which the deduction of 'if there are clouds, there is rain' from 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain' is based on the relation of opposition. What is required is that the conclusion should contain negation of the constituent simple propositions in the premise.

We have another specimen of *Arthāpatti* in Vātsyāyana's comments⁶ "after stating 'non-eternal because of being originated'

it is obtained from the meaning that what is eternal is non-originated..... this by *Arthāpatti*". Here 'non-eternal because of being originated' is certainly not intended to be the premise as it stands. This is rather a synoptic way of stating a pentapod argument which, as we know from the context, runs as follows: 'sound is non-eternal because of being originated; what is originated is non-eternal' and so on. The intended premise of *Arthāpatti* is 'what is originated is non-eternal'. This example, however, creates some complications for the correct interpretation of *Arthāpatti*. In the previous example both the premise and the conclusion are compound propositions. But in this case they are categorical propositions. In fact this case belongs to the variety of immediate inference known as contraposition in western logic. Thus it is obvious that the premise of an *Arthāpatti* is not necessarily a compound proposition. It may also be a categorical proposition, presumably as long as there is only one premise.

The next question is whether, in this second case, the conclusion is related by way of 'opposition' to the premise. There is no question of there being any opposition between the constituent propositions, as there was in the previous case. There is, however, a kind of 'opposition' between the constituent terms in this case. 'Originated' may be said to be 'opposed' to 'non-originated' and 'eternal', to 'non-eternal'. Vātsyāyana has said that 'the positive is the opposite of the negative'. He has not specified that 'opposition' may take place between propositions. Thus it seems that opposition is the relation between not only a proposition and its negation but also between a term and its negation.

Hence it may be said that there is a relation of 'opposition' between the premise and conclusion in both of the available specimens of *Arthāpatti*. There is no other specimen available. It is possible, therefore, though not so stated in the definition of

Arthāpatti, that the premise and the conclusion are to be related by way of 'opposition'. This would certainly amount to an important modification in the concept of *Arthāpatti*, and we do not know whether such modification would be proper. It is possible that Vātsyāyana left us with a more general definition of *Arthāpatti*, because he wanted to accommodate other cases of inference from a single premise and the conclusion are not 'opposed'.

Randle has said: "It will be clear that Vātsyāyana means little more by *Arthāpatti* than what western formalists call the opposition of propositions and immediate inference. But Vātsyāyana has no doctrine of 'logical opposition' as that embodied in our 'Square of opposition'.⁷ Now we have seen that there is one example of *Arthāpatti* which belongs to contraposition as a variety of immediate inference (though Randle has not referred to this example at all). But there is another example (the only one mentioned by Randle), where both the premise and the conclusion are conditional propositions. Reasoning of this type is not traditionally considered under immediate inference. The only sense in which both the example of *Arthāpatti* may be characterized as immediate inference is that in both there is exactly one premise and one conclusion. Still the important difference between the case of *Arthāpatti* dealing with conditional propositions and what are traditionally known as immediate inference should not be overlooked.

Secondly it is true that Vātsyāyana has not supplied us with a 'square of opposition'. But it is not clear that he should be expected to do so. Some of the implications within the square of opposition hold only because of construing that universal propositions have an existential import. We do not know whether Vātsyāyana construed universal propositions as having an

existential import. If he did not, some portions of the square of opposition would be invalid to him. There is reason to believe, however, that some of the implications that hold through 'opposition of propositions' were known to Gautama and Vātsyāyana. They undoubtedly knew that a universal proposition could be falsified by producing one counter example which entitled us to assert the truth of the corresponding particular proposition.

The first example of *Arthāpatti* was: 'if there is no cloud, there is no rain, so 'if there is cloud, there is rain'. This argument is invalid. Vātsyāyana (notes its invalidity while commenting on aphorism 2.2.3, which) says: "*Arthāpatti* is invalid because of being inconclusive". Vātsyāyana's comments are: "If there are no clouds, there is no rain': from the meaning of this it is obtained that 'if there are clouds, there is rain'. But even if there are clouds, there is sometimes no rain, so that this *Arthāpatti* is invalid".⁸

This passage shows that Vātsyāyana knows that an argument is invalid if its premise or premises are true and the conclusion is false. That is why he is pointing out that the preceding argument is invalid because the premise, namely, 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain' is true, but the conclusion, namely, 'if there are clouds, there is rain' is false.

Another important thing in this passage is what it reveals about the nature of conditional propositions. Vātsyāyana has referred to the point of time when there are clouds but there is no rain. This interpretation falsifies the proposition that 'if there are clouds, there is rain'. The only condition in which a material conditional is false is when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Vātsyāyana correctly identified that condition, though he has not spelt it out in actual words. Moreover, this

interpretation makes the premise 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain' is true. This shows that Vātsyāyana correctly realized that a conditional proposition remains true if the antecedent is false and the consequent true. Vātsyāyana, however, has not explicitly supplied us with the truth table of the material conditional as was done by Megarian-Stoic logicians.

After pointing out that the argument is invalid, Vātsyāyana has gone further to indicate what would be a valid argument in the given circumstances. This is found in his comments on aphorism 2.3.4 that "(*Arthāpatti* was thought to be invalid) because of considering as *Arthāpatti* what is not *Arthāpatti* (prefer)".⁹ Vātsyāyana writes:

That even if there is the cause, there is no effect due to obstructing factors is a causal phenomenon and this is not what is known with certainty by *Arthāpatti*. What then is known with certainty by it? 'If there is the cause, there is the effect' (should be changed to) 'it is not that there is the effect without there being the cause', this is what is known with certainty by it. It should be remembered that these comments are about the invalid argument. Vātsyāyana is discussing. Vātsyāyana is telling us in a more general way that what should be deduced from 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain' is not 'if there are clouds, there is rain', but 'it is not both that there is rain without there being clouds'. This is a valid argument in the form that 'if not A, not B; therefore, not both B and not A'. Randle has stated the valid form specified by Vātsyāyana as: 'if not A, not B; ergo if B, A'. This is not strictly accurate. 'If B, A' is logically equivalent to 'not both B and not A', but still a different proposition.

One interesting question to ask is why Vātsyāyana switched from the proposition 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain' to

the more general proposition 'if there is no cause, there is no effect', making similar appropriate changes with respect to the other propositions involved? There is more than one answer possible, but the answer that first comes to our mind is that Vātsyāyana was not concerned with the particular words 'clouds' and 'rain'. He not only wanted to show that the particular argument 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain; therefore, if there are clouds, there is rain' is fallacious, but also that the very form of the argument is invalid, so that any other argument put into the same form would turn out to be invalid. Hence Vātsyāyana used general concepts. The word *Kāraṇa*, in the present context, may be interpreted as the ground or the antecedent and *kārya*, as the consequent. Thus Vātsyāyana's statements amount to saying that the following form of argument is invalid, namely, 'if there is negation of the ground there is negation of the consequent; therefore, if there is the ground, there is the consequent'. When he showed that the argument 'if there are no clouds, there is no rain; therefore, if there are clouds, there is rain', is invalid, he may have produced it as a counter example to the invalid argument form. One important ingredient of a logical theory is the method of proving the invalidity of argument forms by producing a counter example, that is, producing an argument in the same form, the premise(s) of which is true and the conclusion false. It is likely that Vātsyāyana was aware of this method and applied it to the present case.

It will be clear that Vātsyāyana means little more by *Arthāpatti* than that western formalists call the opposition of propositions and immediate inference. But Vātsyāyana has no doctrine of 'logical opposition' such as that embodies in our 'square of opposition'. He notes that some supposed 'implications' are

in fact not logically necessary; but he does not formulate the precise conditions under which an implication is cogent¹⁰

Nevertheless the *Sūtra* already defends *Arthāpatti* against the charge of being inconclusive; although it denies that it is an independent source of knowledge, and holds that it comes under the head of inference. Neither the *sūtra* nor the *bhāṣya* makes it clear just what form implication would take when expressed as *Anumāna*, inference through a middle term. But the *sūtra* has no doubts as to the identity of *Arthāpatti* and *Anumāna*; for it argues against the objector's inference ("implication is not a source of valid knowledge because it is inconclusive"), that, if implication is invalid, then this inference itself invalid; while, if the inference is valid, then implication is valid; the meaning of the dilemma being that the validity of inference stands or falls with the validity of implication since in fact there is no distinction between implication and inference. Neither the *sūtra* nor the *bhāṣya* recognises the distinction, first made perhaps by some Mīmāṃsaka predecessor of Sabara (unless Sabara himself originated the doctrine) between verbal implication (*Srutārthāpatti*) and real implication (*Drṣṭārthāpatti*). *Prāśastapada* cognises it, but regards it as of little importance.

All implication is within a system and therefore relational. Vātsyāyana takes his example from the causal relation, Sabara takes his from spatial relations (if a man is not here, he is elsewhere), while the later Mīmāṃsaka adds one based on time (if not now, at another time). All three illustrations can easily present themselves as a mere opposition between positive and negative between this and not this; for the reason that a system is a whole of mutually exclusive parts, and always be expressed disjunctively. This aspect of the relational argument is present to Vātsyāyana when he characterises the argument as based on

pratyanyikabhāva, or opposition; and when he says the positive is the *pratyanyika* of negative he lapses into a 'formal' view of 'implication'. Sabara and his school, partly atleast, avoid this tendency to a formal account, because they think of the system of facts as forcing upon the mind a point of view which is not merely the negative of the impossible supposition but a positive conception in itself. Nevertheless they do not succeed in realizing the constructive or 'synthetic' character which is the mark of a genuine *Arthāpatti* - as exemplified for example in geometrical construction, in which new positive truth arises by implication in the concrete character of a system.¹¹

Prāśastapāda does not seem to accept Vātsyāyana's account of *Arthāpatti*; and he draws the distinction, which Vātsyāyana does not draw, between *Drṣṭārthāpatti* and *Srutārthāpatti*. His actual words, however, does not enable us to determine what view of *Arthāpatti* he has in mind. But, for reasons suggested below, it is probable that Sridhara interprets him correctly.¹²

"Implication from an object of experience is no more than inference by opposition: implication from what is heard is inference from the inferred".

Sridhara glosses *Virodhyānumāna* by: "a thing which when contradicted by some other means of knowledge is inseparably connected with another thing is a 'Mark by contradiction'". Absence from the house, when contradicted by knowledge that the man is alive, is inseparably connected with, and therefore is mark of, being outside the house. Sridhara takes the reference to be to some such view of *Arthāpatti* as Sabara's.

It is a case of inference, because it clearly rests on *avinābhāva*, universal connection. "There is a middle term (i.e. the process is inference) just so far as there is a rule of necessary

connection", says Śrīdhara: "If absence in the house caused the thought of presence outside simply through the impossibility of the former alternative (*anupapattimātreṇa*), it would not be a middle term based on a universal rule (*niyamahetu*) and therefore the absence from the house might lead to the thought of something else too". (It would not point to any definite alternative). The Mīmāṃsaka says that knowledge of absence from the house generates the idea of something else in order to make itself possible and it is not possible on any other hypothesis except that of the man's being outside. But on what authority does he affirm that a living man's absence from the house is only possible in case he is outside? On the authority of the experience that a finite substance if it is in one place is not anywhere else. But then the realisation of the possibility of the man's absence from the house has as its condition a positive connection (*anvaya*), and so is inferential, since its arising depends on a universal connection. The form of the argument would be: Devadatta is out because being alive he is not seen in the house; like me'.¹³

There is no question that the process is 'inferential' in the sense of depending on a universal. The question is whether it can be 'reduced to syllogistic form'; and since the Indian syllogism is in essence inference from example this really amounts to asking whether *Arthāpatti* can be represented (fairly) as inference from example; and the obvious irrelevance of the example in Śrīdhara's attempt at reduction to syllogistic form indicates that it cannot be done. *Arthāpatti* is not inference from examples - Western Logic meets with similar difficulties in attempting to reduce relational arguments to terms of our syllogism: We cannot easily construct a premise stating explicitly the universal from which the conclusion could be supposed to be 'deduced'; and the premises as they stand present a *quaternio terminorum*: as

for instance in such arguments as 'A is to the right of B, and B to the right of C, therefore A is to the right of C'. Indian logic in its doctrine of *Arthāpatti* is facing this same problem, though from a different angle. The Indian syllogism from example does not differ in essentials from the Western syllogism. Both are subsumptive. And the fact is that there are important classes of inference which are not subsumptive, and therefore refuse reduction to syllogistic form, or to *Anumāna*. Indian logic gives a few illustrations of such arguments under the rubric of *Arthāpatti*. The treatment of the topic is inadequate; but it is still a valuable suggestion.

Prasastapāda's meaning in calling verbal implication *Anumitānumāna* is merely that verbal testimony is itself (on his showing) inference. The fact derives by 'implication' from words are arrived at inferentially; therefore the 'implication' got from such facts is 'inference from the inferred'.

B. ARTHĀPATTI IS A CASE OF SĀMANYATODRṢTA INFERENCE: UDDYOTAKARA'S VIEW

The whole burden of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika discussions of *Arthāpatti* consists in maintaining Devadatta's existence outside the house can be ascertained through inference (*Anumāna*) and likewise all instances of *Arthāpatti* can be satisfactorily explained as cases of inference.¹⁴ It argues that neither the instrumental cause of *Arthāpatti* (*anupapatti*) differs from that of inference nor the knowledge resulting therefrom differs from inferential knowledge and hence there is no necessity to recognise *Arthāpatti* as a distinct *pramāṇa*. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system then proceeds to show how *Arthāpatti* does not differ from *Anumāna*.¹⁵ It should however be pointed out here that neither the Nyāya Sūtra nor its commentaries, Nyāya Bhāṣya and

Nyāyavārtika take note of the definition and illustration of *Arthāpatti* as given by Mīmāṃsikas. The knowledge of the fact that "when there is cloud there is rain" does not result from the awareness of the conflict between two well ascertained facts. *Arthāpatti* according to the Mīmāṃsakas is the presumption of a fact that serves to remove the inconsistency or resolve the contradiction between two well-settled facts. Therefore what passes for *Arthāpatti* according to the authors of the Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāya vārtika is not *Arthāpatti* as understood by the celebrated Mīmāṃsakas. It is only a semantic implication.

It is clear from our foregoing rather detailed account of Gautama's and Vātsyāyana's account of *Arthāpatti*, that neither the Sūtrakāra nor the Bhāṣyakāra specifies the particular type of *Anumāna* under which they wanted to include *Arthāpatti*. That is, neither the Sūtra nor the Bhāṣya makes it clear just what form implication would take when expressed as *Anumāna*, inference through a middle term. But the Sūtra has no doubts as to the identity of *Arthāpatti* and *Anumāna*; for it argues against the objector's inference ("implication is not a source of valid knowledge because it is inconclusive"), that, if implication is invalid, then this inference is itself invalid; while, if the inference is valid, then implication is valid: the meaning of the dilemma being that the validity of inference stands or falls with the validity of implication - since in fact there is no distinction between implication and inference.

From what the Nyāya Bhāṣya has said it is obvious that it brings *Arthāpatti* under *anvayavyāpti* or positive invariable concomitance. Praśastapāda and his commentator Sridhara openly state that *Arthāpatti* is the same as *anvayavyāpti*.¹⁶ Vācaspati Miśra argues for the inclusion of *Arthāpatti* in *Anumāna* it is clear that he considers it as *anvayavyāpti*.¹⁷

Among the Naiyāyikās it is Vācaspati Miśra who for the first time notices and critically examines the definition and illustration of the Mīmāṃsakas Sabara and Kumārila. Udayanacārya ingeniously tries to reduce *anupapatti* to both *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* concomitances and *Virodha* to *Anvaya* concomitance and urges that, in either way, *Arthāpatti* is not different from inference.¹⁸ Vācaspati and Udayana direct their talent in detecting the presence of *anvayavyāpti* in the *Arthāpatti* example of the Mīmāṃsakās, when an existing entity does not exist at one place then it must exist at another place, i.e. non-existent at one place is invariable concomitant with existence at another place is invariable concomitant with existence at another place in the case of a positive entity ascertained to be existing. This invariable concomitance can be easily apprehended by anybody with reference to his own body. "When I am not present in one portion of the house, I am present in the other portion of the house". In the given example Devadatta does not exist in his house and therefore it follows that he exists outside. This is an unambiguous case of inference.

Uddyotakāra the author of Nyāyavārttika observes that *Arthāpatti* as advocated by the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsa as consisting in the resolution of doubt belongs to the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* variety of *Anumāna*.¹⁹

Those who hold that *Arthāpatti* is produced by *doubt* argues thus: Through astrology or otherwise it is decidedly known that Devadatta lives for hundred years; but he is not seen in the house; this absence produces doubt both as regards his hundred-year life and his living outside; and to remove that doubt and to establish and ratify his hundred years of his existence outside is postulated. In this inference Devadatta's living is doubted; from doubt we cannot get *vyāpti*; and as there is no *vyāpti* this inference cannot

be syllogism. It may be objected that if doubt can lead to postulation then, when we see something in the dark and doubt it whether it is a pillar or a man, even this doubt must lead to postulation. The answer is that not all doubts end in postulation; only that produced by the factors above mentioned leads to it. That is, one alternative like the hundred year life of Devadatta must be an absolute truth, and the other like the expectation of him in the house and not outside must be a supposition; when Devadatta is not perceived in his house there will be conflict between our expectation and our idea of his hundred year life, and the conflict will end in doubt. Such a doubt will lead us to postulation and not any other. To this again the objection is: If the two alternatives are equally strong, then where is the scope for postulation? If there is a scope, why postulate his existence outside and not his death in the house? If, on the other hand, it is said that the two alternatives are not equally strong, then there is no place for doubt. An ordinary *vyatireki* syllogism can establish the conclusion. Its form would be: Devadatta lives outside, because he is living but not found in his house; whoever is not so cannot be living and yet be absent from the house. Further, absence from the house cannot produce both doubt and postulation, for what process doubt cannot itself lead to postulation. To this objection also the Mīmāṃsaka is ready with an answer: The two alternatives are contradictories, which cannot both be true and both be false and of which one at least must be true. If we postulate Devadatta's existence outside then one alternative, his absence outside and existence inside, is negated but not his hundred year life. But if we postulate his death in the house then both his absence outside and his hundred year life will be negated - which is absurd. (We should note that, because of Devadatta's absence from the house, his hundred year life on the one hand and his

absence outside and existence in the house on the other become contradiction as only one of them can be true).

This kind of *Arthāpatti* in which doubt is *karana* the Naiyāyikas try to include in their *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* syllogisms. Gautama's classification of inference is contained in the solitary aphorism: 'Inference is of three kinds, *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and

sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.²⁰ In the *Sāṃkhya kārika* of Īśvarakṛṣṇatoo, it is pointedly stated that inference is of three kinds.²¹ In Nyāya Sūtra, three examples of inference are given.²² They are: the inference of past rain from a swelling river, the inference of future rain from the carrying of eggs by ants, and the inference of the presence of a peacock from its sound. These examples are intended by Gautama to correspond respectively to *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* kinds of inference: For *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* Vātsyāyana adduces the example of the movement of the Sun. The cause for the Sun's change of place is motion. When we see the Sun occupying a certain place in the morning and other times during the day and altogether a different place in the evening, we can infer that it is his motion that is the cause of this.

To the above argument of the Mīmāṃsakās the Naiyāyika answers: Of the two alternatives one is certainly to be denied. The argument that Devadatta's death negates both alternatives while his existence outside negates only one, a *tarka*, which is another way of saying: If Devadatta were dead his age would not have been hundred years of life. Withholding of such *tarka* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* syllogism negates one of the alternatives by having in view the idea of death, which would be true if Devadatta does not exist outside. To this the Mīmāṃsaka replies: If his existence outside is not known at all,

then living Devadatta must be taken to be present in the house only. And if the result of our syllogism is to be the negation of one of the opposition alternatives, it would be impossible without knowing beforehand Devadatta's existence outside, which must have been possible only through *Arthāpatti*.²³

It is somewhat difficult to follow this argument. However it may be expressed thus. Is the existence outside to be inferred from the absence in the house or is the absence in the house to be inferred from the existence outside? First, we start with the idea that Devadatta is in his house; we do not find him and we suspect that he is dead. But his death conflicts with his hundred year life guaranteed by astrology. So his death has to be denied. But what is the basis of the negation? Only his existence outside. Hence without the knowledge of his existence outside one of the alternatives cannot be negated. But how to obtain that knowledge? Can it be obtained simply from the absence of Devadatta from the house? No. For Devadatta might have been dead also. So unless our doubt that Devadatta is dead is removed, we cannot infer his existence outside; but that doubt is removed only when we know his existence outside. The Mīmāṃsaka says that Devadatta's existence outside is known through *Arthāpatti* and this knowledge negates the possibility of his death; and he contends that the Naiyāyikas cannot say this because, according to him, Devadatta's existence outside cannot be known unless it is decided that he is not dead. Indeed, the Naiyāyikas says that his decision is obtained through *tarka*, and that ordinary syllogism assisted by this *tarka* gives the conclusion that Devadatta exists outside.

His *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* syllogism would be of the following form: Devadatta is either dead or living, because he is an organism like me. Now *tarka* comes to help this syllogism: If he were dead his age would not have been a hundred years of life and

both the alternatives referred to above would be denied. Then the conclusion is: Devadatta who must be either living or dead, when he cannot be dead, must be living outside. The Naiyāyikas contend that *tarka* does not assist doubt because it would not be economical (*lāghava*) to assume that it assists the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* syllogism rather than doubt, for doubt is not a *pramāṇa*.²⁴

Some of the later Mīmāṃsakaś therefore hold that *Arthāpatti* is produced not by doubt, but by incompatibility, and that it is a postulate to remove that incompatibility. Devadatta is living; he is absent from his house; his absence is incompatible with his long life; to remove the incompatibility his existence outside has to be postulated. One may here try to frame a syllogism. Devadatta exists outside, because though absent from the house he is living, just as a pot which is not destroyed but absent from the house must be found elsewhere; or because any existent thing, if not found in one place, must be found in another, just as I, standing in the middle of the room, or absent from its corner. But this does not refute *Arthāpatti* as a separate form of inference, because our knowledge of Devadatta's existence outside can be obtained even when we are ignorant of the concomitance between the middle and the major terms. *Sāmānyatodrṣṭavyāpti* cannot be accepted because there can be no *vyāpti* of that type.

The Naiyāyika says: What is *anupapatti* or incompatibility? Incompatibility exists when there is no absence of *hetu* wherever there is absence of *sādhya*. Hence there is no need of a separate *pramāṇa* called *Athāpatti*. The Mīmāṃsakaś reply: Syllogism is possible only when we have *vyāptapakṣ- hadharmatājñāna*, that is when we are able to subsume the minor term under the middle. But here there is no major premise and so no middle term. It may be said that with the help of the *vyatirakvyāpti* the minor

can give the conclusion. But the Naiyāyikas themselves say that *Vyatirekavyāpti* is of no use in a *kevalānyayi* inference, and instead of having so many forms of *vyāpti*, it would be economical (*lāghava*) to have only one which asserts the direct concomitance (*sādhovyāpyatvam*) of *hetu* and *sādhya*. Moreover, the absence of Devadatta is found in the room, and how can the *hetu* of his presence be elsewhere. For the rule is that the *hetu* and the *sādhya* should have the same locus (*samānādhikarānya*). It may be said that this objection holds only if the room is the *anuyogi* or the locus of the absence is taken as the *hetu*, but not if the *pratiyogi* or the counterpart of the absence is the *hetu*. The *pratiyogi* here is Devadatta, and he exists elsewhere. Thus he is the *samānādhikarāṇa* of his absence and elsewhere existence. But Devadatta is not perceived, while his absence is perceived; and so *lingāñāna* or knowledge of the mark is not possible and there would be no occasion for a syllogism. Further, the Naiyāyikās insist upon *trītyalingaparamārśa* or the perception of the mark for a third time. But it is impossible unless Devadatta is perceived.

But the Naiyāyikās say that even *trītyalingaparamārśa* is possible through memory. As a matter of fact, the absence of Devadatta in the house is related to both the house and Devadatta. Hence Devadatta is brought before mind, which can treat him as the *pakṣa* having a *vyāptiviśiṣṭalinga*, that is, as the minor subsumed under the middle. Hence even the *Arthāpatti* produced by *anupapatti* is only a syllogism of the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* type.

C. ARTHĀPATTI IS NOT DISTINCT FROM ANUMĀNA : JAYANTA BHĀṬṬA'S VIEW :

Jayanta in his *Nyayamañjarī* specifically rejects Sambhava, Althiya, *Arthāpatti* and *Abhāva* as distinct sources of knowledge. Jayanta follows the conventional Nyāya line in rejecting

presumption as a source of knowledge. Though his predecessors have also dealt with the problem, his detailed, comprehensive and synthetic treatment of *Arthāpatti* in *Nyayamañjarī* seems to have surpassed all former accounts. He has vehemently argued for the superiority of the Nyāya exposition against that of the Mīmāṃsā. It is perhaps for the first and the last time that a triangular conflict regarding *Arthāpatti* has been brought to surface and resolved with ingenious and erudite argumentation. At the time of Jayanta, the main exponents of *Arthāpatti* were the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus Jayanta has to analyse this problem against the views of the Mīmāṃsā. Though his conclusions are conventional, his presentation is novel and unique. He refers to the conflict subsisting between both the schools of Mīmāṃsā. Though at times he seems sympathetic towards the Prabhākaras, ultimately he refutes both the schools contending that since *Arthāpatti* is reducible to inference, it is not a distinct way of knowing.

Jayanta argues that presumption is identical with inference.²⁵ He points out that if two things are not connected by a tie of inseparable relation then one cannot throw light on the other. We cannot know another object just on the basis of the knowledge of an object. Again, the relation of *vyāpti* may exist between the two objects but if we do not know it to be such then we cannot infer the other, by just knowing one of the two. This remark of Jayanta reminds us of the two conditions of valid inference, constitutive and epistemic that Prof. L.S. Stebbing points out in her 'Introduction to modern Logic'.²⁶ For instance a new born baby is not equipped with such a complicative process of knowledge. In all cases of presumption it is not possible to know the specific relation existing between the two objects. But it is equally true that they are known to be related in a general way.

Jayanta also calls attention to the Mīmāṃsaka position that in the case of *Arthāpatti* that it (the given) cannot be proved without this (the assumption) is an instance *vyatireka vyāpti*. The *vyatireka vyāpti*, being known, also leads to *anvyavyāpti* that if it is assumed that it will be explained. *Anvyavyāpti* and *vyatireka vyāpti* are the properties of the *hetu*. Hence, Jayanta argues, *Arthāpatti* is non-else than inference.

Bhaṭṭa's conception of *Arthāpatti* is identical with inference. Jayanta proceeds to prove that the so called instances of *Arthāpatti* which are based upon *Anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension and *śabda* or verbal testimony which are advanced by the Mīmāṃsakas to illustrate the existence of some super sensuous power of an object, are really included in inference as the instances are really pointless since the super sensuous object does not exist.²⁷ According to Jayanta, the examples of *Arthāpatti* based upon *Anupalabdhi*, are the really illustrations of inference.²⁸ The absence of a living person from his house constitutes a probans which indicates his existence outside his house. The absence of living Caitra from his house is the subject of inference. His existence outside his house is the probandum. The state of his being absent from the house is the probans. On previous occasions we have found that whenever a living person has been absent from his house he has been present outside the place of his residence. A similar instance may be cited. Smoke co-exists with fire because it possesses smoke. Therefore, it has been a vain feat of wordy warfare to find fault with the reason and to refute the view that the proposition that living Caitra is present outside his house follows as a conclusion.

To the Mīmāṃsaka contention that *Arthāpatti* is an instance of *Anumāna* then *Arthāpatti* should not be a distinct source of the knowledge of new objects. Such contention according to

Jayanta is untenable. He asks which object is grasped by *Arthāpatti*, according to Mīmāṃsākās? Is it unqualified existence of Caitra? or Is it Caitra staying outside the house? Caitra's existence pure and simple has been known from the predictions of astrology. Hence, it is not a new object. According to Jayanta the object to be known by *Arthāpatti* is Caitra's existence somewhere outside his house. The proof which generates knowledge of his absence from his house oppose the appearance of such knowledge as reveals his presence at home. But it throws light neither on his presence nor on his absence outside.

When we know that a living person is absent from his house then we erringly infer that he is, existing outside the house. Moreover, the knowledge of the absence of a living person from his house cannot be equated with the knowledge of his presence outside his house. The fact that a man is living is one thing but, on the other hand, the fact that he is staying outside his house. From the knowledge of the first object we pass on to the knowledge of the second object but these two pieces of knowledge are not identical. Our knowledge of smoke on the locus of fire is not the same as is the knowledge of fire. Smoke is different from fire. In this case, too, the absence of a living person from his house is distinct from his presence outside his house. The hill and fire are two known objects. We infer only their relation which is a novel object. Similarly, here too, the connection of the living person with the place outside his house is only inferred since it is such an object as was not known before.

Similarly Jayanta considers *Arthāpatti*, based upon verbal testimony, is a weak one and is not different from that of inference. It is merely absurd to presume the part of sentence since the meaning of the absent part can be inferred from its effect which acts as a real probans. Just as we infer fire, the cause of smoke,

on a mountain seeing smoke, the effect of fire, in its cave, so also we may infer the taking meal, the essential condition corpulence, noticing the fatness of a person. We observe no difference in these two instances. From our repeated observations we have learnt that corpulence is the effect of the eating of food. In some cases the probance is perceived but in other cases it may be known by means of *Śabda*. There is no great of difference fixed between these two marks, acquired by perception and verbal testimony.

The *Mīmāṃsaka*s contend that an incomplete sentence cannot convey its meaning. They do not mean to say that the sentence that corpulent Devadatta does not take his meal during the day fails to convey that he is corpulent but simply intends to suggest that the knowledge of his corpulence is conditional and that it involves a reference to its condition which is not given there. The hypothetical knowledge, being incomplete, is not true one. Hence the source of this knowledge i.e. the sentence, is not a means of true knowledge. Hence, the sentence in question should be made complete. Jayanta considers this *Mīmāṃsa* conception also is untenable. He questions which one of the following involves reference to something else. Is it a word or its meaning or its knowledge? If it is held that a word involves a reference then it may be answered that as no inarticulate sound involves a reference so a word which does not refer to a meaning involves no reference to some other word. If it is further held that a word which refers to its meaning also involves a reference to some other word then the hypothesis requires further clarification. The upholders of the hypothesis should agree to the point that the meaning of a word also involves a reference to some other objects. If it is admitted that the meaning of a word involves a reference to some other object then the hypothesis that the presumption of a clause is

necessary becomes superfluous. Now, the Mīmāṃsakaś may uphold the third alternative and assert that consciousness involves a reference. If this is Mīmāṃsakaś stand, then Jayanta points out that all forms of consciousness do not involve a reference to other objects. Jayanta says that Nyāya admits that the knowledge of the meaning of a word involves a reference to other objects over and above its own objects because its object involves a reference to them. But Nyāya also subscribes to the view that the auditory perception of a sound does not involve such a reference since itself, its object, does not involve a reference to other objects. Hence, in order to establish the referential character of meaning one should admit the referential character of an object.

The Mīmāṃsakaś further presume a clause in order to establish the knowledge of some additional objects. Hence, it will be similar course to be adopted by us if we directly assume the additional objects themselves. What benefit, Jayanta asks, do we derive, having recourse to the additional step?

In this connection the Mīmāṃsakaś raise an objection that what is assumed does not follow from Vedas. Jayanta tries to meet this objection that even if we assume for the sake of an argument that a clause or a sentence is presumed than the meaning of a clause or of the sentence is not conveyed by the same since either of the sentence is not conveyed by the same since either of them is non-Vedic. Jayanta also counts the possible contention of the Mīmāṃsakaś the Vedic texts is of two fold character viz., the first type is heard, i.e., given and the second one is inferred and that what is presumed pertains to Vedic texts.²⁹ His counter argument is that the subject-matter of the Vedic text admits of two kinds, viz., the first one is directly given by the Vedic texts and the second one is suggested by the first one. Thus, the suggested matter is also Vedic. In that case, why should we subscribe to

a gratuitous assumption in the shape of a clause or of a sentence? Hence, the new matter, i.e. the subject matter, which is derived from the direct vedic text will be treated also as vedic. Therefore, we can confidently assert that the hypothesis of presumption based upon the verbal testimony is in no way more satisfactory than that of the Naiyāyikas.³⁰

Criticism of *Srutārthāpatti*

Neither the Nyāya Sūtra nor the Nyāya Bhāṣya recognises the distinction first made, by the Mīmāṃsakas between *Srutārthāpatti* and *Dṛṣṭārthāpatti*. Prāśastapāda of Vaiśeṣika cognises it, but regards it as of little or no importance. Jayanta who takes the Mīmāṃsaka distinction seriously specifically directs his attack on *Srutārthāpatti* as non-different from inference. The following are his arguments to prove his thesis and to refute the stand point of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsa.³¹

1) The example of the so called presumption, based upon the verbal testimony, is a weak one, since *Srutārthāpatti* is not different from an inference. It is really absurd to presume the part of a sentence; since the meaning of the absent part also can be inferred from its effect, which serves the purpose of a genuine mark. As fire is inferred from smoke, similarly one can infer the taking of meal as the mark (essential condition) of flabbiness on the basis of noticing the great bulk of a person. There is no difference in these two instances.

2) From our repeated observations we have learnt that flabbiness is the effect of the taking of meal. In some cases the mark is perceived but in other cases it may be known by means of the verbal knowledge. As there is no great gulf of difference between these two types of mark, there is no difference between the *Srutārthāpatti* and inference.

3) The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākās contend that an incomplete sentence cannot convey its full meaning. They do not mean to say that the sentence that 'Flabby Devadatta does not take his meal during the day', fails to convey that he is flabby but what they simply intend to suggest is that the knowledge that "he is flabby" requires a complement, i.e. 'he takes food at night' which is not given in the basic form of the sentence. So what the Bhāṭṭas do is, that they propose to presume the complementary portion of the sentence and call it '*Srūtārthāpatti*'. But Jayanta puts them in a dilemma by asking them as to which of the constituents of the given sentence require a complement? Is it a 1) word or 2) its meaning or 3) its knowledge?

1) If the Bhāṭṭas hold that a word requires complement, then it may be said that as no inarticulate sound requires a complement, so no word which does not refer to a meaning requires a complement.

2) If it is the contention of the Bhāṭṭa that the meaning of the given sentence requires a complement, then let its requirement be fulfilled by having a complementary meaning. And in that case, there is no point in presuming a portion of the sentence.

3) If the knowledge brought about by the given part of the sentence is held as requiring a complement, in such a case even it is the object which is required to make the already acquired knowledge comprehensive, and for that purpose the simple course to be adopted is that the additional objects themselves should serve as complements. And in this situation, the presumption of a part of the given sentence becomes superfluous.

Jayanta is aware of the objections that the Bhāṭṭas could raise against his refutation of their preposition. So at this juncture also he reproduces and then rejects their counter arguments. 1) The Bhāṭṭas state that the presumption of the object and not of

the reference themselves would render the Vedic sentence non-Vedic. But Jayanta holds that if the sentence is presumed, the meaning would become non-vedic with the same logic, since the presumed portion of the sentence is non-vedic is weak shelter. 2) Moreover, the directly given sentence and the subsequent portion indirectly assumed from it, both constitute a vedic text according to the Mīmāṃsakaś, then with the same logic the given and suggested meaning would also be regarded as Vedic. And in the case, there is hardly any propriety in the gratuitous presumption of a clause or a sentence.

Jayanta further holds that on the basis of the above mentioned facts, the arguments of those also automatically stand refuted, who hold that 'Flabbiness' as in the given example is sensuous and 'taking food at night' is super-sensuous and the relation of concomitance holding between them cannot be ascertained. Jayanta seems to propound that if one portion of a logical whole is ascertained, the remaining part could be inferred, and the injection of supersensuous colouring to the silent part is totally unwarranted.

On reviewing the aforesaid account of *Śrutārthāpatti* we arrive at the conclusion that '*Śrutārthāpatti*' is not a distinct means of knowledge. The arguments are not a distinct means of knowledge. The arguments advanced by the Bhāṭṭas are not based on sound footing.

As regards *Dṛṣṭārthāpatti*, Udayana puts forward the curious argument that, though the existence of a living person outside his home is not in conflict with his absence from home, being alive and being absent from home are in conflict with each other, and consequently that the presumption of a living person's being outside his home does not really deserve to be so called, but should be regarded as an opposing inference (*Virodhi Anumāna*) Śrīdhara and Śamkara Mīśra, on the other

hand, offers more plausible argument in favour of the view that *Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* is identical with inference. According to them, the presumption that Devadatta lives outside his home is really inferential knowledge in as much as it is dependent on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between a probans, namely, the non-existence at home of Devadatta as a living person, and a probandum, namely, his existence outside his home. It is to be noted, however, that the invariable concomitance referred to here is positive (*anvayi*) and not negative (*vyatireki*). That being so, the Vedānta seems to lose its point in so far as it holds that presumption may be shown to involve negative concomitance, but never the concomitance of the positive kind.

So far we have referred to Jayanta's criticism of the Bhaṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. We shall now turn our attention to his refutation of Prābhākara's defence of *Arthāpatti*. Prābhākara and his followers adopt a different line of argument to distinguish *Arthāpatti* from *Anumāna*.³² In case of *Anumāna* the *hetu* is not dependable if the *sādhya* does not exist on the locus of the *hetu* in question. For instance smoke does not logically exist on the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) if fire does exist there. Prābhākara thinks that reverse is the relation existing between the implier and implied in the case of *Arthāpatti*. Taking a familiar example the Prābhākara's point out that it cannot be proved that a living person staying outside his house if he is not absent from his house. When a living man goes out of his house, he stays out of the house. The Prābhākaras also explain the extract of Śabara's commentary to fit it into with this new hypothesis. The object which is known to us either through *Śabda* or through any other *pramāṇa* causes us to presume other objects. As such an object is the only source of postulation, so in the absence of it such a presumption becomes impossible. Moreover if we have

no opportunity of postulating an object than the object which is postulated cannot appear on the scene. Postulation reveals an object which is assumed. Hence, postulation is different from inference. This is the contention of the Prābhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsa.

The Mīmāṃsaka's distinction between inference and implication referred to above, Jayanta considers as only verbal and is not based upon new facts. If the object to known is not known before, Jayanta asks, then how can one know that it will appear to us to be a puzzle without having such and such a condition? On the other hand if one already possess the previous knowledge of the object then what is the merit of exposing the puzzling character? This is because, Jayanta answers, we have definitely known the object which we are now trying to know in this context. Jayanta anticipates Prābhākara contention that we have already known not merely the object but also the puzzling character without assuming such and such condition would not such a contention asks Jayanta would amount to the position that the knowledge of *Vyāpti* precedes presumption? If Prābhākara says that the presence of a living person outside is impossible without his absence from house then they should also concede that if a living person is absent from his house then he is surely present outside his house. Jayanta asks what is the nature of the impossibility? If it is logically impossible then the so called *Arthāpatti* is no better than *Anumāna* since the thought process of the latter essentially moves in a similar fashion. If the *hetu* is known before then and then only the *sādhya* is known afterwards and the *hetu* is not previously known then the *sādhya* cannot be known.

Jayanta feels the statement that the absence of living person from his house objectively determines his presence outside, is

wrong.³³ If absence from his house is an established fact the its effect is subsequently produced by it since a cause is invariably antecedent to its effect. Such a cause alone is productive of its effect. Jayanta observes here that any attempt to establish causal connection between the absence of a person from his house and his existence outside at the next movement would result in an absurd situation viz., at the very movement of the absence, he neither stays in nor outside his house. Hence, the causal relation does not hold between one's absence from house and his presence outside. All these discussion according to Jayanta is fruitless since it does not in any way improve Prābhākara thesis that the *Arthāpatti* is an independent *pramāṇa*.

Jayanta also refers to some followers of the Prābhākara school who hold that *Arthāpatti* is distinct from inference since in it the implier points to and conditions the implied. In the case of inference smoke is only the mark of fire but in the case of *Arthāpatti* the absence from house both indicates and produces his presence outside. Jayanta also refutes this thesis. He observes that the Mīmāṃsakas themselves are not sure whether or not an invariable relation holds between the implier and the implied and consequently have put forward another example to prove their thesis viz., when a living person is at home he is not out. Jayanta feels that if the Mīmāṃsakas felt that this is the better example they should have given at outset. But this example does not illustrate *Arthāpatti* based *Anupalabdhi* or non-perception.

D. ARTHĀPATTI INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM INFERENCE BASED ON KEVALAVYATIREKI VYĀPTI

Of all the attempts of the Nyāya–vaiśeṣika to reduce *Arthāpatti* to *Anumāna* the most significant one is to identify *Arthāpatti* with inference based on *kevala - vyatireka vyāpti* or the purely negative concomitance. Udayana, Jayanta, Gaṅgeśa

and a host of Nyāya–vaiśeṣika philosophers of later times con-
 that *Arthāpatti* is identical with *Anumāna* of the *Kevalavyāpti*
 type. Udayana affirms that what is *Arthāpatti* according
 Mīmāṃsakas is none other than *vyatireka* concomitance;
 difference is only in name.³⁴ Before we proceed to consider the
 contention of the Nyāya–vaiśeṣika philosophers, we had better
 make a brief note of their classification of inference *anvaya*
vyatireki, *kevalānvayi* and *kevala vyatireki*.

In view of the methods of proving the *Vyāpti*, syllogisms
 have been classified into *anvaya-vyatireki*, *kevalānvayi* and *kevala*
vyatireki. The methods applied in inductively establishing
vyāpti are *anvaya* (agreement in presence) and *vyatireki* (agreement
 in absence). In the syllogism, "wherever there is smoke there
 is fire", the truth of the probandum may be tested both through
 the methods of *anvaya* (by observing in different cases, that smoke
 is accompanied by fire), and also through the method of *vyatireki*
 (by observing in different negative cases that where there is no
 fire there is no smoke).³⁵ Application of these two tests is possible
 because, fire, the probandum here is of a nature that allows its
 observation by both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* instances.

The reason which has concomitance with the object to be
 inferred both by presence and absence, is called 'the positive and
 negative reason' (*anvayavyatireki-hetu*). Putting P for the
 probandum, S for the subject and M for the reason, the two forms
 of the same syllogism may be represented as follows.³⁶

<i>Anvaya</i>	<i>Vyatireka</i>
All M is P	No non-P is M
All S is M	All S is M
∴ All S is P	∴ All S is P

(Here P is such that both 'All M is P' and 'non-P is M' can be ascertained through observation).

Since there is an equality or co-extension between the positive and negative forms, it becomes sufficient to express one aspect only, either the *anvaya* or the *vyatireka*. The counterpart of it will necessarily be implied.

But there are certain syllogisms which are founded on the positive concomitance alone or on the negative concomitance alone. A syllogism is called *Kevalānvayi* when it is founded on a reason which is always positively related to the object to be inferred. For instance the syllogism may be, "whatever is knowable is nameable, the pot is knowable, therefore the pot is nameable." Here the reason 'Knowability' is concomitant by presence' with the probandum 'nameability', for it is a fact that whenever there is a knowability there is also nameability. For example, a piece of cloth is knowable and at the same time nameable. But in the same way 'knowability' has no concomitance by absence' with 'nameability'. For there is no such fact which can be truthfully represented by the statement that whenever there is absence of knowability, there is also the absence of nameability, because 'absence of nameability' and 'absence of knowability' represent no factual characteristic of any real thing, since every real thing is both nameable and knowable.³⁷

Symbolically represented the *Kevalānvayi* syllogism stands thus:

All M is P
All S is M
∴ All S is P

Here non-P is unknown and the absence of M is non-ascertainable.

Then, there are syllogisms which, although they are based on concomitance by absence, still are not based on concomitance by absence, still are not based on concomitance by presence. Such a syllogism is called *Kevala vyatireki anumāna*. This is illustrated in the example, "of the five elements none that is different from other elements has smell. Earth has smell. Therefore earth is different from the other elements".³⁸ The invariant concomitance which has been utilised here is: 'wherever there is absence of the different from other things', there is the absence of smell, too. And this amounts to concomitance by absence. But for the purpose of the present syllogism, no illustration is available for 'concomitance by presence' which could be expressed as "where there is smell, there is 'difference from other things'". It is true that, earth could serve as an illustration for such 'concomitance by presence' since it has both smell and difference from other things. Still it cannot do so on the present occasion because earth is the subject of the conclusion. "Earth is different from other things". If we did offer 'earth' as an illustration for such a concomitance by presence, it would amount to taking for granted what is sought to be proved by the syllogism. Symbolically put the syllogism stands thus:

No non-P is M
 All S is M
 ∴ All S is P

(Here P is such that 'All M is P' can never be ascertained through observation).

Uddyotakara, the first known Naiyāyika to speak of *Kevala Vyatireki*, illustrates the *Anumāna* in question by using it as a weapon against the exponents of the no-soul theory (*nairātmyavādins*) like the Cārvakas etc. His illustration runs as follows:

The animate body which has life is not without the soul. If it is so, it should be without life etc. The thing which is accepted by both the schools without life etc. is seen soulless but this body is not lifeless. Hence it is not soulless.³⁹

Uddyotakara specifies also the purpose of the *avīta kevala vāireki* by saying that it is intended only to refute the opponent.

The *avīta* is intended to refute the argument of opponent.

It may be of interest to note that the purpose of the *avīta* seems more or less the same with the Sāṃkhyas also. For, they employ the *vīta-hetus* to establish the *satkārya* theory by saying:

"Effect subsists even prior to the operation of the cause: for that which does not exist cannot be by any means brought into existence: further, only appropriate materials are selected; every thing is not by every means possible: capable causes produce only that which they are competent to produce : and the effect is not different from the cause".⁴⁰

The effect even prior to its manifestation always exists as a real entity in its cause (which also must always be real entity), the following considerations will show:

1) *Asadakaraṇāt*: Nothing can be produced out of a thing which is as non-existent as the barren woman's son.

2) *Upādānagrahaṇāt*: In producing anything, one has to have recourse to the proper materials out of which only that thing can be produced. We cannot produce curd from water. Only milk can produce it. This shows that the effect has a certain fixed relation to its cause.

3) *Śarva Sambhavābhāvat*: It is not possible to press oil from sand. Oil can be obtained from mustard seed or such other seeds in which it exists. This shows that the effect always has a latent form in its cause, otherwise, it would be possible to produce all things from anything.

4) *Śaktasya Śakyakaraṇat*: It is common knowledge that the effect must be such as is within the power of the cause to

create. There must therefore be a relation between the cause and the effect as regards potency also.

5) *Karaṇabhāvat*: The cause and its effect have inherent intrinsic similarity or they may be as non-different as the woven cloth from its cause, viz., the threads.

According to Sāṃkhya, everything has a cause. The cause and its effect always co-exist even before the latter becomes known or visible. Nothing happens by chance. Chance according to Sāṃkhya, is a meaningless word needed by us to cover our own ignorance when we cannot ascertain the cause of a thing. As shown in *Kārikā* III above, the whole universe is a continuous process of change of causes into their effects. The root cause which itself is causeless, is *Avyakta* of the next *kārikā*.⁴¹ On the other hand, they use the *avita-hetus* to refute their opponents such as the Naiyāyikas who hold to the duality of the material cause and its effect. Their *avita* syllogism runs as follows:

The cloth is not different from its threads because it contains the same quality which is different from other object that would not possess the same quality, for example cow is not having any of the qualities of horse. The cloth contains same quality of threads because it is identical.⁴²

However, slowly the idea *kevalavyatireki* as a means *Vaidharmya-jñāna* asserted itself and hence we find Gangesopādhyāya (C.A.D. 1200) providing an example of *kevalavyatireki*.

prthivi itarebhya bhidyate, gan dhavattvat

The earth is different from water, fire, air and sky.

Thus the *Kevalavyatireki anumāna* came to play an important role in the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools. Perhaps it was necessary for the Yoga school also as it has much in common with Sāṃkhyas.

On the other hand the *Kevalavyatireki* has been summarily rejected by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins. They accept *Arthāpatti* as the fifth means of valid knowledge. As we have already pointed out in our exposition of the nature of *Arthāpatti*. The Mīmāṃsakas say that they need *Arthāpatti* for certain purposes like assuming a *śruti* on the basis of a given *smṛti*, as explained by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:

Smṛtyā śrutirya parikalpyate smin, etc.

In the "Mīmāṃsā-śāstra" 1) Wherever a *śruti* is assumed on the ground of another *śruti*, 2) when a passage is assumed to apply to a definite sacrifice through "power, etc." and 3) where the result, etc. (of a sacrifice) are assumed from outside, - in all these cases we have no conception of any inferential connection.

Similarly Advaitins swear that they require *Arthāpatti* in order to establish the *prapañcamithyātva* (illusoriness of the objects) and so on. Besides, both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins make use of *Arthāpatti* also wherever the Naiyāyikas and others employ the *Kevalavyatireki*. The different interpretations and definitions offered by these two opposed schools, their representative concepts and their arguments are

counter arguments, since the days of Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Prāśastapāda - through the ages of Uddyotakar Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayanācārya, Parthasārathi Miśra, Śrīharsa, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, Raghunātha Śrīroma Dharmarājādhvarim, Viśvanātha Pañcānana and many others - a well known to scholars and they need not be touched upon here. Thus the *Kevala vyatireki* divides the *Vaidika-darśanas* into two conflicting camps - the Sāṃkhyas, the Yogas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, all upholding it on one side, and the Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, rejecting it on the other. Both go to the extent of swearing by their respective *anuvyavasāyas* in the forms *anuminomi* and *arthāpayāmi* (or *kalpayāmi*). However on the basis of what we have seen so far, an impartial student may observe this: Both these groups earnestly desire to establish the (*ītarabheda*) uniqueness of the Earth (*Prthivī*): the absence of soleness of the living body; and both the groups are very much interested in assuming an unknown *śruti* (a vedic injunction) on the basis of a *smṛti* of unknown origin. The thinkers of the first group try to achieve it through the *Anumāna* alone obviously because the founders of their respective schools do not subscribe to the idea of *Arthāpatti* as a means of knowledge. At the same time the later writers of these schools themselves have realized that an ordinary *Anumāna* cannot deliver the goods. And hence they invented a special *Anumāna* and gave it the name *avita c kevala vyatireki*. Similarly the teachers of the other group cannot escape noticing the strong *Anumāna* elements contained in what they call *Arthāpatti*, in spite of its uniqueness. What they have in their mind is quite discernible when we read Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's concluding observation on the topic:

*evam-svabhāvo' pyanumāna-śabadam
labheta ced astu yathepsitam naḥ*

"If you get this nature of the word *Anumāna*, it is well as good our intention is fulfilled".

A few *sūtras* of Jaimini also may support this suggestion of ours. For, we have already seen that according to the *Mīmāṃsakas* etc., the assumption of *śruti* on the basis of *smṛti* of unknown origin is possible only by *Arthāpatti*, as Kumārila puts it. But at least in two instances, the *sūtrakāra* Jaimini calls such an assumption *Anumāna* only and not *Arthāpatti*.

api vā karṣāṃnyāt pramāṇam anumānam syāt
and *virodhe tvanapekṣam syād asati hy anumānam*.⁴³

"Not so by reason of the common author, the non-*Vec* may also be an authority".

The author gives his own view. Before we see what reply he gives we must determine in what sense he uses certain words. *Anumāna* is used for *śābda śābda* is Veda because that alone is the word of God and you are bound to bow down to its authority whether you agree with it or not. The word *śābda* is used for *smṛti* and it is a belief that every dictum laid down in the *smṛti* is supported by the Vedic authority behind it; if there is none available the presumption is that such authority is lost. This is the meaning of the author by *Anumāna* or inference. The *smṛti*'s therefore deriving their authority from the Veda are said by the author as being the work of common impersonal being, such being the case they are authorities.

Kumārila's *Vārttika* also in the context runs:

Virodhe tvanapekṣam syād asati hy anumānyate.

When there is contradiction it is **not** to be accepted; where there is none then there is the presumption.

In the preceding *adhikaraṇa* we have seen that our author says that the *smṛties* are authorities because they have the support of the Veda behind them. If we do not find the express Vedic text to support which is lost. Further question that naturally arises is "what are we to do when the *smṛiti* text is in contradiction with the express Vedic text?" The reply according to our author is that the *smṛiti* is to be rejected in such a case because no presumption as to its validity arises when there is no supporting contradiction.⁴⁵

However, in the same context he writes a bit earlier:

arthāpattīyāpi yatkimcin mūlam ity avagamyate.

It is known that the valid knowledge *Arthāpatti* has sources other than the Vedas.

Further, it may also be noted that in the *Brahmasūtra—Śabda iti cet, na; ataḥ prabhavāt, pratyaksanumānabhyam*.⁴⁶

The word *Anumāna* denotes a *smṛiti* that leads to the inference of a *śruti*. And Saṅkara too speaks of some subject matter of *smṛiti* leading to the inference of a *śruti*:

tat smaryamāṇaṃ rūpaṃ mūlabhūtaṃ śrutiṃ anumāpāyat

All these would show that even these opponents of *Arthāpatti* find it difficult to think of *Arthāpatti* unalloyed with the *Anumāna* element.

Let us now proceed to see how the Naiyāyikas reduce *Arthāpatti* to an inference of the *Vyatireki* type. Negative (*vyatireka*) concomitance is pressed into service when no positive (*anvaya*) concomitance between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) is available. For example, Earth differs from other categories (*itarabhinna*). This difference from other categories exists only in the earth. If one wants to infer difference

from other categories with respect to earth (minor term) he must possess with him, beforehand, a knowledge of that specific characteristic, of earth, which is invariably concomitant with "difference from other categories" (*itarabheda*vyāpya). Since *itarabheda* and smell are exclusively present only in earth we cannot come across an instance (*anvaya dr̥ṣṭānta*) other than earth where we can observe agreement in presence (*anvayasahacari*) so as to be able to arrive at the positive universal proposition "whatever has smell is different from the rest". But there are instances like water, fire etc., where we can observe at the negative universal proposition. "Whatever is not different from others (water, fire etc) has no smell". Difference from other categories, in earth will have to be inferred only from the negative universal proposition.

None that is not different from earth possesses smell.

Earth has smell.

Therefore earth is different from other categories.

Now it remains for us to see *Arthāpatti* can be satisfactorily explained as a case of inference of the *kevalavyatireki* type. It is well known that inference of the *kevalavyatireki* type starts with a purely negative proposition. It is not indeed an *anvayi* inference in which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agreement in presence between the middle and the major term, e.g. 'whenever there is fatness, there is eating at night'. On the other hand, it is a *vyatireki* inference in which the major premise expresses a universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle. Thus the above example of *Arthāpatti* may be reduced to the following syllogism:

A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day is not fat;

This man who fasts at day is fat;

∴ This man is not a man who does not eat at night, i.e. he eats at night.

As *Arthāpatti* may thus be reduced to *vyatireki* inference the Naiyāyikas refuse to acknowledge it as a separate source of knowledge.⁴⁸ So also the Sāṃkhya philosophers explain *Arthāpatti* as a form of inference. Taking the second example of *Arthāpatti* given above, Vācaspati points out that it can be reduced to the following inference;

If a living individual is absent somewhere, he is present elsewhere;

Devadatta who is living absent from home;

∴ He is somewhere outside his home.

Here a man's existence outside his home is inferred from his absence from home' as the *linga* or the middle term. There is a relation of *vyāpti* or universal concomitance between a man's presence somewhere and his absence elsewhere. Everyman finds this to be true in his own case. Hence when we know the one from the other we simply infer its *linga* or universal concomitance just as we infer fire from smoke.⁴⁹

Now it remains to see whether the Naiyāyikas have succeeded in maintaining *Kevala vyatireki* as an *Anumāna*. It appears that they have not succeeded in their efforts. Uddyotakara's *Kevala vyatireki Anumāna*, quote above, it is to be admitted, smacks of *Arthāpatti*. And this seems to be indicated also by his own statement that it is meant not for establishing a new truth, but only for refuting opponents who raise objections against the conclusion of a system. The point may become further clear if we examine the question as follows: The form of the *Vyatireka vyāpti* (universal observation of the negatives of two things) is given by the

Nyāyayikas⁴⁷ as: *Sādhyābhāva vyāpakibhūtābhā* pratiyogitham. If the knowledge of this *vyāpti* is taken to be the *karana* or instrument of the *kevala-vyatireki* inference, then how can the inference be avoided when one entertains the idea that the *hetu* is *vyabhicarita*, namely, it is *sādhyābhāvadv*, meaning the *hetu* (the ground of inference) exists where there is no *sādhyā* (that which is to be inferred)? That is to say that *anumiti* would be inevitable even when one entertains the above idea. For, the said knowledge of *vyāpti* cannot be obstructed by the above-mentioned knowledge of *vyabhicāra*. On this score, namely the lack of proper *bādhyabādhaka-bhāva* (the relationship of the hinderer and hindered), Raghunātha Siromani has rejected the *Kevala vyatireki vyāpti* and concludes that a *vyāpti* (concomitance) like *sādhyābhāvāvad-avṛttiḥ* alone can be the cause of *anumiti* in all instances and hence the knowledge of *prthivi itarebhyo bhidyate, gandha-vattvāt* and the like are to be considered only as *Arthāpatti* and the like are to be considered only as *Arthāpatti* and not *Anumiti*.

Again positive (*anvaya*) proposition. "Whichever does not exist in the house exists outside" when transformed into a negative proposition will assume the form "whichever does not exist outside is not non-existent in the house". This amounts to saying "whichever does not exist outside the house exists in the house". Here non-existence outside and the non-existence of non-existence do not occur in one and the same locus i.e. the locus of non-existence is outside the house and locus of the non-existence of non-existence is in the house. It appears that there is no *samānādhikaraṇa* and hence no *vyāpti*.

In the classical example for *Kevalavyatireki* type of inference both the "non-existence of difference of difference from other

categories" and "non-existence of smell" have the same loc viz. water etc. In the *vyatireki* inference one can observe sm in the middle term (*pakṣa*,) : but absence in the house cannot seen in the *pakṣa*, viz. Devadatta. How could inference origin in the absence of the knowledge of the middle term in the mi term? i.e. when there is no *pakṣadharmā*?

The Naiyāyikas have surely overlooked the difference between *vyatireka* concomitance and *Arthāpatti* as they have done in case of *anyaya* concomitance. The postulation of Devadatt existence outside does not arise from a knowledge of the mid term in the minor term? i.e. when there is no *pakṣadharmā*.

The Naiyāyikas have surely overlooked the difference between *vyatireka* concomitance and *Arthāpatti* as they have done in the case of *anyaya* concomitance. The postulation of Devadatt existence outside does not arise from a knowledge of *vyatireka* concomitance. The standpoint that *Arthāpatti* is none other than *vyatireka* concomitance, therefore, falls to the ground. Under the situation it is left for the Naiyāyikas either to give up their standpoint or to modify the definition of *vyāpti* suitably so that it may have an extended application and thereby bring *Arthāpatti* under its purview.

If, in spite of the fact that knowledge of *vyāpti* has no function to perform in the emergence of presumption, the Naiyāyikas still stick to their position, viz. presumption is the same as the inference of *vyatireka* type they have to explain the psychology of inference. That inference is by conception a process of reasoning based on an invariable concomitance between the middle and the major terms is evident from the definition of *Anumāna* as enunciated in the Nyāyabhāṣya.⁵⁰ From this definition it is definite that inference starts with *anyaya* concomitance. B

vyatireka vyāpti is the invariable concomitance between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term. Invariable concomitance between the absence of the probandum and the absence of the probans is totally irrelevant when the probandum is sought to be established by means of a knowledge of the probans. How can *vyatireka vyāpti* which has no causal connection with inference generate inference? Udayanacarya contends that a *vyatireki* probans is invariably connected with the probandum (*anvayena vyāpta*). The apprehension of this *anvaya* concomitance is effected sometimes by agreement in both presence and absence and sometimes by either.⁵¹ In other words knowledge of the inseparable association (*vyatireka sahacara*) between the absence of the major and that of the middle term yields the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the middle and the major and generates an inference through the latter.

The stand that Udayana has taken is suicidal. If the knowledge of the *vyatireka* association too yields knowledge of *anvaya* concomitance then, according to Udayana, there remains only one *vyāpti* viz. *anvayavyāpti*. *Vyatirekavyāpti* has no place and the term *Vyatirekavyāpti* will have to be understood in a secondary sense viz. 'that *anvayavyāpti* which is derived from the knowledge of *vyatireka-sahacara*.'⁵² Further it amounts to this-*vyāpti* is one, *anvaya* and inference is only two-fold, *anvayi* and *vyatireki*. The time-honoured *Nyāya* division of *vyāpti* under two heads and of *numāna* under three heads carry no significance; it must be given a goodbye.

Further the statement that *vyatireka* association yields *anvaya* concomitance will be meaningful only when there exists at least one instance, other than the minor term, where the middle term is known to reside. But *Kevala-vyatireki* probans, by definition

pakṣmātravṛtti) abides in only one locus, viz. minor term. Consequently no *anvaya* concomitance is possible. As such any way that *vyatireka* association yields *anvaya* concomitance and thereby yields inference is inconsistent with the Nyāya conception of a *Kevalavyatireki anumāna*.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has a different answer to give. According to Jayanta the *vyatireka* proposition "non-existence in the house is unintelligible without existence outside" necessarily implies the *anvaya* proposition "non-existence in the house is intelligible only in the light of existence outside".⁵³ A *kevalavyatireka* probans leads to inference only with the assistance of the intermediary *anvaya* concomitance.

This *anvaya* concomitance cannot be ascertained with reference to any other locus since the *vyatireka* probans abides in the minor term only. Therefore it has to be admitted that *anvaya* is apprehended either by implication or is inferred from *vyatireka*'s concomitance as Gaṅgeśa holds.⁵⁴ In either way *vyatireka* concomitance in order to generate inference and by itself it cannot. When the dependence on *anvaya* concomitance becomes unavoidable the probans loses all its claims to the title *Kevalavyatireki*; it turns out to be *Anvavyatireki* ultimately.

He further observes that a probans (*līnga*) is productive of inference only when it is known to possess both the properties *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. He also admits that the instrumentality of a *kevalavyatireki* probans consists in its sole dependence on *anvaya* concomitance.⁵⁵

The stand taken by Jayanta runs contrary to the Nyāya conception of a *kevalavyatireki* probans. In his anxiety to include the assumption under *vyatireka* inference he abandons the Nyāya position and unwittingly creeps into the camp of his opponents

- the Bhaṭṭas and the Vedāntins who maintain that all *vyāpti* only *anvaya*.

Gaṅgeśa contends that a *vyatireki* probans is conducive inferential knowledge "in its capacity of being the counter positive of the non-existence which is pervasive of the non-existence of the probandum".⁵⁶

This answer is not at all convincing for it does not bring out the relation between the probans and the probandum in the *Kevala vyatireki* type of inference. This is not a fitting answer to the charge that the relation between the absence of the probandum and the absence of the probans is irrelevant while the *sādhya* is to be established though its relation to the *hetu* is a mere verbal manipulation. In spite of the transformation of the *vyatireka* proposition the fact continues to remain unaltered "Being the counter positive of the non-existence which pervades non-existence of the probandum" is materially the same as "the non-existence of the probandum invariably accompanies the non-existence of the probans".⁵⁷

Further this cannot be an adequate definition as the element of *sāmānādhikaranyā*, the essential constituent of *vyāpti*, glaringly absent. In fact this forms an appropriate definition of *Arthāpatti*.⁵⁸

Uddyotakara and, on the guideline shown by him, Rāmakaṣṇadhvarin come forward with a different reply.

Inconstancy (*Vyabhicāra*) is opposed to *vyāpti* and a probans cannot give rise to inference so long as it is known to be inconstant (*vyabhicāri*). It is logically consistent that an *anvayi* probans capable of generating *anumiti* if and only if its *anvaya* relation to the probandum is known to be not inconstant (*avyabhicāra*). Absence of inconstancy is a necessary condition

for an *anvayi hetu* to become operative. It is found that a *vyatireka* probans also gives rise to *anumiti* only when its relation (*vyatireka saha-cāra*) to the probandum is free from inconstancy. What makes the *anvayi* probans operative makes the *vyatireka* probans also operative. Therefore it is idle to ask how a *vyatireka* probans can generate *anumiti*. Ramakṛṣṇadhvarin sums up the whole argument in a nutshell: Knowledge of *vyatireka* concomitance generates inferential knowledge by virtue of being opposed (*virodhi*) to the knowledge of inconstancy in the *hetu* (*vyabhicārajñāna*).⁵⁹ It follows that knowledge of *vyāpti* whether of the *anvaya* type or of the *vyatireka* type is productive of inference because of its possession of the common element, viz., opposition towards knowledge of inconstancy (*vyabhicāra*).

It will be highly enlightening to know that the famous logician Raghunatha Siromani has to say in this context. By means of penetrating analysis of the nature of *vyabhicāra* and *vyatireka vyāpti* he demonstrates the utter impossibility of working out any real opposition between the knowledge of the two. One cognition can impede the emergence of another cognition only if both the cognitions bear the same mark of distinction (*amānaprakāra*). To witness a specific instance.

The *vyatireka* concomitance will assume the form, "The non-existence of smoke is not the counter-positive of the non-existence which occurs in the locus of the non-existence of fire"⁶⁰ and *vyabhicāra* assumes the form "smoke is the counter-positive of that non-existence which occurs in locus of the non-existence of fire".⁶¹ The mark of distinction of the cognition of the *vyatireka* concomitance is *dhumabhavatva* and that of the cognition of *vyabhicāra* is *dhumatva* and as such there is no

occasion for opposition (*virodha*) between the cognition *vyatireka* concomitance and *vyabhicāra*.⁶²

CONCLUSION

The foregone scrutiny of the Nyāya position makes it plain that the validity of *Arthāpatti* as a distinct means of knowledge remains unaffected in spite of the unsparing attack from the Nyāya side. The vehement opposition to *Arthāpatti* is not founded on valid grounds: probably it is based on a firm conviction that the number of *pramāṇas* cannot be in excess of the four enumerated by Gautama and rooted on a spirit of unwillingness to admit what comes from rival camps.

On a critical examination of the definition of *vyāpti*, Raghunatha rejects *Vyatireka vyāpti* and the *Kevala vyatireki* type of inference. His verdict runs counter to the Nyāya standpoint. He argues that the knowledge arising from the knowledge of *vyatireka* concomitance is not inference at all; it is entirely different from *anumiti*. The instrumental cause (*karana*) responsible for the production of this knowledge is a distinct *pramāṇa*, viz. *Arthāpatti*.⁶³

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Chapter IV

IN DEFENCE OF ARTHĀPATTI AS AN INDEPENDENT PRAMĀNA

As has been explained in the previous chapter, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya refuse to accept *Arthāpatti* as a distinct way of knowing simply because they hold it reducible to '*Anumāna*'. It is clear Nyāya champions this group. As we have mentioned earlier, among the schools of Indian philosophy, it is the Mīmāṃsa and the Advaita Vedānta which alone recognise *Arthāpatti* as a separate or independent source of cognition. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa leads this group, as Jayaraj Champions the opposite one. The basic argument put forth by the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the distinct character of *Arthāpatti* is that all the cases of *Arthāpatti* have for their object Transcendental powers which cannot be known through any other *pramāna*. This is the touchstone on which the Mīmāṃsakas have tested the distinctness of *Arthāpatti* from other *pramānas*. Since *Arthāpatti* is primarily concerned with the formulation of hypothesis, and since hypothesis necessarily related to something so far unperceived, *Arthāpatti* needs to be regarded as a source of *parokṣa* or non-perceptual and not *aparokṣa* or perceptual cognition. Hence the question of *Arthāpatti*'s reducibility to perception does not arise, as also its reducibility to either *Sabda* or *Upamāna*, in virtue of their being sources of non-perceptual cognition, is simply out of the question. The only source of non-perceptual cognition, its reducibility to many things defended by measure of conviction, should be none other than *Anumāna* or inference.

But, as we have seen earlier, both Prabhākara and Kumārila have argued the distinctiveness of presumption from inference in their respective ways. The Vedānta also does the same in the following manner. This school of philosophy, as noted in the beginning, holds that in the case of inference strictly so called, the universal major premise must be based on positive concomitance (*anvayavyāpti*), and that the inference in which negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*) constitutes the basis of its universal major premise is really no inference as such, but another name for presumption (The foremost among the schools of Indian philosophy which admit the possibility of inference with a universal major premise based on negative concomitance is the (Nyāya). The typical example of such inference as given by this school of philosophy is :

Earth is distinct from other elements;

Because it is endowed with smell as its attribute and because whatever is not of this attribution, is not of this description.

The Advaita Vedānta contention in this connection is, however, that he who draws this conclusion is definitely aware that he is not inferring anything, but is only supposing something. Judged in this light, presumption, as the Vedānta argues, is distinct from inference for the simple reason that a universal major premise based on positive concomitance is not available in its case, the proposition, for example, "wherever there is stoutness (*pīnatvam*) there is the condition of eating at night (*rātribhojanam*)" being contrary to fact. But this really brings to light the crux of the whole situation by leaving behind the demand for a fresh inquiry into the possibility of inference with a universal major premise based on negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*). Hence arises the necessity for the consideration

f the attempts made by the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the *Amkhyā* to show that presumption, in the final analysis, is a form of inference.

In the following pages of the present chapter an earnest attempt is made to expound the respective arguments of the two branches of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā headed by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara and the Advaita Vedānta in defence of the distinct and independent character of *Arthāpatti* consistent with their respective conceptions of what constitutes the real nature of *Arthāpatti*, a detailed explanation of which formed the content of our second chapter.

A. THE CONTENTION OF THE PRABHĀKARAS IN DEFENCE OF ARTHĀPATTI

The followers of the Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā adopt a line of argument to distinguish between inference and presumption consistent with their conception of *Arthāpatti* as involving an element of doubt and the removal of which in their view, is the unique function of the *pramāṇa* under consideration.

The principal point on which this differs from inference is that, in the case of the latter, no kind of 'doubt' enters as a necessary factor, while in presumption it is necessary that there should be a doubt as to the validity of the two irreconcilable facts of perception.¹ Thus the source of presumption lies in the perceived thing, which, in the absence of something else, remains inconsistent, and hence doubtful, and for the sake of removing this element of doubt with regard to itself leads to the presumption of that other thing. In the case of inference, on the other hand, the probans - which forms the real source - is not to be set with any doubt. In fact no inference from it would be possible if it

validity were at all uncertain. Thus in the case of presumption, the source or origin is doubtful; while in that of inference, it must be absolutely free from all invalidating circumstances. The Prabhākaraśāstra holds that in case of inference that probans (*hetu*) is not dependable if the probandum (*sādhya*) does not exist on the basis of the probans (*pakṣa*) in question. The adjectival phrase 'otherwise not logically valid' qualifies a probans in the case of inference. For example, smoke cannot logically exist on the subject of inference if fire does not exist there. But in the case of presumption the reverse is the order subsisting between the implied and the implied. The implied object cannot be proved if the implies not exists.² The Prabhākaraśāstra explains this with a familiar example. The perceived non-existence in the house leads to the presumption of his external non-existence, only when it has thrown itself, and also the other known fact of the man's being into uncertainty.³ The Prabhākaraśāstra also explains the extract of Udayana's commentary to fit it in with this new hypothesis. The object which is known to us either through the verbal testimony or through the other means of knowledge causes us to postulate other objects. As such an object is the only source of postulation in the absence of it such a postulation becomes impossible to gain, if we have no opportunity of postulating an object that the object which is postulated cannot appear on the scene. Presumption reveals only an object which is assumed. Hence presumption is not inference.

On Prabhākara's view, the processes of presumption is as follows:

1. The perception of the fact that the man is not in the house;
2. Till it is known that the man is outside, it is a matter of doubt whether he lives or not;

3. It is then a question of the man living outside. So what is to be determined and what is unintelligible is the man's existence outside. This explained of his existence outside. This is the function of *Arthāpatti*.⁴

The Prabhākara view of presumption is not accepted by the *śhaṭṭa* who argues that in the case of the example cited, if the act of the man being alive was at all doubtful, it could not afford a sound basis for the requisite presumption, it is only when the act of his being alive is known for certain, that it can warrant the presumption of the man having gone out. Then again, the doubt, if there any, as to whether the man is alive or not, would be set aside, not by the cognition of his being outside, but only by the certainty of his being alive.⁵

The Naiyāyikas contend that if *Arthāpatti* is the presumption of something that will account for what is otherwise unaccountable, then it is no other than inference; even there we cannot account for smoke (in the stock example) except by postulating (the presence of fire) fire is presumed from (the appearance of) smoke.

Prabhākara agrees and opines that would be so (i.e. a case of inference) if that which is unaccountable is the *gamaka* or logical means. However, what is unaccountable that itself is *gamya* or the logical end.

The Naiyāyikas opined that there is nothing wrong. But the fact is otherwise. It is not by perceiving the *upapādaka* that the apprehension of what was inexplicable arises. If it did the presumption of *Simśpatva* would arise on the perception of *kṣatva*, (treeness) because *simśapatva* cannot be established otherwise than by its possession of the characteristics of a tree (*ṛkṣatva*). Hence what is unaccountable alone is *gamaka* and it

is not *upapādaka* that is *gamaka* and it is not *upapādaka* that is *gamaka* (as Naiyāyika would have it).

Prabhākara points out that he never meant that unaccountability is occasioned by *avinābhāva* (constant association). For him it arises because of doubt. When we have generally come to associate residence in the house with a man being alive, he begins to doubt whether that man is alive perceiving his absence from the house and the doubt is resolved only by postulating his stay outside. Hence since uncertainty to his being alive exists before his stay elsewhere is presumed it cannot be the *linga*. The mere absence from the house unassociated with the fact of being alive leading as it may to the conclusion that man is dead is a case of *anaiikāntika* fallacy as such is incapable of pointing to the conclusion "that he is out". Hence inference being out of the question that *Arthāpatti* is a distinct means of valid apprehension. When in inference the *gamaka* is a well-ascertained fact, *Arthāpatti* the *gamaka* is uncertain. This fact has to be admitted on the strength of (our) experience. And here the reason for uncertainty is the discrepancy with what has hitherto been known (viz. Devadatta being alive and remaining in the house)

The Naiyāyikas object that what Prabhākaras said does not stand to reason. Merely on the ground of doubt whether (Devadatta) is alive, his stay outside cannot be presumed. How can one who is in doubt whether Devadatta is alive, or dead, suppose that he is somewhere outside? The doubt regarding one's existence otherwise (*Jivanabhāvābhāvaḥ*) cannot be dispelled by the presumption of one's being outside. Everywhere it is the removal of the principal cause (of doubt) that dispels it, or by the ratification of one of the two (alternatives that appear in the doubt). It is dispelled merely by the supposition of (Devadatta's) stay outside that

ause (of doubt) is removed. On the supposition that one who is alive is generally found at home it has been explained that one's absence from the house is the cause of doubt. But the doubt will not be dissipated by the postulation of his stay outside. On the other hand it (*bahirbhāvakalpana*) will only confirm the very opposite (viz. absence from the house which is the cause of doubt). Nor is either of the alternatives characterising the doubt justified (by the presumption of stay outside). The doubt indeed is whether he is alive or dead. And the assumption that he is outside cannot determine either the one or the other (i.e. his being alive or his being dead). Being alive is one thing and being elsewhere is another thing (lit. his different spatial relation). The presumption based on his absence from the house is no adequate proof to establish the fact of (Devadatta's) being alive. It is no relevant to argue thus: because Devadatta is not found in the house, therefore he is alive. On the contrary how could (it may be asked) the fact of his being alive which had been previously ascertained to be a fact but now rendered doubtful by his absence from the house be established from that (absence) only. The use of doubt (it cannot be the means of decision or *nirṇaya*) is only once when the fact of his being alive which is doubtful is first established by some other means, (say *Sabda*) then his stay elsewhere has to be presumed. Because Devadatta is alive and not found in the house, therefore certainly he is elsewhere (this is the right presumption). That presumption however is not tenable when it is doubtful if he is alive. Because he is not in the house the doubt arises whether he is alive or not; therefore the presumption that he is away from the house is certainly not reasonable. Hence having ascertained the fact that (Devadatta) is alive together with the fact that he is not in the house—such knowledge being pervaded by the apprehension that he is outside,

his being outside (*sādhya*) is postulated; so that this is *Anumāna* and not a separate means of valid cognition.

The *pūrvapakṣa* by supposing that in the beginning of tenth chapter the transference of all the *angavākyas* expre (in *prakṛiti*) is meant to cause the conclusion that the transfer of the *vākyas* which are in syntactical unity in the *prakṛiti* the same manner in which they stand related in the *prakṛiti* so pointed out the conflict with the chapters relating to *ba* and *ūha*).

Prabhākara's objection emanates, who in all ellipses suppose that it is the *artha* (the sense) and not the word or phrase is to be supplied.

Let the (incomplete) sentence be completed by supplying the meaning and where is the need for the words being understood.

Not only in *atideśa* but everywhere *adhyāhāra* means him that of the idea and not of the word; e.g. Kumārila say

'But for Prabhākara *apurvajñāna* is enough and here is need for the word *apūrvā* to be understood.

What was again said that even here the sublation is of the particular place doubted, not of the valid cognition of being alive, here we say:

If Devadatta being alive is known through inference, relation to a particular place too is to be known, for the sake of his existence.

Here, if he is related merely to space in general, then account of his relation to spatiality, this person too would become space.

Therefore what is known is his being alive related to s in general without its particularity being defined, in the form is alive somewhere'.

Therefore his being alive can be validly known only in res of some particular place, though it is doubted, whether "at home" or "outside".

Of these, when one particular is sublated and prior to apprehension of the other, the valid knowledge of his being alive having no support, is itself certainly sublated.

As regards the Mimāṃsaka's contention that the relation of invariable concomitance holding between the 'implicans' and 'implicate' can in no way be discovered since such a relation is discovered when the objects thus related are within the range of vision.⁶ Jayanta holds that such an argument does not appear to be a reason. He further points out that the Mimāṃsakas themselves are not sure of the truth of their argument. A doubt as to whether or not the invariable relation holds between the 'implicans' and the 'implicate' has arisen in their mind but they have not been able to arrive at the definite conclusion that the above relation does not subsist between them. Hence they have put forward another example to prove their thesis, viz., "when a living person is at home he is not out". But if the Mimāṃsakas think that this is a better example, they should have given it at the outset.

B. THE DEFENCE OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

Let us begin by observing that Prabhākara's attempt to account for the distinction between presumption and inference with reference to his admission of the presence of an element of 'doubt' in the former and the absence of it in the latter proves to be a failure in the light of Kumārila's finding that presumption, as a matter of fact, does not have to bear the burden of any su

thing as 'doubt'. Even so, Kumārila is as insistent on the recognition of this distinction as in Prabhākara, and finds the reason for the recognition in his view that presumption differs from inference in that, whereas the former involves the conflict between the known facts, the latter is free from such involvement. But the very attempt to argue the distinction between the two sources of cognition under consideration, not with reference to their respective peculiarities as ways of cognizing, but with reference to the elements or elements supposed to be involved in them, is undoubtedly superficial and cannot really serve the purpose which it is intended to serve. This seems to have been realized by the Advaita Vedānta as is evident from the fact that, instead of undertaking the useless task of ascertaining the factors likely to be involved in presumption, it straightaway takes notice of the peculiarity of this way of cognizing and accordingly states that it is none but the act of framing hypothesis with a view to explaining situations which calls for explanation.

The Advaita Vedānta, while dismissing the possibility of the interpretation of *Arthāpatti* as identical with that kind of *numāna* in which the universal concomitance (*vyāpatti*) is based on positive instances (*anvayadṛṣṭānta*), does not rule out, but to the contrary, admits the possibility of its being treated as the same as the kind of inference in whose case *vyaptijñāna* is based on a negative instance *vyatireki dṛṣṭānta*. That is *Arthāpatti* is *numāna* through a negative concomitance (*vyatirekivyāpti*) which according to Advaita is no inference at all.⁷

In the syllogism 'Earth is different from the other elements because it possesses odour, the pervasion is negative, in the form 'Whatever is not different from the other elements has no odour, e.g., fire, air, water, or ether'; it cannot, however, be said 'whatever has odour is different from the other elements. Since odour

exists only in earth and with regard to that, since it is the subject there is not certainly, but doubt, whether the *sādhya* (probandum) exists in it or not. And we have said already that in inference our knowledge is based on perversion of co-presence; perversion of co-absence, being merely negative, can give rise to no knowledge except through indicating an unintelligibility that calls for postulation;⁸ earth could not intelligibly possess a quality not present in other elements, without being different from those elements. It is no inference. It is an implication, a hypothesis. For the Advaitin *Arthāpatti* accepted as an independent source of knowledge is the supposition of the cause. When well ascertained fact cannot be explained without the presumption of another thing as causing it, then this supposition is called *Arthāpatti*. The process is inductive. The effect is given, the cause is suggested.

Hence a case of *Arthāpatti* cannot be treated as *Anumāna*. According to Advaita Vedānta, 'the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not a cause of inferential knowledge.'⁹ Only affirmative invariable concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*) can lead to inference. So it accepts only one kind of inference, affirmative (*anvayi*), but concedes that negative invariable concomitance can lead to inference in a round about way, that is, through affirmative invariable concomitance. For from the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance by means of postulation (*Arthāpatti*).¹⁰ From the fact where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake, one can assume that where there is smoke, as in a lake, one can assume that where there is smoke there is fire because the presence of fire in a hill from the sight of smoke there.

In neither of the two cases cited above do we apprehend an affirmative invariable concomitance between the thing perceived and the thing to be inferred, such as between Devadatta

stoutness and eating at night or between Caitra's being alive and staying outside. So these cannot be included in inference, as the Naiyāyikas hold.

As stated in Vedāntaparibhāṣa, 'This postulation cannot be included in inference. For, since affirmative invariable concomitance cannot be apprehended here, it cannot be classified under affirmative inference, and we have previously refuted the contention that inference through negative invariable is also an inference. Hence in cases of postulation the apprehension is not 'I am inferring it', but, 'I am assuming it from this'.¹¹

Rāmākṛṣṇa, the author of the Sikhamani however, differs from the other Advaitins who accept only one type of inference i.e. *anvaya* based on positive universal concomitance which is known through the method of *anvaya* or agreement in presence coupled with non-observation of any *vyabhicāra* or violation. Rāmākṛṣṇa argues that it is not a *vyāpti* between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* alone that can be the basis of an inference. Any other *vyāpti* can also lead to an inference, provided that it does not present any opposition to the universal concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. It is idle to object, according to Rāmākṛṣṇa, that in that case the knowledge of universal concomitance, like "whatever is produced is non-eternal", might also lead to the inference, "the mountain is fiery", as there is no opposition between this universal and the universal "wherever there is any smoke, there is fire". For we never actually have such an inference in life. The testimony of self-consciousness should be the ultimate judge as to whether any inference actually takes place from a proposition or not.

Rāmākṛṣṇa goes further and maintains that by accepting the Nyāya theory of inference based on a negative concomitance

need not be apprehended that the Advaitin is obliged to abandon his own theory of presumption this is as an independent method of knowledge distinct from inference. The fact that the knowledge obtained through presumption they also be obtained through inference, does not necessarily imply that is always so known are, as elsewhere, the evidence of self-consciousness should decide what actually is the source of particular knowledge. The existence of an object known through perception can also be known through inference. But that neither argues that perception is included in inference, nor shows that everywhere the existence of the object is actually known through inference. It is only self-reflection that can tell us whether in a particular case the object is known perceptually or inferentially. Similarly the distinction between *Arthāpatti* and *Anumāna* also is grounded in the testimony of self-consciousness the one cannot, therefore, be reduced to the other.

Another alternative argument in support of inference based on negative concomitance is advanced, by Rāmakṛṣṇa. Even admitting that it is only a universal negative concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*, that can yield an inference, it may be said that the knowledge of a negative universal concomitance can be reduced to an affirmative universal concomitance, and through that to an inference. Thus the Advaitins can, according to Rāmakṛṣṇa accept the Nyāya theory of inference based on negative concomitance quite consistently with their own theory of presumption. Orthodox commentators of the Vedāntaparibhāṣa are however, against Rāmakṛṣṇa that the evidence of self-consciousness does not prove that we ever infer any conclusion that is a *vyatireki* universal. There is no ground, therefore, for accepting an inference, based on a universal negative concomitance.

Having thus presented the different shades of the Advaita views on the matter, it is necessary to evaluate these views. Let us first consider the objections of Advaita against the reduction of presumption to inference. The Advaitins in their criticism presuppose that presumption, if it be an inference at all, must be one based on universal negative concomitance, and argue that such an inference is no inference at all, presumption cannot be one such. It is undeniable that the instances of presumption can be rendered in the negative form. To illustrate, the argument that the man who fasts by day and yet remains fat must eat at night may be rendered in the negative form: "No case of absence of eating at night while fasting by day is a case of fatness. This is a case of fatness. Therefore, this is not the case of absence of eating at night while fasting by day; i.e. this is a case 'night eating'". Similarly, the Mīmāṃsaka argument that Devadatta is alive and not yet at home must be out, may be rendered in the negative form as: "No case of absence of the man outside home, while he is not alive at home, is a case of his being alive. Devadatta is alive. Therefore Devadatta is not absent outside home while he is not home, i.e. he is outside home". *Arthāpatti* is the presumption of one event in the production of negative data.

Prof. D.M. Datta raises an interesting question: "Are we in any way constrained to convert a case of *Arthāpatti* into this form of inference alone?" He expects a student of western philosophy to answer this question, as Vācaspati Miśra did on behalf of the Nyāyika, that the instances of *Arthāpatti* can be put more conveniently in the form of a disjunctive - categorical syllogism which would assume the form: a man who is fat eats either by day or by night. This stout man does not eat by day. Therefore he eats at night or Devadatta who is alive is either at home or out. Devadatta is not at home therefore he is out.

It appears to me that this is more a case where hypothetic and disjunctive inferences are combined than a case of disjunctive-categorical inference as Prof. Datta opines. This can be stated in the form, $p \supset (q \vee r)$. This can be further split up in the following two basic inferences,

1. $p \supset q$

p

$\therefore q$

If Devadatta is fat he must be eating.

He is fat

He must be eating.

2. $p \vee q$

$\sim p$

$\therefore q$

Devadatta who is fat must be eating either by day time or by night time.

He does not eat by day time.

\therefore He must be eating by night time.

Dr. Datta who attempts an illuminating exposition of the discussion as to why *Arthāpatti* cannot be classed as *Anumāna*.¹² He exhibits the *petitio principii* involved in the attempted reduction of a disjunctive - categorical or acategorical syllogism; for whatever is assumed as major premise 'Devadatta who is alive must be at home or out' or 'Any case of a man who is alive not being at home is a case of his being out' involved the very knowledge which *Arthāpatti* seeks to establish. Yet another way of establishing the independence of *Arthāpatti* was explained by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja in a paper before the sixteenth session of the Indian Philosophical Congress; *Arthāpatti* is not really a process of arguing from the exhaustiveness or exclusiveness of already

specified particulars; the process is more like this: it is known that Devadatta is alive; being alive is a general notion which must be realized in some specific way; the initial presumption is that he is alive and at home; when that is negated, a tension is created by the generality having to find out at once. Seeking other specific support; relief is given to this tension by providing a specific alternative, namely Devadatta being out. The bahuhought procedure this is different from that of inference.

Thus, postulation, as a method of knowledge, has a distinctive character. It cannot be identified with inference or any other means of valid knowledge. It has other distinguishing marks apart from the difference of attendant apperception that who have noted above. It resembles hypothesis of western logic, but is different from it. As observed by D.M. Datta: 'On all grounds, therefore, we have to admit that *Arthāpatti* is a distinct method of knowledge; it cannot be reduced to inference and neither can all inference be reduced to it. But before we conclude, it will be interesting to inquire whether we have any analogue of this process of knowledge in western philosophy. It may be compared to the hypothesis of western logic, in so far as both of them are suppositions that set out to explain given facts. But there are all important points of difference between the two. Like *Arthāpatti*, a hypothesis may not be always inspired by the motive of solving a conflict or contradiction. What is more important to note is that 'hypothesis' is used to connote a tentative supposition that awaits verification, and does not, therefore, possess absolute certainty. But an *Arthāpatti*, though a supposition, is the supposition of the only possible fact and carries with it absolute certainty. It can claim, therefore, the same place as a method of knowledge as is enjoyed by inference, perception, etc.¹³

He concludes with the remark: Kant's transcendental principle can, therefore, be regarded as an instance of *Arthāpatti*.¹⁴

Dr. Chatterjee and Dr. Datta have clearly distinguished postulation from hypothesis and deduction:

'It will be found that *Arthāpatti* (postulation) resembles hypothesis as understood in western logic. It appears to be like an explanatory hypothesis. But the difference is that it lacks the tentative or provisional character of a hypothesis. What is known by *Arthāpatti* is not simply hypothetically supposed or entertained but is believed in as the only possible explanation. A *Arthāpatti* (postulator) arises out of a demand for explanation. It is different from a syllogistic inference, the object of which is to conclude from given facts, and not to explain given facts. *Arthāpatti* is a search for grounds, whereas an inference is a search for consequents.¹⁵

3. KUMĀRILA'S DEFENCE OF ARTHĀPATTI

According to Kumāṛila, presumption primarily and indeed exclusively involves the conflict (*Virodha* or *anupapatti*) between two well known facts; so that any additional element such as doubt must be out of place within the structure of this source of cognition. In any case, the recognition of doubt as an element of presumption, according to Kumāṛila, is not, as according to Abhākara it is, called for in view of the distinction between presumption and inference. Kumāṛila's reason for this is that this distinction can be very well explained solely with reference to the conflict involved in presumption. With a view to the explanation of the distinction between presumption and inference, it would, in the view of Kumāṛila, be sufficient to observe that whereas presumption involves an element of conflict and at the same time requires to resolve the same, inference is free from this element

and, consequently, does not have the same function to perform as is incumbent upon presumption to do. Besides, the recognition of doubt as an element in presumption, Kumārila observes further would adversely affect the performance of the proper function on the part of this source of cognition. For if the knowledge rather information about a fact, for example, Devadatta's being alive, were doubtful, presumption would certainly be left without a sound basis to stand upon. Kumārila thus frees this source of cognition from the additional burden, the burden of doubt which Prabhākara imposed upon it and seeks to show that, rid of complexity, presumption can very well maintain its distinctness from inference.

Kumārila quotes the same stock example and on the basis of it tries to prove that the cases of presumption cannot be regarded as the cases of inference. Amongst the types of presumptions Kumārila picks up 'presumption based upon negation' as a typical case, and Bhatta Ubbeka justifies the selection of this type on the ground that it is related to the only example of presumption which has been given by Sabara himself. The example runs 'the living Caitra is not present in his house'. So, on recognizing the absence of the living Caitra from his house and in order to solve the inconsistency between his living and his absence from his house, one presumes that Caitra would be present somewhere outside his house.

Kumārila advances the following arguments to substantiate his objection to the reducibility of presumption to inference.

Arthāpatti is different from Anumāna

In the example of Caitra's presence outside his house, let us see if it can be satisfactorily explained as a case of *Anumāna*. The given fact in this example is Caitra's absence

the house, that which is to be known from this fact can be stated in two forms, viz. 'Caitra is present in outside space' and 'outside space is one in which Caitra is present'. Accordingly the middle term is either Caitra or outside space. But what is the middle term? The middle term is always the property of the minor term. In the present case absence cannot be the middle term since it is not a property either of Caitra or outside space. Absence is apprehended in the house. Therefore, it can reasonably be the property of the house alone. Can then the house qualified by the absence be the middle term? No, because the house can never be a property of Caitra or of outside space. What is apprehended is the absence and the house. What is apprehended is the absence in the house. Caitra and outside space are not apprehended at the same time. How can then absence in the house be related to Caitra or outside space? However, imperceptibility can be related to Caitra because when the person goes to Caitra's house he does not perceive him there. Can we then make the imperceptibility the middle term and say that Caitra is present in the outside space because he is imperceptible inside the house? No, because imperceptibility is not directly related to the major term, viz. presence outside. Since he may be at home. One must say therefore that the fact of his absence from home related with that of his being perceived is the mark from which we can infer the fact of his being outside. But we find that the relation of these two facts constituting the mark is not possible without the assumption that he is outside until that alternative comes to the mind life and absence from home appear incompatible. That is to say, the knowledge of the mark presupposes already the knowledge of the fact to be proved, and nothing remains to be proved by the conference. Hence the attempt to reduce *Arthapatti* to inference fails¹⁶ being vitiated by a *petitio principii*.

A student of western philosophy would like to understand clearly how this argument of the Mīmāṃsakas affects the disjunctive - categorical syllogism to which, it has been found, *Arthāpatti* can be reduced. It is not easy to understand how this syllogism, 'Devadatta, who is alive, is either at home or is out. Devadatta is not at home. Therefore, he is out', can come within the purview of the above criticism. For a disjunctive argument cannot be said to have a middle term, unless it is forcibly converted into the categorical type.¹⁷

Thus imperceptibility and absence in the house both singulars are useless for our purpose, because the form is related to minor term, Caitra, but is not related to major term, 'presence outside the house', and the later may be related to the major term but is not related to the minor term.

There is another difficulty also in *Anumāna* the minor term is apprehended prior to the major term. It seeks to prove that a formally unknown property (*dharma*) belongs to a well known property possessor (*dharmānu*). But in the case in question the property-possessor, viz. Caitra or outside space, is not apprehended so, how can anything be proved by *Anumāna*? He *raṇKumārila* anticipates the following objection. From the fact that in river water rain in higher region is known and this is recognised by all as a case of inference. But according to the above reasoning it cannot be so, since the minor term 'higher regions' is not seen so that there can be no *pakṣadharmata* i.e. the middle term 'rain in river-water' cannot be related to the minor term. *Kumārila's* answer is that the minor term in the said case is not higher region but it is the 'region in earlier the rise in river water is seen' and then the conclusion of the syllogism will be 'the place is one whose higher region have rain' instead of 'the higher regions are such as have rain'. But this answer does not seem

satisfactory. It is a mere verbal manipulation. In spite of the change in statement the facts are not altered because the rain occurs in the higher region where the rise in river water is seen in place. And if the change in statement can make the syllogism flawless, then in the case of Caitra's presence outside too it can make the house minor term instead of Caitra. Anticipating this objection Kumārila says that the knowledge of rain in higher regions is not a case of inference but of *Arthāpatti*.¹

Parthasārathi says that Kumārila's answer is futile. There is no lack of *pakṣadharmata*, i.e. the relation between the minor term 'Caitra' and the middle term 'absence in the house'. The relation is obvious when we go to Caitra's house and find that he is absent. It is not a condition of inference that the minor term should always be perceived. Though Caitra is not perceived yet he is remembered. Thus the syllogism 'Caitra is present outside the house because he is absent in the house and whoever is absent in the house is present outside, like myself' is quite valid and similarly the syllogism which proves the occurrence of rain in the higher regions also is valid. Therefore, either *Arthāpatti* is not different from *Anumāna* or if it is different the proper reason should be stated.¹⁹

Another reason why *Arthāpatti* cannot be included in *Anumāna* is that it does not stand in need of knowledge of *vyāpti* while the latter cannot proceed without it. *Vyāpti* is a generalization based on a frequent and uncontradicted experience of two things together and in *Anumānavyāpti* which constitutes the major premise is known prior to the conclusion. *Arthāpatti* on the other hand, is independent of the knowledge of *vyāpti*. It is true that there is *vyāpti* between non-existence inside the house and existence outside, but it is not known prior to the presumptive

Caitra's existence outside, so that it cannot be the cause of cognition that Caitra is outside. Even one who has never experienced the concomitance of non-existence inside the existence inside presumes that a person who is not inside is present outside. Moreover, the proof of the said concomitance is no other than *arthāpatti*. From the inexplicability of the fact that Caitra exists and does not exist in the house it is presumed that he exists outside and then we become aware of the relation between non-existence inside and existence outside. The conclusion of a syllogism is the result of applying a general empirical rule to a particular case; but in the case in question *Arthāpatti* is the means of knowing the general rule. This established the distinctness of *arthāpatti* from *Anumana*.²⁰

The opponent may object that *Arthāpatti* is not the only means of knowing the relation between non-existence in one place and existence elsewhere, because it is just possible for one who stands at the door and perceives Caitra in the garden to know the relation. This is true and in this way there may be no need for *Arthāpatti* for knowing the *vyāpti* in the case of some person in some instances. However, we cannot do away with *arthāpatti* for ever, because though in some cases *Arthāpatti* is an alternative means of knowing the *vyāpti* in others it is the only means. For example, the *vyāpti* between existence in one place and non-existence in all other places cannot be known otherwise than through *Arthāpatti*.

The opponent says that if non-existence is ascertained not merely by non-apprehension but by non-apprehension in a place where one actually goes, then since it is impossible for one to go to all the places where fire does not exist, the proposition 'here there is no fire there is no smoke' cannot be established. The answer is that this fact undermines the position of only those

who hold that the *vyāpti* from which an inference is drawn must be universal and negative in form. It is, however, been already shown that *vyāpti* is affirmative in form and that it is established by a uniform and uncontradicted experience of the co-existence of the probans and the probandum and the negation of the probans. Now if, the opponent again objects, the universal relation between smoke and fire can be established through the experience of a limited number of the places where they co-exist, then the relation between existence in one place and non-existence in all other places also can be established through the experience in all other places also can be established through the experience of Caitra's presence in one place and his absence in the adjoining place. We know from the co-existence of smoke and fire in a few places that they co-exist everywhere and likewise we can know from the absence in a few places of Caitra who is known to be present in one particular place that he is absent everywhere else. To this the answer is that the two cases are not parallel. In the case of the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire the terms are of a limited extension and are found to be present in their entirety in the few places in which they are observed together. But in the case of *vyāpti* between existence in one place and non-existence everywhere else, the latter term of the relation is of an unlimited extension, so that it cannot be known in its entirety in a few experiences, though the first term is known in its entirety. The opponent again says that we can know Caitra's non-existence through inference as follows: All places are devoid of Caitra because they are places other than the one in which he is present, like the place in front. But this inference is inconclusive because it can be counter-balanced by the following inference. All places are those which are not devoid of Caitra because they are other than the one in front, like the place where Caitra is present. Thus

Caitra's non-existence everywhere else can be presumed. In case of *Arthāpatti* there should be some inexplicability in the ascertained fact, while there is no inexplicability in the perception of the presence of a person in place, and this has been admitted by Sucaritamisra also. The fact becomes inexplicable only with Caitra, who is a finite being, is supposed to be present simultaneously in other places also. But this sort of inexplicability is different from the one which leads *Arthāpatti*, e.g. the inexplicability involved in Devadatta's fattening in spite of his fasting during the day. The contradiction in the present case is not real but hypothetical. To ascertain that a thing can be present in multiple places at the same time is inconsistent with the fact that it is finite, therefore, we have to deny it. Thus the said instance is not a case of *Arthāpatti*. It is however a case of *Arthāpatti* according to an earlier definition which is found in Vatsyayana's *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya Sūtra*. By *Arthāpatti* Vatsyayana means "Apprehending from Apposition what is not directly stated in the proposition".²¹ From the proposition that a finite thing is present in a particular place at a particular time we apprehend that it is not present in other place at the same time, because the denial of this later fact is opposed to the notion of finite *Arthāpatti*. In this sense is implication rather than presumption.

The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakaś further add that *Arthāpatti* is different from *Anumāna* in the sense that the former corroborates the findings of the two independent means of proof, *śabda* and *Anupalabdhi*, which grasp the existence and non-existence of the same object, i.e. Caitra.²² It simultaneously reveals the existence and the non-existence of the object, i.e. Caitra. *Śabda* indefinitely speaks his existence. We know that he exists somewhere. But when we know for certain that he is absent from his house, we also definitely know that

Arthāpati lives somewhere outside his house. *Arthāpati* is not an inference because of this distinctive feature. Moreover, a presumption not being conditioned by the knowledge of invariable concomitance is different from an inference.

In the case of inference the relation of invariable concomitance holding between fire and smoke is grasped by a single means of proof. But in the case of presumption the relation of invariable concomitance holding between presence outside a house and absence from a house cannot be grasped by a single means of proof. If it is admitted by the Naiyāyikas that the relation of invariable concomitance is indirectly grasped by means of a hypothetical judgment that this is not possible if such and such condition is not available then we (the Mīmāṃsākās) take no objection to it. The major premise is obtained by means of assumption. The conclusion may be deducted from it by means of syllogistic process. If the subsequent part of the cognitive process is called an inference then the Naiyāyikās may do so as they like.

The relation of invariable concomitance holding between two objects just outside his house may be discovered. But in this way the relation of invariable concomitance holding between an object negated and its negation can never be discovered.

When we see that Caitra is present in his house we conjecture that we cannot account for his stay at home if he is not absent from other places. Thus, we presume his absence from all the places other than his house. We cannot see all the places other than his house and come to know that he is absent from each of them. In this case, generalization, based upon observation, is impossible since the places are innumerable. How do the Mīmāṃsākās arrive at the general (universal) proposition "where

there is no fire there is no smoke?" The reply of the Mīmāṃsākas to this question is that the method of agreement contributes much to arrive at the required induction that smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire but exclusive use of the method of difference to arrive at the said induction is not worth trying. If we arrive at the correct generalization repeatedly observing the positive instances then why should we run after negative instances to arrive at the same truth in a roundabout manner? In the present case, whenever we try to establish the relation of concomitance holding between Caitra and his absence in a general way we realise the real difficulty which asserts that the absence of Caitra cannot be innumerable. Hence an induction is impossible but a summation of a few cases is merely possible. Hence Caitra's absence cannot be inferred.

Now, a question may arise that Caitra's absence may be definitely known by means of non-perception. 'No' is our reply. The reason is as follows: When we know negation by means of non-perception we know it as located upon a particular well-defined locus. But the negation of Caitra belongs to all places excepting his house. Hence it cannot be known by non-perception. The objector may urge that he will roam about from one place to another in order to know the negation of Caitra by means of non-perception. Such an contention is not tenable. Though he pays a visit to all the different places yet he cannot definitely know the exact locus of the negation of Caitra. He leaves Kausāmbī for some other places. But a doubt may chase him that as soon as Caitra departs from Kausāmbī he may return to it. To an ordinary man with a limited power of knowing things the negation of Caitra in all places outside his house cannot be known by means of non-perception but by means of presumption. He may still contend that the object in question may be easily inferred. The

argument is as follows: All the other places contain the negation of Caitra because they are other than the place occupied by Caitra like the place in the vicinity of his house. Such an argument is set at naught by a counter-argument. The other places are not distinct from such places as contained in his negation because they are distinct from the place which is very close to his house like his own house. The small boy of a man is seen only at a particular place. If its negation had not existed in all other places then in small size would have been a puzzle which could not be solved. That is why it should be presumed that his negation exists in all places not occupied by him. Hence, the negation of Caitra under discussion is only ascertained by means of presumption.

As part of their sustained and continued efforts to preserve the independent and distinct status of *Arthāpatti*, the Chhatta Mīmāṃsākās raise an interesting question, 'Are all inferences reducible to *Arthāpatti*?' Parthasārathi raises this question and discusses it at considerable length. If this line of argument we adopted, is not possible to show that all cases of inference (not only inferences and based on purely negative concomitances) are instances of *Arthāpatti*? Let us consider the case of the inference of fire on the hill. We know that where there is smoke there is fire and we perceive smoke on the hill. Now if there were no fire on the hill the proposition 'where there is smoke there is fire' would be false or our perception of smoke would be false. This is the element of conflict; and the inference of the presence of fire may be taken as a means of resolving this conflict, in which case the inference is *Arthāpatti* only. Parthasārathi's answer is that though the cognition of fire on the hill arrived at in the aforesaid manner may be *Arthāpatti*, yet the cognition that where there is smoke there is fire is not arrived at through *Arthāpatti*. The *vyāpti* between smoke and fire is the

result of *Anumāna* based on the experience of particular instance of smoke and fire. Smoke and fire are seen together in the heart and this fact does not involve any contradiction if the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is not recognised. The proposition 'some cases of smoke are cases of fire' is true even though the proposition 'all cases of smoke are cases of fire' be false. Thus there being no contradiction here there is no scope for *Arthāpatti*. And as some cases at least of *Anumāna* cannot be brought under *Arthāpatti*, the two should be admitted to be distinct *pramāna*. The distinction between the two having been recognised there is no harm if the same cognition arises through *Anumāna* or *Arthāpatti*. The knowledge of fire on the hill may be arrived at by *Anumāna* and *Arthāpatti*, yet this does not mean that *Anumāna* and *Arthāpatti* are not distinct from each other. When the knowledge of fire on the hill arises from the recollection of the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire it is *Anumāna*, and when it is preceded by the consciousness of inconsistency it is *Arthāpatti*. Thus the processes are different and none can be reduced to the other.²³

Parthasarathi's answer, however, is not accepted by the late Bhattas. It has been shown in the chapter on *Anumāna* that Parthasarathi's view that the knowledge of *vyāpti* is based on *Anumāna* is not accepted by others. As a matter of fact there is no conflict between the knowledge that all cases of smoke are cases of fire and that the hill has smoke. The presence of fire on the hill is inferred from the perception of smoke on it consistent with the knowledge that where there is smoke there is fire. There is no inconsistency here, so that it cannot be case of *Arthāpatti*. Thus the presence of fire known in this way is not found in the higher regions of the hill its presence in the low region is presumed to remove the inexplicability of the fact that

fire is present though it is not present in the higher regions of the hill.²⁴

The Vedāntins hold that even if we arrive at the conclusion of an inference through *Arthāpatti*, we have to depend for our data on a previous inference. Therefore, inference cannot be reduced to *Arthāpatti*. Dharmarāja, however, seems to hold that *yatireki* inference is reducible to presumption and here, at this point, there is a face-to-face conflict between Dharmarāja and Jayanta in particular and the Vedānta and Nyāya in general.²⁵

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Chapter V

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE

In the course of our exposition we have considered in detail the various arguments for and against *Arthāpatti* as a distinct source of knowledge or as an independent *pramāṇa* and it is needless to repeat those arguments here. The present researcher is convinced that *Arthāpatti* may be accepted as a distinct form of knowledge. The foregoing scrutiny of the Nyāya position makes plain that the validity of *Arthāpatti* as a distinct means of knowledge remains unaffected inspite of the unsparing attack from the Nyāya side. The vehement opposition to *Arthāpatti* is not founded on valid grounds, probably it is based on a firm conviction that the number of *pramāṇas* cannot be in excess of the four enumerated by Gautama and rooted on a spirit of unwillingness to admit what comes from rival camps.

There has been a prolonged controversy as to the relation of *Arthāpatti* with *Anumāna*. An important point to note, however, is that even those who would like to have it included within *Anumāna* are ready to accept that it is a valid mode of knowledge. It is not necessary for my purpose to go into the details of this discussion. I think that the position of the controversialists on the subject may be summarised by saying that whereas all of them agree in recognising the epistemological value of *Arthāpatti* and in giving it a place of independence as an epistemological method, some of them believe that logically it can be reduced to the *vyatireki* form of the *Anumāna*. As Datt

in his exposition on the subject in "Six Ways of knowledge" and Randle in his "Indian Logic in the Early schools" have shown, "it cannot be reduced to inference and neither can all inference be reduced to it", and we should accept it as an independent method of knowledge.

It may be interesting however, to inquire into the specific logical nature of *Arthāpatti*. It appears that the logic implied in it is neither exactly the same as that of immediate inference, or of syllogism, or of inference either of the Western type or of Indian type. There are certain fundamental differences between *Anumāna* and *Arthāpatti* which make it impossible for us to reduce either of them to the other. It cannot be reduced to inference as the Naiyāyikas and the Sāṃkhyas endeavour to do. The reason for this, however, is not, as the Advaitins suppose, that there is no such thing as *vyatireki* inference, to which *Arthāpatti* may possibly be reduced. The Advaita Vedāntins lose their case against those who prove that *vyatireki* is a genuine type of inference, or reduce *Arthāpatti* to some other kind of inference like the hypothetical-categorical or the disjunctive-categorical syllogism. The real reason, as the Bhaṭṭas point out, that *Arthāpatti* cannot be reduced to any kind of inference.

It may be seen at first view that both of them involve the same process of reasoning. In *Arthāpatti* we pass from the knowledge of an observed phenomenon to that of an unobserved phenomenon without which it cannot be explained. In inference also we pass from the observed smoke to the unobserved fire as that which alone explains the smoke. But a closer view of the matter reveals certain important and unmistakable difference between the two. In inference we proceed from the *gamaka* or the evidentiary fact to the *gamyā* or the evidenced fact, while in *Arthāpatti* we pass from the *gamyā* or the fact to be evidenced

and explained to the *gamaka* or that which evidences and explains it.

Again, *Arthāpatti* arises when there is doubt or contradiction¹ in the mind, and we try to free the mind from it by discovering an assumption which dissolves the conflict. For instance, on not finding Devadatta at home while being certain, on some other evidence, that he is alive, we have to assume that he is out. Without this assumption there is a conflict between the knowledge of his absence from home and that of his being alive. It is only when we light upon the alternative idea that he may be out that we can reconcile the two. Again, there is conflict between the knowledge that a man fasts by day and that he is stout, till the idea strikes us that he may be eating at night. Now the assumption in each of these cases is justified and is a valid piece of knowledge, because the two facts, between which there is an apparent conflict, are known to be certain (so that the conflict cannot be possibly got over by rejecting one of them), and because the fact assumed is the only one that can explain away the conflict. Hence while in *Anumāna* we pass from an undoubted fact (*niscitagamaka*) to its invariably concomitance, in *Arthāpatti* we proceed from a doubtful fact (*samdig-dha gamaka*) to something which explains it and frees us from doubt and uncertainty.

When this analysis of the process of *Arthāpatti* is accurately understood, it is easily found that it cannot be treated as a case of *Anumāna*. It will be admitted by all that in *Anumāna* we know that mark (or the middle term) first and ascertain the major term, through that, afterwards. But it would be found that this does not hold good if *Arthāpatti* is put in the form of an inference. If *Arthāpatti* were an inference what would be the mark? To go back to one of the instances given above, we cannot say that mere absence from home can serve as the mark for

inferring that the man is out, since he may be dead and altogether non-existent; neither can we say that the mere fact of being alive is a mark of his being out, since he may be at home. We must say, therefore, that the fact of his absence from home related with that of his being out. But we find that the relation of these two facts constituting the mark is not possible without the assumption that he is out; for until that alternative comes to the mind, life and absence from home appear incompatible. That is to say, the knowledge of the mark presupposes already the knowledge of the fact to be proved, and nothing remains to be proved by the inference. Hence the attempt to reduce *Arthāpatti* to inference fails,² being vitiated by a *petitio principii*.

The fundamental condition of all inference is the relation of *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance between the major and the middle term. In every inference the conclusion follows from a universal proposition which is the result of a previous induction. The knowledge of the universal proposition is derived from the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence or in absence between the middle and the major term. In any inference we apply a universal proposition, which is already known, to a particular case. To reduce *Arthāpatti* to inference we must, therefore, show that here our knowledge of the unobserved fact follows from a universal proposition which is already known by induction. The Naiyāyikas and others would say that the knowledge given by *Arthāpatti* does follow from certain universal propositions. That Devadatta eats at night follows from the universal propositions "A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day is not fat". Similarly, the fact that he is out follows from the proposition, "A living man is either at home or out of it".

What mainly concerns us in this connection is whether *vyāpti* exists at all between non-existence in the house and existence outside and how far the Nyāya disputants are justified in their views. The Nyāya concept of *vyāpti* is based on what is known to be *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, the characteristic of having the same locus. *Vyāpti* is not a bare unqualified relation. It is an invariable relation obtaining between the probans and the probandum, both existing in one and the same locus. In other words the probans and the probandum must be concomitant or co-existing. It must be remembered that it is only this relation of co-existence that plays the role of an instrumental cause in the emergence of inferential knowledge. In the example under consideration Devadatta's non-existence occurs in the house and his existence occurs elsewhere outside. Existence and non-existence of Devadatta occurs in different locus i.e. there is no *Sāmānādhikarāṇya*, between existence outside the non-existence of Devadatta in the house. In the absence of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* it is needless to point out, the relation between existence outside and non-existence in the house cannot be characterised as *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance.

Existence of a non-existensive entity (*mūrta*) at one place necessitates its non-existence at other place. When one occurs the other also must occur i.e. there exists a necessary relation (*niyatasambandha*) between the two. Or the occurrence of one at one place is inconceivable without the simultaneous occurrence of the other at another place, i.e. one cannot occur separately from or independently of the other. It follows that there exists an inseparable relation (*avinābhāva sambandha*) between the two. It is an undeniable fact that necessary relation or inseparable relation obtains even between things that are non-concomitant

(*vyadhikarāṇya*) and instances where this relation exists are available in abundance in our day to day experience. For instance, the rising and setting of the Sun. When the Sun is rising at one place it is setting at another place. But rising and setting do not occur at one and the same place. The relation which is absolutely independent of *samānādhikarāṇya* may be called "necessary relation" or "inseparable relation". *Vyāpti* is not identical with *Avinābhāva*; it is something more than that. As observed earlier it is *avinābhāva* qualified by *samānādhikarāṇya*.

As the relation between existence outside and non-existence in the house is not one of *vyāpti*, the knowledge of existence outside issuing from the knowledge of non-existence in the house cannot be inferred (*anumiti*). The validity of our experience of the knowledge of the existence of Devadatta outside the house cannot be questioned. The resulting knowledge must be given a different name, say *Arthāpatti*.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins can conveniently draw out the distinction between inference and presumption through the difference in the instrumental causes that generate them. The knowledge arising out of mere *avinābhāva* is presumption whereas the one that arises out of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is inference.

The Naiyāyikas of the early times either missed the difference between *avinābhāva* and *vyāpti* or perhaps deliberately ignored it. Udayana asserts that if the knowledge of one out of two inseparably related entities is responsible to give rise to the knowledge of the other entity then the relation between the two is to be deemed as *vyāpti*. The knowledge of one thing, not invariably concomitant with the other, cannot possess the

knowledge of the other.³ Against this glaring difference between *avinābhāva* and *vyāpatti*, Udayana's position can hardly sustain.

Udayana, Jayanta, Gaṅgeśa and a host of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophers of later times contend that *Arthāpatti* is identical with *Anumāna* of the *kevalavyatireki* type. Udayana affirms that what is *Arthāpatti* according to the Mīmāṃsakas is none other than *Vyatireka* concomitance; the difference is only in name.⁴

Negative (*Vyatireka*) concomitance is pressed into service when no positive (*anvaya*) concomitance between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) is available. For example, Earth differs from other categories (*iterabhinna*). This difference from other categories exists only in the earth. If one wants to infer difference from other categories with respect to earth (minor term) (*the pakṣa*) he must possess with him, beforehand, a knowledge of that special characteristic, of earth, which is invariably concomitant with "difference from other categories" (*iterabhedavyāpya*). Since *itarabheda* and smell are exclusively present only in earth we cannot come across an instance (*anvayadr̥ṣṭānta*) other than earth where we can observe agreement in presence (*anvaya saḥacara*) so as to be able to arrive at the positive universal proposition "Whatever has smell is different from the rest". But there are instances like water, fire etc., where we can observe agreement in absence (*vyatireka saḥacara*) and arrive at the negative universal proposition. "Whatever is not different from others (water, fire etc.) has no smell". Difference from other categories, in earth, will have to be inferred only from the negative universal proposition.

None that is not different from earth possesses smell. Earth has smell. Therefore earth is different from other categories. Now

it remains for us to see whatever *Arthāpatti* can be satisfactorily explained as a case of inference of the *kevala vyatireki* type and Devadatta's existence outside can be inferred from a knowledge of *kevala vyatireka* or the purely negative concomitance. It is well known that inference of the *kevalavyatireki* type starts with a purely negative proposition. Again positive proposition. "Whichever does not exist in the house exists outside" when transformed into a negative proposition will assume the form "whichever does not exist outside is not non-existent in the house. This amounts to say "whichever does not exist outside the house exists in the house. Here non-existence outside and the non-existence of non-existence do not occur in one and the same locus, i.e. the locus of non-existence is outside the house and the locus of the non-existence of non-existence is in the house. It appears that there is no *samānādhikarānya* and hence no *vyāpti*.

ii

Regarding the other and in fact a more important aspect of the issue is whether the knowledge of universal concomitance between the absence *sādhya* and the absence of *hetu*, i.e. *vyatireka vyāpti* yields the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the *hetu* and *sādhya* i.e. *anvaya vyāpti*, and generates an inference through the latter, it must be said an affirmative reply to that by the Naiyāyikas amounts to a surrender of their position on a few of their basic positions as the following consideration would show.

In refuting the view that *Arthāpatti* is postulation produced by doubt the Naiyāyikas have said that the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* produces the same result when aided by *tarka* *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* unaided by *tarka* produces only a disjunction

like "Devadatta is either dead or living", which results only in doubt. But with the help of *tarka* it produces the definite knowledge of Devadatta's existence outside.⁵ But what is *tarka*? Gautama defines it as a reasoning to know the truth when there is doubt.⁶ It is a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is attribution of *hetvābhāva* by supposing *sādhyaābhāva*. For the classical example, the mountain contains fire because there is smoke, the *tarka* would be of the form, if it does not contain fire there would have been no smoke. The Naiyāyikas do not treat *tarka* as a separate *pramāṇa* or even as a form of syllogism (*Anumāna*) but only as an aid to *vyāpti*.

But how is this *tarka* different from what we call *vyatirekavyāpti*? The latter is the concomitance of the *sādhyaābhāva*. But *tarka* also runs: Had there been *sādhyaābhāva* there would have been *hetvābhāva*. Indeed there is difference between the two modes of expression. When expressed as a *vyāpti* there is an 'is', and when expressed as a *tarka* there is a 'would have been'. But 'would have been' is based upon 'is'. It is not even an implication of 'is', though we may say that it is an application. It is just an immediate inference, the contrapositive of the original *anvayavyāpti*. The contrapositive of "All S is P" is "All not p is not S"; thus the contrapositive of "wherever there is smoke there is fire" is "whenever there is absence of fire there is absence of smoke". *Tarka* in the classical *anvayavyatireka* example would be if there is not fire there would not have been smoke : but there is smoke: (and the Naiyāyikas continue) hence this smoke must have been without cause and eternal (*nitya*).

The Naiyāyika does not seem to proceed further; if he does there would be difficulties. Supposing the question is asked: what is the harm if smoke is without a cause and eternal? He would

have to say that it conflicts with what we see. If it does, the conclusion would be: There is fire. Now, if the conclusion can be obtained through *tarka* itself, the latter must be treated as a *pramāṇa* or it itself would be inference. If, on the other hand, he answers that if the smoke is eternal the law of causality would be violated he would be holding the view that inference possible only when the *hetu* and the *sādhya* are causally related. But even for *anvayavyatireki* inference there are instances where the two are not causally related but yet are concomitant. The example of European logic is: All men are organisms, Socrates is a man, and therefore he is an organism, is of the kind. Here the *tarka* would be, if Socrates were not mortal he would not have been a man; but man and organism are not causally related.

The Naiyāyika is not at all prepared to treat *tarka* as a form of inference. Udyotakara discusses the point.⁷ He anticipates the objection that *tarka* is *Anumāna* as it is dependent upon the memory of the concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. But he replies that *Anumāna* is possible when we have a *dharma* and a *dharmi*; when we have a *dharmi* alone only *tarka* is possible. Supposing we see something at a distance in dark and say; It is a pillar or a man. Then we see a horse nearby; and as horses imply riders, we conclude that is a man. Here the horse is not a *dharma* or property of man, from which we could have inferred the man. What the *tarka* does here is the negation of the alternative pillar. But this argument of Udyotakara is obviously lame. For unless we are sure that it is a man we cannot negate that it is a pillar. But how could we have got that knowledge? Only with the help of horse through *tarka*. It is immaterial whether the *hetu* is a property (*dharma*) or cause (*kāraṇya*) or some other kind of mark or sign. If it cannot give us the *sādhya* that it is a man the possibility of a man being a pillar can never be negated.

Further, when Gautama used the word *kāranopapattitaḥ* in the *Sūtra* he means that *tarka* works with the law of causality, and an effect can be taken as the *dharma* of the cause.

If then through *tarka* alone it is possible to get the conclusion, if it is little different from *vyatirekavyāpti*, and if it can be used only in *anvayavyatireki* and *kevalavyatireki* inferences and not in *kevalānvaya*, is there sufficient reason to separate *tarka* and *vyatirekavyāpti* and treat the former as only as aid in establishing the latter by removing *vyabhicārāśāṅkā* or the doubt that the *hetu* may be present where the *sādhya* is present? The *vyāpti* which is common to both *vyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki* as given by Visvanādhā is the absence of *hetu* wherever there is absence of *sādhya*.⁸ But the form of *tarka* is: if there is no *sādhya* there would have been no *hetu*. One may say that as accepted by the latter Naiyāyikas it is not exactly of this form. Then it would be: If no *sādhya* then the *hetu* would not have been produced by it. We have already examined this form a little above; and we may add that even if it is of this form the meaning is the same, for that the *hetu* would not have been produced may mean also that there would not have been the *hetu*. Hence it is obvious that *tarka* is logically, though not always grammatically the same as *vyatirekavyāpti*.

All Naiyāyikas believe that *tarka*, is not an inference but only an aid. Curiously enough there are some among them who believe that *kevalavyatireki* by itself cannot lead to the conclusion but only by producing the *anvayavyāpti*. Then, we may say, as *anvayavyāpti* is the only *vyāpti*, *kevalavyatireki* is only, an aid, in obtaining it. This line of thinking also supports our contention that *tarka* and *kevalavyatireki* are not essentially different as Rāyanarasimha, in his *Prabhā*, a commentary on 'Muktāvalī' refers to the view of Acārya, who is probably Udayana,⁹ according

to which *samānādhikarānya* of *hetu* and *sādhya* is essential for all *vyāpti* and so *kevalavyatireki* would be that *Vyāpti* which is produced by the knowledge of *vyatirekavyāpti* unaccompanied by the knowledge of *anvavyāpti*.¹⁰ That is, *kevalānvayi* is that *vyāpti* which is produced by the *sahacāra jñāna* or the knowledge of the concomitance of the *hetu* and *sādhya*; *kevalavyatireki* is what is already defined; and *anvavyatireki* is the *vyāpti* produced by the knowledge of both types of concomitance. *Kevalvyatireki* by itself is no *vyāpti*.¹¹ We find thus that what Udyotakara says against *tarka* is practically said by Udayana against *kevalavyatireki*. The author of *Cintamani* also accepts this view, and even goes further to give the *vyatireka* an *anvayi* meaning by some twisting *vyāpti* according to him, may be interpreted as the concomitance of the *hetu*, which is the negation of the negation of the *hetu* whose negation is present wherever the negation of *sādhya* is present, with the negation of the negation of the *sādhya*.¹² This *vyāpti* which is really an *anvayi* is obtained (*gamya*) by the *vyatireki* inherent in it. It is quite apparent that definition is tortured. However, the feeling is there that the *anvayi* alone is the true *vyāpti*.

We have so far tried to show that *tarka* and *vyatirekavyāpti* are not essentially different. Then why do all the Naiyāyikas object to accepting that *tarka* is an inference? And why do some at least hesitate to say that the *vyatirekavyāpti* by itself can produce the conclusion? The argument advanced against *tarka*, as we have already seen, is that it does not involve the relation between the *linga* and *lingi* or *hetu* and *sādhya*. And what is the argument against the *Vyatireki*? It is practically the same, namely, the concomitance between *hetu* and the *sādhya* is expressed by the *anvayi* and not by the *vyatireki*. But we have already pointed out that it is not necessary for the *hetu*

to be a *dharma* or property of *sādhya*; it is enough if the former is a sign or something that goes invariably with the latter. Yet both *tarka* and *vyatireki* cannot give the conclusion as syllogism by themselves. Both presuppose *anvayavyāpti*. This defect has been noticed by Sriharṣa,¹³ who says that *tarka* is based upon *vyāpti*, and if the *vyāpti* is in need of the support of the same *tarka* there would be the fallacy of *anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence) and, we may add, if of another *tarka* infinite regress (*anavasthā*). For how can I know that *dhūmābhāva* or the negation of smoke is the *vyāpaka* (distributed over) *vahnnyabhāva* or the negation of fire? Or to put it in simpler language, when can I know that smoke cannot be found unless there is fire? Only when and after I know that wherever there is smoke there is fire. If there is any doubt about this positive *vyāpti*, I can never be sure of the *vyatireki*, for I still doubt whether there might not be smoke in the absence of fire. It is of no avail to bring in the concept of causality. For so long as this lasts one cannot be sure of the causal relation between fire and smoke, and one begins to question the causal relation itself. And taking the example of Western logic, unless I am sure that all men are mortals I can never be sure that non-mortals are non-men, and the latter can never help me in establishing the former.

It may probably said that though in these examples the *vyatireki* is dependent on the *anvayi*. It is so in all. When we infer *ātmā* or soul from *icchā* or desire, *ākāśa* or ether from *śabda* or sound, and *prithvi* or earth from *gandha* or smell, we do not have an *anvayavyāpti*. We cannot say wherever there is desire there is *ātmā*, because their concomitance or co-existence is not perceived and what the inference wants to establish is the reality itself of *ātmā*. This inference arises when we question whether there is an entity called *ātmā* at all. In such instances, it may be said *vyatireki* or *tarka* is absolutely necessary.

In answer it must at first be pointed out that those Naiyāyikas who hold that *kevalavyatireki* operates through *anvayi* have to say that in these instances in the *vyatireki* can operate through itself or that these inferences are no syllogisms. But no Naiyāyika seems to be prepared to accept the latter alternative. They invent some interpretation like that offered by the author of 'Cintāmani' and referred to above, which is really the *vyatireki* of *vyatireki*. But the objection against that would be that unless we know beforehand the *anvayi*, the *vyatireki* of its *vyatireki* cannot give us a knowledge of it. It would be like saying that though one has not seen an elephant he can get a knowledge of it from the negation of the negation of it. That the idea is absurd can be easily shown. If we do not know what an elephant is, how can we say, when a horse for instance is shown, that it is not an elephant? Again, only when we see the elephant can we negate the negation of the elephant. And now, how is the former alternative to be defended? If the inference is a syllogism the *vyatirekavyāpti* would be: whatever is not *ātma* is without *icchā*. But in the form of *tarka*, it would be. *Ichchā* would have been present even in what is not *ātma*. But the question would be asked: How is the *vyāpti* obtained? Is it true? Is the doubt or its falsity to be removed by *tarka* and what would that *tarka* be? The *Vyatireki* of the *Vyatireki* would be: That which is not without *icchā* is not *anātmā* or that which has *icchā* is *ātma*. Put in the form of *tarka*, it is; that which not without *icchā* would have been *anātmā* or that which has *icchā* would not have been *ātma*. But then this *tarka* is not helping to prove the exclusion but is assuming its truth. It is an undisguised *petitio principii*.

We may examine the position with less technicality. The *vyatireka-vyāpti* is: That which is not *ātma* is without *icchā*. But how can we know what is not *ātma* if we do not already know wha

is *ātmā*? It is not enough to know earth as earth, water as water and so forth; we have to know them as not-*ātmās*; and this knowledge is impossible unless we know as yet; and the inference is made to establish its reality for us. The *vyatirekavyāpti* would be true only if the *sādhya* is already established (*siddha*); and the *sādhya* would be *siddha* only if the *vyatirekavyāpti* is true. This mutual dependence completely undermines the validity of the *vyatirekāmumāna*.

In western logic we find the charge *petitio principii* brought against every syllogism. In the syllogism, all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal, it is said, the major premise cannot be true unless the conclusion is true and therefore assumes the truth of the conclusion. Some modern logicians have attempted to defend the syllogism against the charge. We need not take sides with either party here. But it should be noted that this objection is different from the one we bring against *kevalavyatireki*. Our contention is that this is not a syllogism at all, because it lacks the major premise *vyatirekavyāpti* cannot be formed unless we have an *anvayavyāpti* is, the former would be without a basis if latter is not already known.

Our objection holds good even in the classical example of Devadatta, which is interpreted as a syllogism by the Naiyāyikas. The *vyatirekavyāpti* is somewhat differently given in different works. As given by *Viśvanātha* and elaborated by *Rāyanarasimha* in his *Prabhā*¹⁴ it is: Every living being lives either in his house or outside, because he is living; one who is not either in his house or outside is not living. Then, every living being who is not in his house must be outside; Devadatta is such a one; therefore he is living outside.¹⁵ This inference really consists of two syllogisms. The major of the latter has the appearance of the *anvayai* the former is obviously a *vyatireki*. We have already

seen a slightly different form in the discussion of *samsayakāranaka arthāpatti*. There the Naiyāyika starts with the same form of disjunction, negates one of the alternatives through *tarka*, then frames an *anvayavyāpti*.¹⁶ Even the ordinary inference of fire from smoke may be expressed in this form: The mountain either contains or does not contain fire; if it does not contain fire there would have been no smoke. So the latter alternative is negated. Next, any mountain which is subject to these alternatives and has smoke must contain fire; this is such a mountain; hence it contains fire. In the first interpretation which belongs to the later Nyāya *vyatirekānumāna* leads to *anvayi*. In the second which belongs to the earlier schools *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* with help of *tarka* leads to *anvayi*. If we examine the logical structure of the arguments we find they are the same. But to those who hold that the *vyatireki* by itself can lead to the conclusion, it need not lead to the *anvayavyāpti*. It would be: Living Devadatta if he is not in his house, must be outside; for one who is not outside and not in his house cannot be living. It is like the inference. The element earth is different from the others, because it possesses smell for whatever is not different from the other elements does not possess smell. But whatever be the form of the argument, our objection against *tarka* and *vyatireki* holds.

On a critical examination of the definition of *vyāpti*, Raghunath rejects *vyatirekavyāpti* and the *kevalavyatireki* type of inference. His verdict runs counter to the Nyāya standpoint. He argues that the knowledge of *vyatireka* concomitance is not inference at all; it is entirely different from *anumiti*. The instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) responsible for the production of this knowledge is a distinct *pramāna*, viz., *Arthāpatti*.¹⁷

iii

There seems to be a tendency among some recent interpreters of *Arthāpti* to call it a disjunctive syllogism. When *Arthāpti* is reduced to the disjunctive - categorical syllogism, it would assume the form "Devadatta, who is alive, is either at home or is out. Devadatta is not at home. Therefore, he is out". The alternative negated in the categorical minor premise is not directly negated but only through *tarka* or *vyatirekavyāpti*. If I go to see Devadatta after ten years and do not find him in his house, I cannot jump immediately to the conclusion that he is living outside; he might be dead. And because the idea of his death conflicts with that of his hundred year life, which cannot be denied, we infer his existence outside. But his death is denied only through *tarka* or *vyatireki*. And we have shown that *tarka* or *vyatireki* is no syllogism.

But it may be asked; Apart from what the Naiyāyikas say, is it not possible to have a disjunctive syllogism here? Can we not give this interpretation independently? One may give an independent interpretation. But one must be also aware that the two alternatives cannot be obtained unless the doubt of death is removed. If I have the disjunction, Devadatta is either in his house or outside, and negate the first alternative I get the second. But as it is, the second alternative is not known; and if it is known there is no need of the syllogism. For we already know what we want to know. It may perhaps be said that the disjunction can be inferred from the example of a pot, as the Naiyāyikas do. Living Devadatta must be in his house or outside like the pot which is not destroyed is either in the house or outside. But how does one get the knowledge about the pot? From the observation of some other thing? And of this? From a fourth thing? But do we get our *vyāpti* like this? There is the more fundamental question: How can we know that an existent thing not found in one place

can be found in another? Unless this is known there can be no *vyāpti* for the Naiyāyikas, and without a *vyāpti* there is no syllogism, either disjunctive or categorical. That is why the Mīmāṃsakas say that Devadattas's existence can be inferred even when we do not have a *vyāpti*. When there is a *vyāpti* we of course have a syllogism. But when there is none too we have inference, which the Mīmāṃsakas call *Aathāpatti*. But when there is none the Naiyāyikas can have no inference, for inference according to them is only syllogism, which can never work without a *vyāpti*. (*Upamāna* or analogy may be called an inference, but one can easily see that the present inference is not an *Upamāna*). It is in order to have a *vyāpti* that some of them take *tarka* or *vyatirekas* aids. But as we have shown, they cannot be aids because they depend on the *vyāpti* which they want to establish. And this defect we pointed out even in the view that *vyatireki* can given the conclusion by itself. If through *Arthāpatti* it is possible to have the conclusion without having recourse to *vyāpti*, it would be illogical to resort to the latter. It would be like framing a major premise for the inference, A is to the right of B, B is to the right of C, and so A is to the right of C. After we know that Devadatta is outside, if we still want to infer it, our thinking would be like the inference from the perceptual judgment, It is red; which would be of the form: It is either red or not red; if it is not red, then it will have to be both red and not red, which is absurd; therefore it is red.

We may add therefore that even if we are sure that Devadatta is not dead, there is a need of some thought process, which cannot be syllogism, to infer his existence outside. At a certain stage of mental development all know that things are not dead or destroyed, if they do not exist in the house, must exist outside. But before that stage when the outside existence of things is inferred, it can

only be through *Arthāpatti*. As a matter of fact, examples like these are not typical. At the state of mental development when we can discuss logic such examples appear to be no postulations. One may ask: Is it not quite an ordinary fact that existent things not seen in one place must be found in another? The significance of *Arthāpatti* is seen only when we have typical postulation. And postulation cannot be turned into syllogism. The Naiyāyika inference of *ātmā* from *icchā* is a better example. Here the existence of *ātmā* is postulated, the reality of which they may be doubted. But the *vyāpti*, *yannaivam tannaivam* or that which is no *ātmā* has no *icchā* is meaningless. For how do we know what is not *ātmā* when we have not yet known what *ātmā* is? So there is here really no *vyāpti*. Yet one may ask oneself. Can I attribute *icchā* to the earth: No. To the element water? No. Then after all the known *dravyas* are exhausted we might say: There might be another *dravya* which we may call *ātmā*. But this type of thinking is simple postulation and not syllogism. One may frame a syllogism if one likes after the *ātmā* is postulated. But first, it is unnecessary; and secondly, when through a particular form of thinking we can obtain a conclusion without *vyāpti*, we have to recognise its speciality. To refute the Mīmāṃsaka position it is incumbent on the Naiyāyika to prove that there can be no inference, not merely no syllogism, without *vyāpti*. This he cannot. But the Mīmāṃsaka, whose burden it is to show that there are inferences without *vyāpti*, has proved his case.

iv

The two systems of PūrvaMīmāṃsa and Advaita consider *Arthāpatti* as an independent and distinct source of knowledge because in their view this *pramāṇa* provides us with the knowledge of, certain facts which no other *pramāṇa* can explain to us. The Mīmāṃsakas frequently use *Arthāpatti* for explaining the Vedic

texts by supposing missing words and meanings without which the texts cannot be correctly understood. The Mīmāṃsakas also base their beliefs on *Arthāpatti* in such cases as survival of self after death. The Advaita Vedāntins themselves used *Arthāpatti* not simply for explaining facts of finite experience like the stoutness of a man who does not eat during the day or the absence of Devadatta from home, but also for arriving at philosophical categories like that of power or *shakti*. Their main argument may be stated thus: something, as e.g. germ growing into a tree or *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice leading to heaven, would be unexplained or *anupapanna* if there were no supposition of power.

The Advaitins also find this method useful for explaining the Vedānta texts. For example, the Upanisads sometimes speak of the creation of world by Brahman and out of Brahman; but sometimes they teach that there is no multiplicity, Brahman being the only Reality. This conflict is removed by supposing that creation is not a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman. It is only an apparent change (*vivarta*) just like the appearance of a rope as a snake. Therefore a new type of objectivity is postulated called *māyā*, which is neither real nor unreal. For the hypothesis of *anirvacanīya* there can really be no *vyāpti*. The inference of the movement of the sun, which is sometimes given as an example of *sāmānyatodruṣṭa*, is also a better example than that about Devadatta. Modern science denies that movement. However, if we accept its truth for argument's sake, we may say it is more fitting. Here also there is no real *vyāpti*, though one may be framed and instances may be given. It is of course not as good as an example as the above two. In modern science we get better examples. The postulation of ether as the medium of sound is one. The philosophy the Absolute is inferred as the ultimate postulate of our experience is the result of *Arthāpatti*. And the best example is the proof itself of the law of contradiction, which

would be: If the principle is not true, even the proof to disprove it will not be true.

Generally we postulate a principle or entity in order to explain some facts or to remove some contradiction. And as even syllogism is based on the principle of contradiction, it may be interpreted as postulation also. This is what is called the *reductio* and *absurdum* proof. Even in the ordinary example, if the truth of "Socrates is not mortal" is not accepted, then the proposition, "All men are mortal", would be false. Hence its truth must be postulated. This point is noticed by the Mīmāṃsakas, who say that, if fire is inferred from smoke without the help of *vyāpti*, the thought process would be *Arthāpatti*.¹⁸ Thus wherever there is a syllogism we may discover *Arthāpatti*; but in every *Arthāpatti* we cannot discover a syllogism.

The Advaitins use this method also in supposing some unperceived facts and principles for explaining experienced facts. For example, they suppose the existence of an objectless blissful consciousness during dreamless sleep, in order to explain the memory we have on rising from such a sleep when we say "I had a comfortable sleep; I did not know anything then". We can, again, trace this method of postulation in the supposition (made by the Advaitins for explaining the world and empirical experience) that the six things viz. the individual, God (*Īśvara*) pure consciousness, *māyā*, the difference between the individual and God, and the relation between *māyā* and pure consciousness, are all beginningless. In fact, all necessary and indispensable suppositions, such as power or potential energy in things necessary for explaining their effects, the law of *karma* necessary for explaining the otherwise inexplicable good and bad lucks of persons, and the existence of God,¹⁹ for explaining the distribution

of fruits in accordance with an individual's actions, etc., are cases of *Arthāpatti*. It has thus a very wide scope.

The value of *Arthāpatti* as providing a methodological basis of the common process of arriving at new knowledge by reading of complex passages should be taken cognisance of, it is undeniable that we do that we knew valid and useful knowledge in this way. I do not know if western logic has tried to explain how this is possible in the actual process of reading without reducing the actual sentence structure to cut and dried artificial forms. At least this is that no one waits for this cumbersome reduction process for feeling certain of his newly acquired knowledge. It seems that as the complex proposition unrolls itself from point to point before my reading eyes these meanings of factual or relational import go on meeting together or parting from each other and in this growing process some elements partly contradict other elements till the final meaning of the sentence as a whole flashes out in the same general way as we find in the classical examples of *Arthāpatti*. This interpretation is not altogether original with me for the Mīmāṃsākas recognise one particular form of *Srutarthāpatti* e.g. *Abhidhanārthāpatti*, in which the meaning of a spoken word like "door" is understood by the hearer by means of *Arthāpatti*.

In *Arthāpatti* the point is that the presumed fact is an aid to resolve the difficulty or conflict and not something which we should all pride in having discovered it a new. Here our consciousness is not that 'we have cognised new fact' as that 'we have overcome a difficult' or untied a knot. This situation of *Arthāpatti* does not call for the cognition of facts but demand the resolution of discrepancies.

Originally, *Arthāpatti* must have served as an instrument of resolving conflict - both linguistic and factual - in the Vedic

texts. The Vedic texts present numerous conflicting situations, both verbal and factual. The Brahman is *Saguṇa*, and the *Brahman* is *Nirguṇa*? Now the question: Is Brahman *Sarguṇa* or *Nirguṇa*? Here is a situation that calls for the resolution of conflict and he resolves the conflict by presuming a fact the '*Nirguṇa*' means not devoid of qualities as such but 'devoid of bad qualities only'. The state of mind of a man who offers such a solution through presumption is not that he has cognised a new fact that 'Brahman is devoid of bad qualities'. The *Īśāvāsya upaniṣad* says that 'Brahman never moves (*anejat*), 'it is swifter than the mind'. 'It is stationary', but 'it surpasses all fast moving bodies'. Similarly upaniṣads construe Brahman as the creator of the world and sometimes they maintain that there is no plurality, and Brahman is the only reality.

One who is convinced that the *śruti* does not teach at one place one view and at another place another view, diametrically opposed to one another, but teaches one and the same doctrine, has to show by interpreting that the differences, we witness the *śruti* texts are not real but only apparent. The followers of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* being convinced that all texts in *śruti* teach the same doctrine were constrained to find harmony underlying the apparently conflicting passages of different *śruti* texts. In other words they had to resolve the conflicts and contradictions in the *śruti* texts which they did by presuming the missing words and missing facts wherever necessary. *Arthāpatti* is the principle on the basis of which they could make *śruti* self consistent.

Viewed in this way *Arthāpatti* is not so much an instrument of cognition as that of resolving discrepancies or that which helps us see unity and harmony in the midst of the apparently discrete facts. Committed to the interpretation of Vedic texts and confronted

with problem of reconciling the conflicting views in them none (others) would have felt the need for *Arthāpatti* more than the followers of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Because of its importance, *Arthāpatti*, the principle of resolving discrepancies must have been accepted as an instrument of cognition, subsequently.

It must, however, be stated that the cognitive aspect is not altogether alien to *Arthāpatti*. In a sense it could be interpreted as an instrument of cognition. One can meaningfully ask as to what one knows from the given facts: 'Devadatta is alive' and 'he is not present in the house' and claim that his presumption 'he exists outside the house' has given him the knowledge that 'he exists outside the house'. But in a situation like this our problem is what do you do? How would you solve or resolve this difficulty and not how would you know. The actual problem to be explained is 'living Devadatta's non-existence in the house' which is sought to be solved by the presumption that 'he exists outside the house'. is, thus, and not establishing or knowing that 'he exists outside the house'. The burden of *Arthāpatti* the resolution of discrepancy between the conflicting facts. The intellectual process involved in the instances of *Arthāpatti* are those of 'deciding', 'explaining', 'reconciling', 'harmonising', 'compromising', 'settling' and not of cognising. Here the transition of our thought is from inconsistency to consistency, from conflict to harmony, from disquiet to quietude, from anxiety to rest.

v

For the reasons stated above we may say ²⁰ that *Arthāpatti* can best be interpreted as the transcendental method of Kant or the dialectic of Hegel. In both there is the postulation of something new in order to reconcile some conflict, to remove some contradiction and explain some facts. For Kant the ideas

of reason are the unconditioned ground of all reasoning, which appear as if they can be obtained through an infinite series of pro-syllogisms. But this is really only a way of saying; for no one can exhaust this infinite series in order to reach the infinite ground, which therefore must only be a postulate. The so called ontological proof for the existence of God, as interpreted by the Hegelians, is of this type. Similarly, the categories are deduced by Kant as postulates or hypothesis; and though his proof is called deduction it is hardly syllogism. The movement of Hegel's dialectic from Being to Nothing, and then to Becoming and so forth, is a kind of postulation. Being through self-contradiction collapses into Nothing, and Nothing similarly into Being, and this collapsing into each other settles down into Becoming. But this settling down is only momentary, for process begins again with Becoming. That is, Nothing is freed of contradiction in Being and Being in Nothing, and this contradiction between Being and Nothing is removed by Becoming. Thus each category is posited or postulated in order to remove a contradiction.

It may be interesting to note that the specific logical nature of *Arthāpatti* is neither exactly the same as that of immediate inference, nor of syllogism, nor of inference either of the Western type or of Indian type. Syllogisms are by nature subsumptive. *Arthāpatti* is not a subsumptive process. There is only a general formal similarity of it with dialectic. One may describe if one likes, *Arthāpatti* as factual dialectic. One fact is partially contradicted by another fact and the contradiction is finally resolved by a piece of knowledge of factual import.

Randle makes a suggestion which I think is worthy of consideration. He criticises the Naiyāyikas for not realising the constructive or synthetic character of genuine *Arthāpatti* and suggests that the implication present in it is within a system and

is therefore truly relation. He gives also an illustrative example from geometrical construction in which new positive truth arises by implication in the concrete new positive truth arises by implication in the concrete character of a system. I am disposed to render Randle's suggestion in a slightly different from and to that when in the first stage of *Arthāpatti* doubt appears in the form of two contradictory facts a relational system is actively present in the background of the mind and what really precipitates the valid knowledge of the new explanatory fact is the specific relation of the contradictory fact within this system.

According to B.N. Seal the difference of the general philosophical position between Hume and Kant may be said to rest on the application of an *Arthāpatti*. Over against fact of finite experience as obtained through series of sense impressions stands such general notions as causality. The element of contradiction involved is sought to be removed by Hume by rejection of the ontological validity of the general notions. In the same situation Kant on the other hand proceeds to reason on the line of *Arthāpatti*. Accepting the validity of both discrete sense elements and of general notions he comes to his transcendental deductions. The line of procedure is analogous to that in *Arthāpatti*. From the consequent to the only possible antecedent without which it cannot be explained. We have stated that the conclusion in *Arthāpatti* is a function of the nature of the partial contradictories in mutual relation. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire how would Kant's transcendental implication stand modified if the facts were regarded in other than Human tradition of absolute difference of body and mind. The objective idealism of Hegel can be said to be the result of an *Arthāpatti* in which the basic facts of the arguments have been so changed.

I feel tempted to indulge in a little generalisation to say that *Arthāpatti* may be very rightly accepted as a proper method of philosophising. the truth that we aim at arriving by this process in such as cannot be attained by perception or inference which being finite experience or being based on finite experience cannot give us such truth. Intuition has been called into supply the required method, but it has hardly been able to satisfy the reasoning proclivity of man. Reasoning is too vague and wide term. Transcendental logic has been offered as the proper method of philosophy since the time of Kant. Our *Arthāpatti* comes very close to it. It seems to me, however, that *Arthāpatti* gives a better account of the process involved in the attainment of philosophical truth than the Western transcendental logic. In the first place in its relatedness to scientific hypothesis it may hope to bring philosophy and science in the same line. In the second place in insisting on the importance of the nature of the facts which present apparent contradiction for the correctness of the transcendental conclusion, it may put a curb to wild speculation in philosophy. In the third place it gives a sort of logical analysis of the process of transcendence itself.

Philosophy would appear from the point of view of our interpretation on the full realisation of the relational system which the partially contradictory aspects of experience suggest by their inner necessity and which lying as the reality in the background of our finite and limited experience in making us wonder and doubt.

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1. Śastra – dīpikā, p. 79.
2. Ibid. p.78.
3. Nyāyakusumānjali, III.19.
4. Ibid. III. 19.
5. Jagadīśi, p.904.
6. Nyāyadarsana I, i.40 Avijnanātatatve art
karanopapathitaḥ tattva jñā nārthamūhas tarkah.
7. Nyāyavārtikam, p.142 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Seri
Benaras).
8. Kārikāvali , p.480.
9. Ibid. p.795.
10. Op.cit.
11. Op.cit.
12. Jagadīśi Tīkā p.844, Sādhyabhavavyāp
– sādhanābhavā bhavena sādhanena sādhyābhāvas
sādhyasya sādhanāt.
13. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍkhāḍya, p.623.
14. Kārikāvali, p.796.
15. Here I am not using the Naiyāyika form of syllogism v
five steps.
16. Jagadīśi Tīkā, p.905.
17. Dīdhiḥ, Kevalānvayi section.

18. Jagadīśi Tīkā, p.916.
19. Vide Samkara on Br.Sūt. 32- 38.
20. Thought and Reality, Part V.

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